Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Robert Brusca

Robert A. Brusca is Chief Economist of Fact and Opinion Economics, a consulting firm he founded in Manhattan. He has been an economist on Wall Street for over 25 years. He has visited central banking and large institutional clients in over 30 countries in his career as an economist. Mr. Brusca was a Divisional Research Chief at the Federal Reserve Bank of NY (Chief of the International Financial markets Division), a Fed Watcher at Irving Trust and Chief Economist at Nikko Securities International. He is widely quoted and appears in various media.   Mr. Brusca holds an MA and Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University and a BA in Economics from the University of Michigan. His research pursues his strong interests in non aligned policy economics as well as international economics. FAO Economics’ research targets investors to assist them in making better investment decisions in stocks, bonds and in a variety of international assets. The company does not manage money and has no conflicts in giving economic advice.

Publications by Robert Brusca

  • Consumer sentiment in the United Kingdom fell in May of 2022 dropping to its lowest reading since 1996 when the GfK survey began. GfK consumer sentiment in May fell to a level of -40 from -38 in April. The reading had been at -31 in March it has fallen steadily over the past six months. The GfK metric average is -19 over 12-months. -28 over 6-months and -36 over 3-months. Sentiment in the U.K. has been steadily falling.

    What is most disturbing about the U.K. sentiment figures is that this is a new low, meaning that it is even below the low levels reached when COVID struck and also below the low levels for sentiment during the period of Brexit uncertainty. These are two recent major events quite apart from the recessions run since 1996 that occurred over this span, and, in May, with a lot of uncertainty and global issues in the mix, the U.K. now shows the lowest sentiment reading on record. This is a rating that's competing with some pretty stiff company historically for 'worst ever,' making the new low against this competition is a disturbing phenomenon.

    Including the headline there are 13 readings in the table for sentiment. Of these 13 readings eight of them declined on the month in May three of them improved and two of them were unchanged. This compares to April when ten fell and three rose and to March when eight of them fell and five rose. The clear tilt has been for more of the components to show weakness than strength each month. The headline has declined for six months in a row. So sentimentally U.K. has seen a very steady ongoing erosion. OF course some of the reading that rise recollect bad news such as for inflation, expected inflation and expected unemployment. Over the last six months of these 3 categories (inflation expected inflation and expected unemployment) there are 18 observations of which 13 have gotten worse month to month.

    Turning to the standings most of the readings are weak. The exception, of course, is the ranking for CPI inflation over the last 12 months which is in its 99th percentile as well as expectations for the CPI over the next 12 months which is also in its 99th percentile. Another exception that is unfortunate is the 74.7 percentile standing for unemployment expected over the next 12 months. That's a relatively high standing. We can take it as an 'approximation' of people's fear of recession. After that, the next highest reading is the current reading for savings which has a 54.6 percentile standing, just above its historic median.

    The remaining indicators show extreme weakness. I refer you to the table to see the specific numbers but the percentile standings for the range of observations not yet discussed consist of a range from a high at the 22nd percentile to a low at the 0.3 percentile. All of these are undeniably weak and clearly and substantially below the median reading that occurs at a ranking of 50th percentile for each category. The household financial situation is weak the environment for making major purchases also is weak and that environment has worsened in each of the last three months, and it's part of a string of weakening that extends back for the last six months.

    Looking at the last 12-months the environment for making a major purchase and the general economic situation for 12-months ahead have both worsened for five months in a row. The household financial situation ticked up slightly in May after three consecutive months of falling significantly in each of those months

    Looking ahead to other metrics for the next 12 months, prospects for unemployment have been rising or unchanged for six months in a row, a chilling development.

    Confidence expressed by general income classes the 'lower' and the 'upper' income classes show little difference with both of them giving extremely low rankings. Upper income class sentiment has fallen in four of the last five months and lower income class sentiment has fallen in four the last six months.

    The GfK barometer is worrisome. It's worrisome because it competes with some bad events and still gives us a weaker reading than any of those historic events. It comes with the Bank of England fighting a very difficult inflation fight along with other global central banks. It comes at a time when there is a war being waged by Russia on Ukraine that is straining the global economy. It's a war that Russia is using to degrade global feedstock and to spread hunger and panic globally because countries will not roll over and accept its desire to dominate and control Ukraine.

    This may not be a situation that qualifies as a 'World War'. But this is a situation in which there are two countries at war and one of them is acting to put the entire world in a disadvantaged state by helping to drive up oil prices, other commodity prices, and by purposely depriving non-combatant countries access to needed food stocks. The impact on low income developing countries is going to be severe. There will be hunger. Some will die of hunger. All of this comes because Russia refuses to abide by the Budapest memorandum which had signed, pledging to defend Ukraine's borders. And further because of its refusal to abide by Post War conventions that outlawed cross border incursions to seize territory. It is still not clear how China, a country that lays strong territorial claims to Taiwan, is absorbing the news of how the world has come together to defend Ukraine. However, the impact of these global events on U.K. consumer sentiment is nothing short of disastrous.

  • United Kingdom
    | May 18 2022

    UK Inflation Jumps

    The Office of National Statistics (ONS) in the UK reports that inflation accelerated to 9% in April from 7% in March. This puts inflation at the highest rate since the series began in January of 1989 and the statistical authorities say that it would have last been last higher sometime around 1982- that puts UK inflation at a 40-year high.

