Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Robert Brusca

Robert A. Brusca is Chief Economist of Fact and Opinion Economics, a consulting firm he founded in Manhattan. He has been an economist on Wall Street for over 25 years. He has visited central banking and large institutional clients in over 30 countries in his career as an economist. Mr. Brusca was a Divisional Research Chief at the Federal Reserve Bank of NY (Chief of the International Financial markets Division), a Fed Watcher at Irving Trust and Chief Economist at Nikko Securities International. He is widely quoted and appears in various media.   Mr. Brusca holds an MA and Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University and a BA in Economics from the University of Michigan. His research pursues his strong interests in non aligned policy economics as well as international economics. FAO Economics’ research targets investors to assist them in making better investment decisions in stocks, bonds and in a variety of international assets. The company does not manage money and has no conflicts in giving economic advice.

Publications by Robert Brusca

  • German inflation rose by 0.4% in February after rising by 1.5% in January. The core rate fell by 0.3% in February after rising by 0.6% in January. Sequential growth rates show that the HICP measure of inflation for Germany rose at a 5.5% annual rate over 12 months, accelerated to a 7.8% rate over six months but cooled its pace to 7.4% over three months. Similarly, core inflation rose by 3.1% over 12 months, at a 4.1% annual rate over six months, then fell back to a 1.8% pace over three months. The bad news, of course, is that inflation in Germany remains exceptionally high; 5.5% is an extremely high headline inflation rate. The core pace of 3.1% is well above the 2% goal for inflation for the entire of the EMU area set by the European Central Bank. However, inflation in Germany is decelerating! It decelerated from six-months to three-months for the headline; for the core the deceleration is substantial and significant.

    ...and the details are devilishly good In addition to deceleration in the HICP, diffusion calculations show that the increases for inflation by category are actually not prevalent. However, over 12 months inflation is high, virulent, and broad-based. The 12-month inflation rate, which is at a 5.5% pace for the HICP headline, is 5.2% for the German domestic CPI. It registers a 72.7% diffusion reading. That's an extremely high reading, but that's for the year-over-year pace compared to the pace of one-year ago.

    If we look at a six-month horizon, inflation rate accelerates to 7.8% from 5.5% in the HICP while the domestic gauge accelerates to 6.7% from 5.2% inflation. But over six months diffusion drops to 36.4%. This is significant. Below 50% diffusion is telling us that inflation is not very widespread. In fact, it's telling us that falling inflation is a more common characteristic than rising inflation. At 36.4%, diffusion for German inflation has already cooled broadly compared to 12-months despite the increase in the headline rate. Of course, what that means is that inflation is being carried ahead by just a few categories pushing the headline up aggressively even though that kind of inflation experience does not line up across most categories.

    The three-month HICP headline shows deceleration to a 7.4% pace from 7.8%. For the German domestic inflation rate, however, there is an acceleration to a 7.4% pace from a 6.7% pace. The domestic CPI excluding energy accelerates to 3.7% from 3.5%. The domestic ex-energy acceleration is a small one, but it's different from the HICP core which showed a significant decline to a pace of 1.8%. However, when we look at the details of diffusion, we find once again that the diffusion for inflation over three months compared to six months there's only a 36.4% diffusion marker. Inflation does not accelerate broadly over three months compared to six months either.

    The behavior of inflation overall depends in some sense which of these gauges you want to look at. Over three months, it's decelerating for headline inflation and accelerating for the domestic measurement; it's decelerating for core HICP or it's accelerating for the CPI excluding energy. So, what you see for German inflation depends a lot on the actual metric you want to use to measure it. However, if you look down the line at various components of the CPI report, you find that inflation is not accelerating very many places. And in most places, there is a decelerating pace over three months and over six months. That is an important consistency.

