Decade of Record Deficits & A Vulnerable Business Cycle
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Summary
Federal budget deficits need to be analyzed nowadays in the context of how much it is propping up the economic growth cycle because after a decade of record federal deficits the current business cycle would ran out of gas without [...]
Federal budget deficits need to be analyzed nowadays in the context of how much it is propping up the economic growth cycle because after a decade of record federal deficits the current business cycle would ran out of gas without ongoing federal borrowing to support public and private sector spending and activities.
The current decade-long business cycle has received unprecedented support from the federal government. For example, in the last 10 years the federal budget deficit averaged $830 billion per year, and the cumulative deficits of the past decade have exceeded the budget deficits in the previous 50 years combined by nearly $2 trillion.
Measured in relation to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the annual budget deficit in the past decade averaged 4.8%. That's the first time in the post war period that during an economic growth cycle the scale of the budget deficit exceeded the annual growth (4%) of nominal GDP.
Federal budget deficits require the US Treasury to borrow money from the financial markets because the revenue intake is insufficient to meet all of its financial obligations. At various times these deficits help pay for all of the programs and agencies of the federal government, grants to individuals, businesses and state and local governments, interest payments and enable businesses and individuals to pay less in taxes than what otherwise would occur. In the end, the federal deficit represents excess spending, funded by the US Treasury, which eventually finds it's way directly or indirectly into the economy.
The decade-long growth cycle might appear that monetary and fiscal policymakers have become so adroit that it can offset every potential dip in economic activity and create an endless and uninterrupted expansion. That would be a mistake. The right question that needs to be asked is whether efforts by policymakers to extend the cycle has increased it vulnerabilities? One area of potential vulnerability has to be the scale of continuous support from federal deficits to finance public and private spending.
To be fair, federal budget deficits have been a common feature of business cycles, but over the course of economic growth cycles deficits have tended to narrow and in some cases disappear. In fact, at the end of the two long expansions of the 1960s and the 1990s the federal government budget recorded a surplus. In the fiscal year ending on September 30th, the US recorded a $984 billion budget deficit (4.6% of GDP), a clear sign that in its 10thyear of expansion the current cycle is still heavily dependent on support from the federal sector.
The question is not whether these relatively large deficits can continue but what happens if they do? Based on current policies, the Congressional Budget Office projects that annual budget deficits will average $1.2 trillion a year over the next decade, or 4.7% of GDP, essentially the same scale in relation to the economy of the past decade.
Fiscal policy was always a tool to be used to support the economy from its faults, bad decisions and imprudence. Throughout the post war period fiscal policy has been reactive at times, but it has never been so accommodating for so long.
Conventional wisdom nowadays says deficits don't matter, but that ignores the "vulnerability" of the current business cycle being so dependent on federal deficits.
Consider the collapse of a building after an earthquake strikes. The most probable cause of the building falling to the ground was the shock from the earthquake, but the underlying cause could well be a faulty foundation. The building was able remain standing as long as no shock came along.
It is always difficult to predict what "shock" could trigger the next recession, but the reliance on federal deficits to support public and private spending should draw attention to the structural weakness of the current cycle. At present, the US economy is vulnerable to any type of shock, and fiscal policy is in a uncertain position as it cannot reverse course and introduce fiscal drag into an economy so dependent on budget deficits, nor is it in a position to help moderate the effects of a shock if one occurs. Policymakers understand that they cannot prevent every recession, but large budget deficits add instability to a weak economic environment, raising the odds of a bad outcome.
Viewpoint commentaries are the opinions of the author and do not reflect the views of Haver Analytics.Joseph G. Carson
AuthorMore in Author Profile »Joseph G. Carson, Former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein. Joseph G. Carson joined Alliance Bernstein in 2001. He oversaw the Economic Analysis team for Alliance Bernstein Fixed Income and has primary responsibility for the economic and interest-rate analysis of the US. Previously, Carson was chief economist of the Americas for UBS Warburg, where he was primarily responsible for forecasting the US economy and interest rates. From 1996 to 1999, he was chief US economist at Deutsche Bank. While there, Carson was named to the Institutional Investor All-Star Team for Fixed Income and ranked as one of Best Analysts and Economists by The Global Investor Fixed Income Survey. He began his professional career in 1977 as a staff economist for the chief economist’s office in the US Department of Commerce, where he was designated the department’s representative at the Council on Wage and Price Stability during President Carter’s voluntary wage and price guidelines program. In 1979, Carson joined General Motors as an analyst. He held a variety of roles at GM, including chief forecaster for North America and chief analyst in charge of production recommendations for the Truck Group. From 1981 to 1986, Carson served as vice president and senior economist for the Capital Markets Economics Group at Merrill Lynch. In 1986, he joined Chemical Bank; he later became its chief economist. From 1992 to 1996, Carson served as chief economist at Dean Witter, where he sat on the investment-policy and stock-selection committees. He received his BA and MA from Youngstown State University and did his PhD coursework at George Washington University. Honorary Doctorate Degree, Business Administration Youngstown State University 2016. Location: New York.