    In the table above we memorialize the CPIH rate which is currently at 6.3% year-over-year with a core reading of 5.2%. This gauge accelerates from 12-months to 6-months to 3-months both in terms of the headline and in terms of the core rate where the core is the CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco.

    The rise in inflation is creating plenty of blowback pressure on both the Bank of England which is being accused of moving too slowly and on the administration of Boris Johnson that has been under fire for several different reasons. Inflation, when it rises, becomes a political problem for just about everybody involved. Let the finger-pointing begin!

    For its part, the Bank of England has expected inflation to accelerate; at its recent meeting it looked for inflation to rise to about 9% in April and it looks for some further increases in the coming months and for inflation to peak somewhere around 10% in the fourth quarter. What we see from the BOE apparently is the same tact taken in the US where the Fed seems to be raising interest rates steadily with intent to corral and eventually control inflation. But the plan does not seem to be to jump rates up to create a more traditional ‘positive real interest rate’ based on the current level of inflation. Central bankers are being more cognizant of the impact of rate hikes on growth- for better or for worse.

    Inflation is a global phenomenon and there's not too much debate about that. Highly developed economies that are not suffering an inflation problem are unusual, Japan is the best example of it. Japan is a country that has had a challenging time getting inflation up to its inflation target for some time so it's not surprising that in an inflationary environment Japan would be the country that doesn't run much of an inflation rate. However, Japan now has the problem of a sinking exchange rate which should encourage more inflation and could change this calculus.

    Inflation in the UK shows that inflation has accelerated in March compared to February with the diffusion reading of 54.5. This diffusion reading is constructed by taking all the accelerations of inflation across product categories month-to-month and half of the observations that are unchanged as a percentage of an 11-category framework that includes the 10 categories in the table plus the core as if it were a separate observation. This diffusion rating marks an increase from the 45.5 percent logged in February and compares to the 54.5 level logged in January. Inflation diffusion measures have been slightly pro-inflation (above 50%). Diffusion is the metric that compares the number of industries where inflation is accelerating to the number of industries where inflation is decelerating. However, the presence of inflation itself is clear with the headline of 1% in March compared to a monthly rise of 0.5% in February and 0.5% in January. The core rate is up 0.8% in March compared to 0.4% in February and 0.6% in January. Inflation diffusion may not be mushrooming but inflation itself is entrenched at an elevated level and showing an ongoing tendency to rise further, even is that tendency is slight in diffusion terms. A less discussed aspect of diffusion is that UK inflation is already very high and is not backing down in many categories after rising.

    Inflation diffusion over broad time horizons shows that inflation had accelerated very broadly but has since reduced its breadth. Over 12-months for example inflation has risen in 90% of the categories compared to the inflation rate of 12 months ago. Over 6- months once again inflation is up in 91% of the categories compared to the increase in inflation over 12-months. But then over 3-months inflation is up in only 54.5% of the categories compared to its 6-month pace. However, as we showed at the very beginning all these inflation rates, the headline, and the core rates, accelerate from 12-months to 6-months to 3-months despite diminishing breadth.

    The Bank of England is taking steps to head off inflation just as the Federal Reserve has been taking steps in the US while the European Central Bank is only making plans to head off inflation. Because the pandemic struck globally every country at about the same time there was a squashing of demand and then a ballooning of demand everywhere on the same timeline. The increase in demand has been particularly concentrated in the goods sector creating excess demands and shortages and interacting with supply chain problems that developed first in the wake of the pandemic and then, that have been exacerbated, by the war waged by Russia against Ukraine. Fiscal and monetary policy were used to try to soften the blow from the pandemic but in combination with the excess demand this has proved a potent brew to slake the thirst of inflation.

    Central banks now have a daunting task to try to get the toothpaste back in the tube after an extended period of price stability- one in which inflation was not only low but for an extended period inflation was too low undershooting central banks targets. Historians eventually will decide whether central banks compensated too much for their past undershooting or whether they simply made errors in trying to offset the weakness in the pandemic and forgot to account for the stimulus from fiscal policy. Another potential aspect of policy error is simply that everybody in the world was on the same business cycle with exactly the same things going on and the stress of demand on supply was just simply too great.

    In the meantime, however, central banks must make policy. The Bank of England is raising rates the Fed is raising rates the ECB is making plans. Countries are recovering from COVID and they're also just a little more than a decade distant from the Great Recession where a great deal of damage was done to economies. In the mid-1970s when inflation grew and mushroomed there was a national consensus that inflation had been too high for too long and there was a will to bear the cost to reduce inflation to a more sustainable level. Now, however, central bankers struggle with inflation and with the timeline for controlling it. They also face less political support and even political opposition. That makes the job of central banks much harder.

    When inflation becomes a problem for the public it becomes a problem for politicians. However, absent inflation, politicians tend to prefer pro-growth policies and will pressure central banks to create an environment that will create more growth. However, when that strategy backfires and inflation goes up, politicians will be the first to wash their hands of responsibility and to blame the central banks and the fiscal authorities for their unreasonable and outrageous behavior. How could you, sir! Such is the state of the world in which we live the pressures and the realities that central banks now face and must deal with. These also are global realities.