    Oil It's also interesting that this is happening in Germany as Brent oil prices continue to push higher. In February Brent was 9.6% higher than in January; January was 14% higher than in December; the December Brent price did back off by 6.3%. If we look at the sequential growth rates, over 12 months Brent is up at a 61% annual rate, over six months it's up at a 91.5% annual rate, and over three months it's up at an 88.1% annual rate. Yet, the inflation metrics do not show that inflation is permeating the German economy.

  • Irish inflation gained 0.3% on its HICP measure in February; that's down from 0.4% in January and level with December’s 0.4% gain. Year-over-year Irish inflation is running 5.7% and increases to a 6.7% annual rate over six months but falls back to a 4.2% annual rate over three months. Ireland's domestic CPI measure tracks the results for the HICP monthly; the sequential trend is also very similar to what the HICP posts over 12 months, six months and three months. On balance, Irish inflation appears to have stopped accelerating, but it isn't clear whether this is a pause or whether there's more to come.

    The domestic CPI measure has a core rate available. The core rate for Ireland shows a 3.7% gain over 12 months, a 3.3% annualized gain over six months, and that pace ticks up to 3.5% over three months. For Ireland, the core inflation performance is relatively flat and there is a hint that inflation may be stable in the neighborhood of 3.5% (still well above the ECB’s 2% objective for inflation in the EMU area). However, it's still hard to tell and certainly hard to tell with so much pressure still present in the headline and with global oil prices and commodity prices showing so much pressure and volatility themselves. On a quarter-to-date basis, the HICP for Ireland is up at a 4.8% annual rate (that's two months into the quarter). The domestic CPI measure is up at a 4.7% annual rate QTD, nearly the same as for the HICP. However, the core CPI is up at only a 1.7% annual rate in the unfolding quarter which is not only mild but it's within the overall target band sought by the European Central Bank. Can things really be that good this soon?

    Is the Irish CPI smiling? The domestic Irish CPI shows 11 major components for inflation; these show the annual inflation rate is up with a breadth of 66.7%. That kind of diffusion (approximately acceleration in two-thirds of the CPI categories) is quite high and disturbing. Over six months, the diffusion ranking falls back to 58.3%, still showing acceleration with uncomfortable breadth. However, over three months, the diffusion measures steps back to 41.7% to accompany its milder pace. That's below the 50% mark and 50% is the dividing line between inflation accelerating or decelerating. Over three months, inflation is decelerating in more categories than it's accelerating and for Ireland this is a potentially significant result and potentially a signal that inflation it's not pausing before accelerating but is pausing because it's not going to be accelerating.

    Extreme price moves over three months Still, there's still plenty of inflation in Ireland and a lot of categories that are quite troublesome. For example, prices for alcohol are increasing at a 27.8% pace over three months. Rent and utilities as an aggregate category shows inflation up at a 9.9% annual rate over three months. The recreation and culture category shows inflation at a 5.6% annual rate over three months; food prices are up at a 6.8% annual rate over three months. Balancing those clear excessive gains are communication where prices are declining at a 3.9% annual rate, education where prices are falling at a 3.7% annual rate, and the catch-all ‘other’ category where prices are declining at a 4% annual rate.

  • Italy
    | Mar 09 2022

    Italian IP Sinks in January

    Italian industrial production for manufacturing (IP) fell by 3.4% in January. This is the second decline in a row for manufacturing industrial production. In December, IP had fallen by 1.1%. All major sectors’ industrial output fell in January. Consumer goods output fell by 3.6% month-to-month, capital goods output fell by 1.6%, and intermediate goods output fell by 3.4%. None of these sectors showed increases in December either. However, in December, consumer goods output was flat while capital goods output fell by 2.2% and intermediate goods output fell by 0.6%.

    With this sort of weakness over the last two months, it's not surprising that over three months industrial output is declining in double digits. In fact, looking back over the last 12 months, six months and three months, manufacturing industrial production in Italy falls on all those horizons and its decline gets increasingly large over shorter periods. Over 12 months Italian manufacturing industrial production falls by 2.4%, over six months it falls at an 8.3% annual rate, and over three months it falls at an 11.6% annual rate. Italy’s industrial sector is struggling.

