Global| Feb 04 2021Fiscal Stimulus: How Much Is Too Much? Boom/Bust!
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Summary
Suppose Congress passes something close to Biden's Administration stimulus proposal of $1.9 trillion. In that case, that will lift the cumulative amount of fiscal stimulus in the past 12 months to $5 trillion---three tranches $2.2 [...]
Suppose Congress passes something close to Biden's Administration stimulus proposal of $1.9 trillion. In that case, that will lift the cumulative amount of fiscal stimulus in the past 12 months to $5 trillion---three tranches $2.2 trillion, $900 billion, and $1.9 trillion.
In the past year, nominal GDP totaled $21 trillion, so the cumulative injection of fiscal stimulus amounts to almost 25%.
Nothing in modern times comes close, especially during peace times. CBO published a report in 2010 on the military costs of significant wars. The military war costs of World War 1 amounted to 13.6% of GDP and World War 11 35.8%----so the current spending/stimulus is in the middle of the two World Wars.
During World Wars, activity in the private sector is depressed. That's not the case today. The housing sector is booming, with housing starts at the highest levels in 15 years, and prices are rising double-digit to record levels. At the same time, the manufacturing sector is experiencing a mini-boom in orders and production.
Given the scale of fiscal stimulus, one would expect the Fed to be thinking of "leaning against the wind." But not this Fed--the Fed is using the same playbook from the Great Financial Recession, providing unneeded stimulus to the red-hot housing market.
What's the economic and financial endgame? It's hard to see anything but a "boom-bust" scenario playing out with fast growth and rising market interest rates in 2021 and early 2022, followed by a bust in late 2022/23 when the fiscal stimulus/support dries up.
The US experienced mild recessions following the sharp drop in government military spending after the Korean and Vietnam wars----and back then, the scale of military expenditures amounted between 2% and 4% of GDP. The "sugar-high" today is unprecedented, raising the odds of a harder landing.
Viewpoint commentaries are the opinions of the author and do not reflect the views of Haver Analytics.
Joseph G. Carson
AuthorMore in Author Profile »Joseph G. Carson, Former Director of Global Economic Research, Alliance Bernstein. Joseph G. Carson joined Alliance Bernstein in 2001. He oversaw the Economic Analysis team for Alliance Bernstein Fixed Income and has primary responsibility for the economic and interest-rate analysis of the US. Previously, Carson was chief economist of the Americas for UBS Warburg, where he was primarily responsible for forecasting the US economy and interest rates. From 1996 to 1999, he was chief US economist at Deutsche Bank. While there, Carson was named to the Institutional Investor All-Star Team for Fixed Income and ranked as one of Best Analysts and Economists by The Global Investor Fixed Income Survey. He began his professional career in 1977 as a staff economist for the chief economist’s office in the US Department of Commerce, where he was designated the department’s representative at the Council on Wage and Price Stability during President Carter’s voluntary wage and price guidelines program. In 1979, Carson joined General Motors as an analyst. He held a variety of roles at GM, including chief forecaster for North America and chief analyst in charge of production recommendations for the Truck Group. From 1981 to 1986, Carson served as vice president and senior economist for the Capital Markets Economics Group at Merrill Lynch. In 1986, he joined Chemical Bank; he later became its chief economist. From 1992 to 1996, Carson served as chief economist at Dean Witter, where he sat on the investment-policy and stock-selection committees. He received his BA and MA from Youngstown State University and did his PhD coursework at George Washington University. Honorary Doctorate Degree, Business Administration Youngstown State University 2016. Location: New York.