  • Industrial output among EMU members fell by 1.8% month-to-month in March following a 0.5% increase in February and a 0.8% decline in January. The corresponding S&P Global manufacturing PMI index for these three months shows declines in March and February but an increase in January.

    Looking across the countries in the table, there are 13 European Monetary Union members and three non-EMU members. We see output declines in nine countries as of March. This is a step up from 6 declines in February and it compares to 8 declines in January.

    Sequential growth rates show that six of the countries in the table have decelerating output over three months, only two have decelerating output over six months and five have decelerating output over 12 months.

    The consolidated figures by sector showed that overall European Monetary Union output declines by 0.9% over 12 months, increases at a 1.2% annual rate over six months but then declines sharply at an 8.1% annual rate over three months. Quarter-to-date, output is rising at a 3.7% annual rate- with today’s report the first quarter data are complete on a preliminary basis. Manufacturing output in the quarter-to-date is even stronger, rising at a 5% annual rate. Looking at sector trends, the consumer sector shows output up at a 13.3% annual rate, led by a 15.1% annual increase for consumer nondurables compared to a 4% annual rate of increase for consumer durables in the quarter-to-date. Intermediate goods output rises at a 1.4% pace while capital goods output is falling at a 0.5% pace.

    The sequential growth rates for sectors show clear cut acceleration for consumer durable goods output. Consumer nondurable goods output looks healthy but fails to go over the bar to have consistent acceleration since there's a small step back over six months but the three-month growth rate at a 12.3% pace is well ahead of its 12-month growth rate of 2.8%. Intermediate goods output falls over 12 months by 0.2%, runs flat over six months, and then falls at a 5.9% annual rate over three months. Capital goods output, similarly, falls over 12 months by 2.9%, marks an increase at a 2.7% pace over six months, then falls very sharply at a 21.2% annual rate over three months. These data show relatively healthy increases in the consumer sector with uneven or weakening trends for intermediate goods and capital goods with some severe encroaching weakness for capital goods.

    Capital goods not only show that output is lower in the quarter, when compared to the pre-COVID level, output is also lower- that is over two years ago. Capital goods output is down 5.7% from its level in January 2020. All the other industrial sectors show increases. This decline in capital goods is enough to knock manufacturing output down by 0.4% on the same timeline well overall industrial output falls by zero point 7% on the same timeline.

    Going back to country details of the 13 reporting European Monetary Union countries, six of them have declining output in the quarter-to-date; however, none of the declines are among the four largest EMU economies Germany, France, Italy, or Spain.

    Five EMU countries still have levels of output that are below their levels of January 2020 before the virus struck. These include Germany, France, Malta, Luxembourg, and Portugal. In addition, non-EMU member, the U.K., has output lower by 0.5% on this timeline and Norway has output lower by 0.8% on this timeline.

  • The French trade deficit slipped deeper into the red ink zone in March at €14.4 billion compared to €12.5 billion in February. The deficit has eroded gradually over the year with a 12-month average of €10.3 billion, a six-month average of €12.2 billion and a three-month average of €12.5 billion. These numbers compare to a trade deficit of €7.9 billion over the previous twelve months- a clear on-going deterioration as the chart documents.

    French exports in March fell by 0.1% after falling by 3.6% in February; these compared to imports that rose by 3.4% in March after rising by 0.5% in February. Clearly trade flows are working in the past couple of months to make the deficit larger.

    Sequential growth rates show more stability for exports than for imports. But that's little solace since the export growth rates are below the growth rates for imports even though the import growth rates are decaying somewhat.

    Exports grow at a pace of 14.3% over three months, 15.7% over six months and 15.1% over 12 months. These are growth rates annualized over the various periods. They compare to imports where the three-month growth rate is 19.2% which is down from 39.7% over six months and lower than the 26.5% pace over 12 months. But clearly, over each of these horizons, imports are growing faster than exports and therefore each of the horizons shows pressure on the trade deficit to get larger.

    Export details for France show that food, beverages & tobacco exports have been accelerating slightly from 12.6% over 12 months up to a 25.6% pace over three months. However, transportation equipment exports that fell by 0.1% over 12 months is falling at a 13.1% pace over three months. For other exports, the growth rate is hardly changed, sitting at 19.4% over 12 months and then logging a pace of 19.7% over three months.

    For imports, food, beverages & tobacco imports rise by 15.4% over 12 months and by 12.2% over three months. Transportation equipment show imports falling by 0.4% over 12 months and then falling at a much more rapid 29.1% pace over three months. For other imports, the 12-month pace is 33.2%, nearly the same as the 30.7% pace over three months.

  • German industrial production fell 3.9% in March. There were declines in all three manufacturing sectors: consumer goods output fell by 1.5%, capital goods fell by a large 6.6%, while intermediate goods output fell by 3.8%. Construction output bucked the trend, rising by 0.9% in March.

    These declines followed February where two of three manufacturing sectors advanced and January where all three manufacturing sectors advanced. Construction output has increased in each of the last three months: January, February and March.