    Sectors and sequential weakness Looking at Italian output by sector, consumer goods, capital goods and intermediate goods, there is decelerating output in just about all three sectors. All three sectors showed declines in output over three months, six months and 12 months. The declines are at progressively greater rates of shrinkage in all cases with the exception of capital goods. That exception is only a technical exception as the pace of output decline registers a -7.7% pace over six months; that improves to -7.1% over three months, a small ‘technical’ improvement but still a very large negative rate of decline. Capital goods really aren't an exception to the rule of deceleration and growing weakness across all the sectors when you really look at it broadly.

    Quarter -to-date weakness In the quarter-to-date, manufacturing output is declining at a 20% annual rate. For consumer goods, the decline is at a 20.2% annual rate. For capital goods, the decline is at a 13.5% annual rate and for intermediate goods, it's at a 19.7% annual rate. There are double-digit rates of declines overall and for all sectors. That indicates considerable outright weakness on the part of the Italian manufacturing sector. It's no wonder Italy is fighting to try to maintain energy imports during this time that many countries are pushing for an embargo on energy from Russia. The Italian economy relies on Russian energy, and given the state it's in, it's hard to imagine what sort of shape it would be in if Italy’s energy shipments were suddenly cut off.

    Italian manufacturing since COVID struck Looking at Italian industrial production and its recovery since COVID struck, all sectors show a lower level of activity than they had in January 2020. Overall manufacturing is 4.2 percentage points lower, the output of consumer goods is 6.6 percentage points lower, the output of capital goods is 3.9 percentage point lower, and the output of intermediate goods is 1.1 percentage points lower.

    Percentile rankings of Italian growth rates Evaluating the 12-month growth rates for all sectors, we find the overall standing for Italy is in its 27th percentile. This means that the growth rate has been weaker only about 27% of the time since 2000. The consumer goods sector has a 49.6-percentile standing; that's very close to its median and is the best showing of any of the sectors. The capital goods sector has a 30.7-percentile standing and intermediate goods have a 21.6-percentile standing.

    Industrial indicators for Italy are much more upbeat Going beyond the industrial production data, we can look at various indicators for the Italian industrial sector. The EU industrial indicator for Italy, in fact, has a 94.3% outstanding based upon the level of its index value. The statistical agency Istat sees current orders for Italian economy at a 98.9-percentile standing indicating a very high level of orders. The Istat outlook for production is at a 77.6-percentile standing. These surveys of Italian activity are really quite different from what we see when we look at actual industrial production and look at the increases that Italian factories are experiencing on the ground. Clearly, people answering the surveys are somewhat more optimistic when they look at and evaluate the state of conditions or when they form their expectations for the future. It's also true when we look at these indicators that all of the indicator evaluations are made based on levels of the indicators not on their growth rates. But if we were to evaluate the indicators based on year-over-year changes, they would be quite strong as well.

    Since COVID struck Compared to their levels in January 2020 since the COVID, all of the indicators have improved. However, if we look at the indicators in the current quarter-to-date, all of them are showing weakness. The EU industrial confidence indicator is down by nearly one point, the Istat current orders index is down by about 3/4 of a point, while the Istat outlook index for production is down by 1.7 points.

    Summing up Survey data are much more upbeat in the assessment of the Italian economy when compared to the industrial output. Output shows that, in real time, on-the-ground conditions are poor and they've been bad for quite some time. There's a deceleration in progress and it is deceleration of some significant magnitude. The chart that compares Italian PMI index for manufacturing to industrial production index shows that once again the PMI index for manufacturing is much stronger than the output index and is still above the level of 50 pointing to manufacturing expansion. But in the survey, we see that the PMI is in a declining trend.

  • Japan's economy watchers index in February tipped slightly lower to 37.7 from January's 37.9; this small backtracking compares to a reading of 57.5 in December. Clearly the economy watchers index in the year 2022 has the economy on much weaker footing than it had been at the end of 2021.