    Sequential growth rates raise more questions than they determine reliable trends. Consumer goods output is an exception to this with output rising at a 5.2% pace over 12 months, accelerating to a 10.6% pace over six months, and accelerating further to a 19.9% annual rate over three months. Intermediate goods decline on each of these same horizons, but the declines are not clear decelerations. Intermediate good output has a 3.5% decline over 12 months; that's reduced to a 1.2% pace of contraction over six months and then there is a clear step-up in the pace of decline to an annualized 10.5% pace over three months. Similarly, capital goods output trends generally show deterioration and deteriorating patterns but have a break in the wrong direction over six months. Capital goods output falls by 8.2% over 12 months and then posts a small 0.5% rate of increase over six months and goes on to log a large 29% annual rate of decline over three months.

    Each of the manufacturing sectors seems to have its own trend or trajectory underway; however, these do not combine for any sense of a clear picture for manufacturing overall. Construction on the other hand shows acceleration as output falls by 0.6% over 12 months, rises at a 10.7% pace over six months then accelerates to a 30.2% annual rate over three months. Still, we are not left with a clear picture of where German production is headed.

    Other horizons In the quarter-to-date (now the completed first quarter), German output shows increases in all sectors except capital goods where there's a 5.4% annual rate of decline. Consumer goods output spurts at a 19.1% annual rate and intermediate goods output increases at a 2.7% annual rate; in construction output rises at 18.5% annual rate.

    Looking at these sectors since January 2020 when the virus struck, total output, capital goods output, and intermediate good output are all lower than they were in January 2020. However, consumer goods output is 3.7% higher and the output of construction it's up by 1.8% on that two-year plus timeline.

    Orders and sales In March manufacturing output fell by 4.6%, real manufacturing orders fell by 4.7%, and real sales in manufacturing fell by 5.9%. These weaknesses add to the weakness in industrial production overall and point to problems with orders and demand quite apart from output. Over three months real manufacturing orders are showing clear deceleration as they fall by 3% over 12 months, fall at a 7.5% rate over six months, and then accelerate that decline, falling 12.6% at an annual rate over three months. Real sector sales make a familiar detour to slightly stronger numbers over six months; otherwise they also trace a weakening pulse. Real sector sales for manufacturing fall by 6.2% over 12 months, rise at a 2.4% annual rate over six months and then decline at a sharp 23.7% annual rate over three months.

    Germany, among European countries, has been very locked into the Russian economy not only for its energy but also for commerce and with the sanctions put in place and the war going on between Russia and Ukraine, it's not surprising that the German economy is doing poorly; its orders are falling quite sharply, and sales are weak or consistently pulling back.

    Industrial indicators Industrial indicators from ZEW, the IFO manufacturing survey, IFO manufacturing expectations and from the EU Commission industrial indexes all show weaker conditions in March than in February across the board. Sequential readings typically show greater weakness over shorter periods; however, the EU Commission indexes are remarkable for their stability. There is little-change in the EU Commission indexes when we look at its average levels over three months, six months and 12 months; however, we know that in March there is in this one month a substantial deviation and drop from previous averages,

    Other Europe Turning to the industrial situation in other Europe, we have three European Monetary Union (EMU) members in France, Spain, and Portugal reporting early and then we have EU member Sweden reporting as well. Among these countries in March, only France shows output declines. Spain, Portugal, and Sweden show increases in output. Looking at their sequential results, output in France is accelerating from 12 months to six months to three months. The same pattern holds for Spain. Portugal starts out with some acceleration but then conditions fall off over three months with output declining at a 0.8% annual rate. Sweden also starts off with accelerating trend; it fails to produce stronger growth over three months compared to six months although it does produce another positive growth number.

  • The S&P Global manufacturing PMIs continue to show slippage for worldwide manufacturing. The chart highlights three main areas: China, the United States, and the euro area. Each of these areas shows consistent slippage from early-2021 onward and for China a bit longer.

    The two tables below show manufacturing PMI readings and summary data for 18 countries in April. Half of them show worsening in April and half of them show improvement. This is an improvement from March when 12 showed month-to-month weakening; it compares to February when seven showed month-to-month weakening. Those statistics mark this as a period of unevenness tending to weakness.

    Over three months compared to six months, 12 members in Table 1 show weaker results. Over six months compared to 12 months, 11 members in this table show weaker results. However over 12 months compared to 12 months ago, only 5 show weaker conditions. These five are China, Brazil, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Turkey, a selection of developing economies.

    There are 7 reporters and the table with manufacturing percentile standings (cast form data back to January 2018) that are below their medians; these are identified by any queue standings that reside below their 50% mark. Countries in this situation include Germany, China, Russia, Brazil, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Turkey. Countries with queue percentile standings high in their respective ranges are led by Malaysia with a 90.4 percentile standing, followed by the U.S. with an 86.5 percentile standing and Japan with 82.7 percentile standing.

    Table 1 also evaluates manufacturing sectors for their strength since COVID hit. The final column of the table shows the change in manufacturing PMIs from January 2020. On this timeline, Germany and the euro area had the two strongest gains, followed by the U.S., the U.K., and Canada that also have relatively strong gains. However, there are still four countries in the table that show net declines on this timeline. China leads them, with a decline of 5 points, Turkey with a decline of 2.1 points and declines by manufacturing in India and Taiwan.

    The 18 countries in the table show the queue percentile standings average 58.9 percentile which is a reasonably firm but not a particularly strong reading. If we position them on this timeline between their respective high and low values, they stand relatively higher in their range than in their queues with a 74.3 percentile standing on average.

  • The European Monetary Union (EMU) reached a peak unemployment rate of 11.7% early in the 2013 period. Since that point, the unemployment rate has been declining steadily, consistently across the European Monetary Union in the wake of the global financial crisis. And then COVID struck early in 2020; with COVID in play, the unemployment rate jerked back up to a peak of 7.8%, but has since returned to its downward path, and in fact, is carving out new lows. The unemployment rate in the EMU fell in March to 6.8% from 6.9% in February. The ongoing decline is good news and if it weren't for the virus, we would be on an extended long glidepath to lower rates - of consistently declining unemployment rates across the euro area.

    However, in March there are some indications that the worm is starting to turn. March brings with it an increase in the rate of unemployment in four of the earliest members of the European Monetary Union: Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal. All report increases in their unemployment rate in March. In Spain, the unemployment rate ticks up by one tenth of one percentage point to 13.5% from 13.4%. In Greece, it ticks up by one tenth of one percentage point to 12.9% from 12.8%. In Portugal, it ticks up by one tenth of one percentage point to 5.7% from 5.6%. But in Ireland, the unemployment rate rises to 5.5% from 5.2%. These are mostly small increases in the unemployment rate, perhaps no more than technical adjustments. However, Spain, Ireland, and Greece also post increases in their unemployment rates over the last three months. Ireland logs an increase in its unemployment rate over six months as well.

    For the euro area as a whole, unemployment rates are continuing to fall, and these four countries are anomalies of sorts - but there are four of them - and these are among four of the weaker economies that are more likely to show economic distress sooner if conditions are changing. Consider them as the canaries in the coal mine…

    Global conditions continue to be under a great deal of strain. The COVID virus is still circulating and creating issues that are being handled differently in different countries. Infections have spread, but that hasn't always increased hospitalizations or increased hospitalizations in a way that is alarming. There are ongoing dislocations stemming from when the COVID crisis is more severe, through its impact on supply chains. These are still being repaired. And even as these are being repaired, the supply chains are still being challenged anew by war in the Ukraine and by the economic sanctions that have been imposed on Russia. Russia seems determined to escalate the conflict and to intensify the combat if it can find the right cover to do so. The sense of risk is palpable.

    Russia has started to cut off gas supplies to some of its customers in Europe; so far Bulgaria and Poland are on that list. Hungary, a country that tends to foster closer relations with Russia, has agreed to make its energy payments in rubles and has met with favor from Russia. It does not face the threat of having its energy cut off. However, even Germany is now making plans to decouple itself from the great intravenous pipeline flowing from Germany bringing the life blood of energy to its economy.

    The European Monetary Union has seen the overall unemployment rate fall by 1.4 percentage points over the last 12 months; the number of unemployed in the monetary union has fallen by 14.6% and fallen by about the same amount (by 15%) in the larger group, the EU.

    Unemployment over the last year has fallen the most sharply in Greece by 3.9 percentage points, in Austria by 2.4 percentage points and in Ireland by 2.2 percentage points. Unemployment has fallen by less than one percentage point in Portugal and France, and by one percentage point in Germany. The unemployment rate over the last 12 months is higher by one percentage point in the Netherlands.

  • China
    | May 02 2022

    China's PMIs Weaken Sharply

    China continues to post weak and weakening PMI numbers in April. The manufacturing index fell to 47.4 in April from 49.5 in March. This marks the second month in a row that the manufacturing index is below 50, indicating that manufacturing activity is contracting in China. China's nonmanufacturing index fell extremely sharply to 41.9 from March's 48.4. This is also the second month in a row that nonmanufacturing (an amalgamation that includes the services and construction sectors) shows a decline in activity for that joint sector.

    The drop in manufacturing in April was relatively sharp. Over the last 15 years, there are only ten months in which the manufacturing index fell more sharply in one month than it did in April. Nonmanufacturing fell by 6.5 points in April, marking it as the second largest decline in the history of this index going back to 2007. The largest nonmanufacturing decline came when COVID struck in 2020; in February of that years the manufacturing sector fell in one month by 24.5 points...of course, it also rebounded by 22.7 points the very next month.

    These statistics tell us that the ongoing assessment of these two sectors in China is weak and that the near-term weakness has become more intense. China continues to suffer some great difficulties on the economic front because of its decision to continue to pursue a zero COVID policy. The zero COVID policy refers to a policy goal in China to eliminate COVID. China has no tolerance for any infection whatsoever.

    While the rest of the world is learning to live with COVID and with infections, to manage hospitalizations and illnesses, as well as to develop treatments, China's policy of complete intolerance and of shutting the economy down and literally fencing people into the places that they live so that they cannot mingle with other uninfected people is having dramatic impact on the economy and creating extreme distress among people in China.