    The facts: Over the last three months the economy watchers index is down by 19.1 points; over six months it's up by 2.8 points; over 12 months it's down by four points.

    Over the past year the economy watchers index has barely changed and has not been very volatile. It is slightly stronger over six months; it's slightly weaker over 12 months. The queue standing of the index in February is at its 13.4 percentile, a level that marks it as being weaker since 2002 only about 13% of the time. The economy watchers index tells us that Japan's economy continues to struggle as of February.

    Current component trends These general points about the economy watchers index permeate the various components which show, for the most part, (1) small changes from January to February and (2) significantly weaker levels in January compared to December plus (3) declines by all components over three months coupled with (4) very small changes over six months, and for the most part, (5) most small declines over 12 months. These generalities are the ‘rule' up and down the line of this survey. The main exception to these rules is that over 12 months there's a more significant weakening for eating & drinking places and that industry depends upon improved conditions on the virus front in order it to be back on its feet.

    Current component levels All the queue standing components of the current index are below the 50-percentile level. That's significant because the 50th percentile on the queue standing represents the location of the median for each series. So that each series is performing at a below median level of performance. The best performing of these components on a relative basis is the employment reading which is at its 45.6 percentile standing: the next best after that it's for manufacturing establishments at the 31st percentile standing. The worst performing component, eating & drinking places, had its 4.2% standing followed by services overall at a 9.6% standing. Pretty clearly Japan's economy's struggle is broad-based. Fortunately, employment is the least affected among the components surveyed in the table. The employment reading is below its median, but not by much and its relative strength (compared to other readings) provides stability for the economy because employment supports wages and income creation and thereby spending.

    The future index The economy watches future index moved up slightly to 44.4 in February from 42.5 in January; these two readings are somewhat below their December level of 50.3. The future index improved slightly month-to-month and January while the January-February pair are weaker than December by 6-8 points. That is significant, but it is much less that the 20-point drop off for the current index. The future index also shows three month declines across all its components as did they current index. Over six months the future index is mixed but little changed. The future index, like the current index, is moderately lower over 12 months. The percentile standing of the future index is at the 28th percentile overall; across components it ranges from a low of the 20th percentile for nonmanufacturing firms to a high of 34.7 percentile for employment assessments. Like the current index, the relatively strongest reading is for employment in the future index. However, the percentile standing is lower in the future index.

  • Germany
    | Mar 07 2022

    German Orders Rise But Slow

    German new factory orders rose 1.8% in January after rising by 3% in December and by 3.6% in November. Orders are up at a 39.2% annual rate over three months; that's a sharp acceleration from the minus 9.2% rate of change over six months and a solid acceleration from the 7.4% annual rate over 12 months.

    Foreign orders rose by 9.4% in January after falling 2.4% in December and rising 6.5% in November. Foreign orders are rising at a very strong 67% annualized rate over three months after falling at a 3.2% annual rate over six months and rising by 9.4% over 12 months. Domestic orders fell by 8.3% in January, blunting the increase in overall order gains. Domestic orders rose by 11.4% in December and fell by 0.7% in November. Over three months domestic orders are rising at a 6.1% annual rate, up from a minus 17.5% rate over six months compared to their 4.6% increase over 12 months. Domestic orders have been more volatile and weaker than foreign orders.

    Clearly German orders are being driven by their foreign component. This is not surprising since foreign orders have increasingly more important than domestic orders going back to at least 1990. Germany is highly trade-dependent, and its manufacturing sector continues to show that. Germany is highly exposed to international events although a lot of German trade occurs within Europe and within the EMU single currency area without clear foreign exchange consequences.

    Overall orders: Quarter-to-date and Covid-to-date In the quarter-to-date, total orders are rising at a 34% annual rate boosted by a 75.7% annual rate increase in foreign orders; domestic orders are falling at a 10.2% annual rate early in Q1 2022. Looking at orders back to January 2020 when COVID first struck, total orders are up by 8.8% on that timeline, foreign orders are up by 11% and domestic orders are up by 5.5%. These are reasonably firm results for real orders over a two-year period.