    Despite the extreme unpopularity of this program, China shows no signs whatsoever or backing off it and - quite the contrary – its leaders seem to be even more committed to the goal as time passes. China is pursuing this strange strategy of lockdowns and isolations and it is employing so much testing that it has stopped administering inoculations of the vaccine.

    The new strains of COVID have proved to be far more transmissive than the earlier strains of COVID but not as dangerous and certainly not as lethal as the earlier strains. This explains why the rest of the world has found that it can make some sort of peace with the virus by controlling it and dealing with outbreaks when they occur.

    An added problem here is that this is the well-known coronavirus. Science knows it is a class of virus prone to developing variants. As a result of this tendency to develop changes, it has been very difficult to develop truly effective vaccines against COVID. However western medicine has discovered vaccines and treatments that were developed for the earlier strains of COVID that generally have some usefulness in combating some of the later strains that have developed even though the vaccine may become less effective overtime. The vaccines are not very 'vaccine-like' as they only can stop infection for a brief period of time immediately after inoculation. That protection wears off quickly and then, people who are double vaccinated and boosted, can still get infected- but they have less risk of extreme illness or death.

    China's approach to COVID has left it with a manufacturing PMI that shows a steady slide; its 12-month average slips to a lower six-month average and to a lower three-month average with a particularly sharp plunge in April. The nonmanufacturing index also shows the same sequential set of declines that are even clearer and more substantial with an even larger plunge in April.

  • European Monetary Union (EMU) GDP growth logged a 0.8% gain in the first quarter of 2022 after rising by 1.2% in the fourth quarter of 2021. Both are annualized quarterly rates of expansion. The year-over-year growth rate in the first quarter of 2022 sits at 5%. This growth rate is substantially because of the extremely strong growth rates of over 9% logged in the third quarter of 2021 and the second quarter of 2021.

    Beginning with Q2 2022 data, these very strong growth rates are going to begin to fall out of the year-over-year calculation and, at that point, we will start looking at annualized European growth rates that are going to be a little bit more like the annualized quarterly rates that we see in the table below. For the last two quarters, for example, we are seeing GDP average something more like 1% at an annual rate. However, having two quarters out of four with quarterly growth rates over 9% right now pushes the annual rise in GDP up very strongly.

    The annual growth rate for the EMU shows 5% growth in the first quarter of 2022, up from 4.7% in the fourth quarter of 2021 and from 4.1% in the third quarter of 2021. That compares to a second quarter year-over-year growth rate at a 14.6% in the second quarter of 2021.

    Obviously, what we're seeing now is the transition away from those COVID-affected growth rates. Comparisons with the weak readings of GDP during the period of COVID are falling by the boards; however, the strong rates posted in the expansion after the COVID recession are still embedded in the year-over-year calculations. They are still affecting substantially the year-over-year growth rates; meanwhile, the last two quarters are showing us European growth that is coalescing at a 1% annual rate

    Yet, even with these lower growth rates of GDP, inflation in Europe continues to flare strongly. The European Central Bank still has a job to do. And based on the way GDP is evolving, it doesn't look like the excessive growth rate in GDP is to be blamed for the inflation pressures that have developed in Europe and have lingered. Supply chain problems, war, food scarcity and other industrial dislocations appear to be at work.

    Among the early six reporting European Monetary Union members, only Portugal is really knocking down eyepopping growth rates. Portugal had first quarter 2022 GDP growth at a 10.8% annualized rate, up from a 7% pace in the fourth quarter and that compares to an 11.2% pace and the third quarter of 2021. However, two EMU members, France and Italy, log GDP declines in the first quarter with France's quarterly GDP declining at a 0.2% annualized rate and Italy's GDP declining at a 0.7% annualized rate.

    The four largest EMU members (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) grew at a pace of 0.3% annualized in the first quarter of 2022 and that compares to a 2.1% annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2021. For the rest of EMU, growth in the first quarter came in at 2.1% pace compared with a decline at a 1.4% annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2021. Both the four largest economies and the rest of the EMU had extremely strong rates of growth and the third quarter of 2021.

    Year-over-year growth rates for the countries in the table are still quite strong. For the most part, they were in the 90th percentile or higher in their queue of annual growth rates back to late-1997. The exception is Germany whose growth rate is only at the 85.9 percentile; that's a minor exception although it is the European Monetary Union's largest economy.

  • The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) index for industry in April 2022 shows total orders in the U.K. industry falling back to a reading of 14 from 26 in March. It's a significant step back. It's also a step back that leaves the index in April much weaker than it has been for much of the year. The 12-month average for orders is a reading of 20; the six-month average has a reading of 22; and the three-month average has a reading of 20. So, the April reading is a reading that is significantly weaker than what industry has been showing over the last 12 months in general. However. April is not a weak reading. When April is ranked among all readings back to 1991, that CBI reading emerges as stronger only about 4% of the time. Despite the setback in April, the CBI reading for orders continues to show a strong advance.

    Export orders in April show more weakness. There is a relatively sharp one-month step-back and a reading that is historically much less robust than the reading for total orders. In April export orders fell to a reading of -9 from a reading of plus 7 in March. March was a relative high point, however. Export orders average a reading of -6 over 12 months, -3 over six months as well as -3 over three months. The reading of -9 in April ranked on data back to 1991 stands in its 67th percentile, marking April as a top 33% reading which is not bad but certainly not as strong as the reading for total orders.

    Stocks of finished goods are showing some improvement in April at a - 3 reading compared to -8 in March. The -3 reading compares favorably to the -12 average over 12 months. the -14 average over six months and the -8 average over three months. However, as a standing in the queue of data from 1991, April is still a bottom 4% reading for stocks of finished goods. Judging from this, it would appear that businesses continue to have problems getting output to respond to needs and are unable to build stocks back to normal levels.

    Looking ahead, the CBI survey assesses expected output volume over the next three months to be weaker than had been expected in March. The reading for April falls sharply to 17 from 30 in the March reading; March is in line with February that had a reading of 31. Over three months and six months, expectation for output volume had an average of 26; those readings slipped from 29 over 12 months. The reading of plus 17 for April is weaker by the standards of the last 12 months. Although it's weak relative to those standards, it's still a moderately firm reading overall. Ranking the April level in the queue of data since 1991, the standing for April is in its 72nd percentile, which is a firm reading just outside of the top 25% of observations over that same period.

    Average prices continue the show a great deal of pressure. The average price is expected over the next three months show some let up in price pressures with that index falling to 71 in April from 80 in March; that is also weaker relative to its level of 77 in February. Over 12 months the average for this reading has been 58; over six months the average has been 71; and over three months the average rose to 76. The current reading of 71 in April is at the six-month average and stronger than the 12-month average yet only slightly below the three-month average. However, when compared to the queue of data since 1991, the April reading has a top one-percentage point reading for expected prices. Inflation is high and it looks like it's expected to remain high over the period ahead.

    Data on industrial production are not as topical as the CBI survey and are only up to date through February. In February, manufacturing production fell by 0.3% month-to-month. Over three months manufacturing production was up at a 5% pace, which was a step up from the 3.5% pace over six months; that compares which was like the 3.6% pace struck over 12 months. The year-over-year growth rate for industrial production has a 75-percentile standing among all year-over-year growth rates back to 1991; that's a firm standing for production.

  • The S&P Global flash PMIs for EMU in April advanced to 55.8 from a finalized 54.9 in March. The manufacturing reading slipped lower to 55.3 on a flash basis compared to its finalized March value of 56.5. The flash services reading rises to 57.7 in April compared to a finalized 55.6 in March. The service sector improves on the month while manufacturing steps back. Due to the weight of services, the overall composite index improves.

    These readings are for April and by now they represent about two months of time that has passed since the Russia-Ukraine war broke out. The impact on the PMIs over this period is mixed. EMU manufacturing flash is at 55.3 in April compared to 58.2 in February; the services flash at 57.7 in April compares to 55.5 in February. Manufacturing is weaker and services is stronger in line with their respective month-to-month change as well. Of course, two months is not much time to pass, and the sanctions were not imposed exactly from the outset of the conflict and so we should be wary that there may be more repercussions to come in the months ahead.

    In the discussion that follows, it will be understood that any reference to April data refers to a flash estimate and any estimate to historic data refers to finalized estimates.

    For Germany, the results are slightly different. The composite is weaker month-to-month along with manufacturing while services are stronger month-to-month. Comparing April to February for Germany, the composite is lower, manufacturing is lower, but services are stronger.

    For France, the composite is stronger month-to-month along with both manufacturing and services. Compared to their February values, manufacturing is weaker, but services are stronger and the composite is stronger overall.

    For the U.K., month-to-month the composite and services are weaker while manufacturing is stronger. Compared to February, both sectors as well as the composite are weaker in the U.K.

    In Japan, the composite is slightly stronger, and services are slightly stronger ticking up to a diffusion value of 50.5 showing expansion which is a reversal from earlier months. Manufacturing, however, is weaker month-to-month in Japan. Compared to February, all the Japanese readings are stronger in April.

    The U.S. shows mixed performance with the composite weaker month-to-month, manufacturing stronger and services showing significant weakness compared to March. Comparing the April values to February, the U.S. composite is weaker and services are weaker, but the manufacturing sector is stronger.

    The S&P Global PMIs show mixed patterns for broader changes as well. Over three months, all the EMU readings are weaker; the same is true for the U.S. However, for Germany, the composite, the manufacturing and the service sectors all are stronger over three months; France, the U.K., and Japan show mixed conditions. Over six months, the European Monetary Union shows the composite, the manufacturing sector, and the service sector are weaker. Germany, the U.S. and the U.K. show that same result. In contrast, Japan shows three stronger readings. France shows weakness except for services that are stronger over six months.

    Over 12 months, all sectors and all these reporting units have stronger readings.

    The queue (or rank) standings show some significant differences across countries and areas. The European Monetary Union has a composite ranking in its 80th percentile, France is at its 94th percentile; the U.K. is at its 82nd percentile. However, Germany has only a 64-percentile ranking. The U.S. is only at its 56th percentile with Japan in its 66th percentile standing. For France, the composite index is very strong; for the U.K. and EMU there's significant strength; however, elsewhere, composite indexes show only moderate firmness.