    Real sales trends Real sales in Germany show more of a mixed trend across its component sectors. For manufacturing monthly sales are up by 1.8% in January; that accelerates from 0.7% in December and compares to a 4.3% rise in November. However, consumer goods, consumer durable goods and consumer nondurable goods sales all decelerate month-to-month. Intermediate goods sales decelerate month-to-month as well. But those trends are dominated by capital goods that accelerate and grow 3.9% month-to-month in January, after being flat in December and surging by 8.3% in November alone.

    For the moment, capital goods are extremely strong and making up for some lost time. Manufacturing sales are also accelerating; they are accelerating to a 30.4% annual rate over three months from 8.3% over six months and 3% over 12 months. The manufacturing sector is gaining momentum.

    By sector, consumer goods output is less linear with a 3.2% gain over 12 months turning to a decline of 0.8% at an annual rate over six months but then climbing back in the plus column with a 5.3% annual rate gain over three months. Intermediate goods accelerate steadily, rising from a 0.3% gain over 12 months, to a 1.2% pace over six months and to a pace of 8.1% over three months. Capital goods show the strongest acceleration of all; real capital goods sales are up by 3.1% over 12 months rising to a 14.8% pace of expansion over six months. That increases to 60.2% at an annual rate over three months. Clearly capital goods are driving force in the German economy right now.

    Quarter-to-date and Covid-to-date Quarter-to-date real sales show strength for manufacturing where sales are up at a 24.1% pace; consumer goods are up at 3% pace; intermediate goods are up to 2.2% pace; capital goods sales are rising in the quarter-to-date at a massive 46.8% annual rate. Some of this clearly is ‘catch-up’ as sales have been weak since COVID struck. Looking at the change in sales since January 2020, total manufacturing sales are still somewhat weaker being 0.2%, below their January 2020 mark. Consumer goods real sales are 2.4% lower; intermediate goods sales are higher by 0.9% but sales of capital goods are lower by 0.7%. So, the manufacturing sector is just now beginning to gather momentum and post some pace.

    Caveat outlook This, of course, is time for us again to deal with suspicions about the future. After having to make caveats over the last two years about COVID and its effect on manufacturing in the economy, on orders and on trade, there is now a war going on in Ukraine. There are huge potential consequences for Germany and for Europe because of the dependence of this area on oil from Russia. There is an ongoing dialogue about whether Russian oil will be embargoed or not. This raises a huge question mark about Germany and its potential for growth looking ahead.

    So far, we have good strength in the countries that we summarize in the table: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. Industrial measures stand in their respective 90th percentile ranking them in a data queue since 1990. Obviously, the future is clouded because of war in the Ukraine and because of European dependence on oil. For now, momentum looks good. Sector performance is solid. There are still ongoing supply-chain problems, but for now, these forces do not seem to be restraining Germany very much. However, the war in Ukraine is a new element that must be put in the uncertainty column looking ahead and it could become a huge fact and will likely restrain growth ahead.

  • The German trade surplus has generally been withering over the past year or so, but in January it has made a reversal and started to improve slightly. Nominal imports fell by 4.3% in January, dominating the trend for the trade account in the month. Exports also fell by 3.1%, but the bigger drop in imports caused the trade surplus to get larger. January was a race to the bottom and imports won.

    Sequential growth rates tell an uneven story with exports growing 7.6% over 12 months. The pace slows to 3.4% over six months, then exports go stagnant with no-gain over three months. That part of the story is clear enough and it's an ongoing export deceleration. But for imports, the growth rates have been stronger and relatively steady at 22.1% over 12 months, at 20.4% over six months, then falling sharply to 12.6% over three months. But paired up against the export growth rates, imports are stronger by a wide margin on each of those horizons. And despite the sharp deceleration in import growth over three months, imports still are quite a bit stronger than exports over three months.