    Manufacturing is in its 80th percentile or better in the U.S., Japan, and France. The standing is in the 60th percentile for the European Monetary Union and for the U.K. For Germany, the standing for manufacturing is only in its 47th percentile, below its historic median for this period.

    However, it is the service sectors that show the most disparity. In the European Monetary Union, the services sector has a 92-percentile standing; the same standing holds for Germany. For France, the standing is even higher at the 98th percentile, marking an all time high for this period. In the U.K., the service sector has an 84-percentile standing, but in Japan, the service sector only has a 52-percentile standing. In U.S., the service sector has an anemic 45-percentile standing, below its historic median.

  • Total German industrial orders fell by 2.2% in February after gaining 2.3% month-to-month in January and 2.4% in December. This decline ends a strong run for orders in Germany. February, of course, is the month in which the invasion of Ukraine began - it was in late-February - so we are likely still looking ahead to the impact of that invasion on German orders. As things stand, over 12 months German orders are rising 2.9%, over six months the annual rate bumps up to 4.8%, and over three months the annual rate of expansion is at 10.2%. German orders are still on an accelerating trend, but it looks like that's about to be cut short by war.

    Foreign orders German foreign orders have been a little bit more irregular month-to-month; they fell by 3.3% in February after rising 9.5% in January and falling by 3% in December. Foreign orders are up by 4.1% over 12 months, they rise at an 8.6% annual rate over six months and accelerate to an 11.2% pace over three months.

    Domestic orders German domestic orders fall by 0.2% in February after falling by 7.2% in January and rising by 10.5% in December. Domestic orders rise by 1.3% over 12 months, they fall at a 0.6% rate over six months and then they rebound to rise at a 9.4% annual rate over three months. German domestic orders are weaker overall than foreign orders and their path is one that is more erratic.

    Quarter-to-date In quarter to date basis, which is two months into the current quarter, total orders are rising at a 19.8% annual rate. Foreign orders are rising at a 41.5% annual rate while domestic orders are falling at a 6% annual rate.

    Real manufacturing and mining sales patterns Real sales by sector are more erratic than orders have been. Real sales from mining and manufacturing fell 1.4% in February after rising 1.5% in January and gaining 0.8% in December. Sequentially, mining and manufacturing sector sales are rising, but apart from showing growth there is no acceleration. Over 12 months sales gain 4.2%, that accelerates sharply to 17.2% over six months then backs down to a 3.6% annual rate over three months. Manufacturing sales by themselves show the same pattern.

    Real manufacturing sales by sector While sales by sector are also erratic, they show growth. Consumer goods sales rise 5.8% over 12 months, slip back to 4.8% at an annual rate over six months and then jump to an 8.5% annual rate over three months. The strength in sales comes from consumer durables that rise by 7% over 12 months, increase their pace to 12.6% over six months and then accelerate further to 22.7% annual rate over three months. In contrast, consumer nondurable goods sales are more erratic, rising by 5.5% over 12 months, slowing into a 3.2% annual rate over six months and then rising at a 6.1% annual rate over three months. Capital goods rise by 1.4% over 12 months, accelerate to a sharp 28.3% annual rate over six months and then decline at a 5.2% annual rate over three months. Intermediate goods show a 3.7% growth rate over 12 months, rising to a 6.9% pace over six months following back to a 3.9% pace over three months. Real sector sales are much more sluggish than orders. Orders usually lead, but this gap could also reflect supply chain problems.

    Quarter-to-date by sector Quarter-to-date growth rates by sector show a 12.9% annual rate for manufacturing with overall consumer goods at a 5.4% annual rate, led by a 17.2% annual rate for consumer durables and held back by a 3.5% annual rate for consumer nondurables. Capital goods sales are rising at a 17.2% annual rate; intermediate goods gain at just a 0.9% annual rate.

    Big Four EMU economies and their EU metrics The industrial readings according to the EU industrial confidence index show different patterns for the largest economies in the European Monetary Union. For Germany, the net readings are strong, but they decay from December to January to February; they also show sequential monthly decay in Italy. France shows an erratic monthly pattern while Spain shows monthly acceleration. The queue standings for each of these countries that place the current reading in a ranked queue of data since 1990 show all of them to be strong, in their 90th percentile or higher for this period. Spain has the highest relative standing at 99.7%, followed by Germany at 98.7%, France at 94.7%, and Italy at 92.8%. According to the EU data, the industrial sectors are strong in all these countries – this is ahead of the outbreak of war...

    Compare to the pre-Covid situation Looking at changes back to January 2020 before the Covid struck, we see the largest gain and the German industrial sector where its EU index is up by 36.5 points; for France, Italy and Spain, the indexes are up by 12 to 14 points for the period. On the same timeline, German orders are up by 7% with foreign orders up 7.1% and domestic orders up by 6.9%; these metrics reveal a tightly clustered sense of rebound. However, sector sales are very different matter. For Germany, mining and manufacturing sales are down by 1.3% on this timeline while manufacturing alone has sales down by 1.2%. Consumer goods sales are down by 0.4% although durable consumer goods sales are up by 6.1% and consumer nondurables sales are down by 1.5%. Capital goods sales are down by 5.8% while intermediate goods post an increase of 2.9%. Order-versus-sales metrics look very different.