    Much of what we see in these trends is related to price developments. We can make a comparison by looking at nominal versus real trade flows. However, to do that we have to look at data that are lagged by a month, since that is the most topical real trade flow data we possess. On that basis, exports appear much firmer, rising at a 12.1% pace over 12 months, at a 12.8% pace over six months, and culminating at a 31.7% pace over three months. Although those are enlivened flows on data updated through December (one-month lag; see shaded cells in the table), compared to imports they're still the weak ones. Imports are up at a 24.8% pace over 12 months, at 25.4% pace over six months and at a 59.1% annual rate pace over three months. Nominal import data continue to dominate export data even when we lag them by a month period and when exports 'wake up.'

    We look at the lagged nominal data so we can compare them to the real flow data which are available topically only through December. Real flow data lagged one month show exports are up by 1.1% over 12 months, falling at a 0.7% pace over six months and then rising at a 15.8% pace over three months. Those flows compare to imports where lagged real imports are up by only 0.7% over 12 months and are lagging exports that are up by 1.1% over 12 months. Real imports fall by 1.2% over six months, again putting exports on stronger ground since they fall by only 0.7%. Real exports pickup to grow at a 15.8% rate over three months, but real imports pick up by more and reach a growth rate of 21.3% putting imports back in the lead.

    Taking price out of the equation puts exports and imports on a much more even footing for growth. However, prices are in the equation. Rising oil prices and commodity prices have been part of the problem in this cycle and we can see that's one of the main forces that has been dogging the German trade deficit. Its pattern of deterioration reverses this month, not on revived exports but on weaker imports.

  • The PPI gain is strong The PPI in the European monetary area rose by 4.9% month-over-month in January. In December, the PPI rose by 2.7% m/m. The rate of growth for headline producer price inflation in the European monetary union is up at a 42.2% annualized rate over three months; that's an acceleration - but barely an acceleration- from its 40.6% annual rate increase over six months. Year-over-year producer prices are up at a 30.5% annual rate. These rates of growth compare to an inflation rate one year ago for the PPI that was up year-over-year at a 0.2% annual rate. This is a stunning and broad acceleration. Inflation is high… inflation is rising… inflation is accelerating broadly… and central banks, generally, still are waiting to make their first moves to head it off at the pass. That, at least, is true of the ECB and the Federal Reserve.

    The PPI gain is broad Statistics and acceleration show that the PPI is accelerating in about 38% of the EMU members (and others in the table) in January compared to December whereas in December it increased in about 50% of them compared to November. Over three months inflation is accelerating in 46.2% of them; over six months it is accelerating at 61.5% of them. Year-over-year it's accelerating in 100% of the currently reporting members and others in the table. One year ago, even though inflation was much lower, it also was broadly accelerating with 78.6% of the reporters in this table showing inflation higher. While inflation continues to increase broadly and accelerate widely, the increase in Brent oil prices carries on, but oil has been steadily decelerating. The push for inflation to show more broadly cannot placed at the feet of rising oil prices. This leads us to see inflation as becoming more deeply embedded in the economy apart from oil.

    Table 1

  • In February, manufacturing PMI results are mixed with 7 out of 17 reporters showing results that are worse than they were one month ago. Over three months nine countries or regions show worse PMI values than they had six months ago; there is net deterioration over six months. However, over 12 months all reporting areas except one show results superior to what it was 12-months ago with the exception being China.

    The table shows mixed momentum over three months and six months. But the queue or rank standings show that by and large conditions are still relatively firm across most of the regions for manufacturing. Only three countries have percentile standings of their PMI gauges below 50%; those are Mexico, China, and Russia. Turkey sits on the fence at its 50% mark. Queue and rank standings at 50% reflect the midpoint for each series. For the most part, countries have firm-to-strong readings for manufacturing well above their midpoints. These results are quite solid when compared to their recent history over the last four-plus years.

    The table also shows changes in manufacturing PMIs since January 2020 before the virus struck. What we see is only the euro area and Germany have double-digit improvements over this period. After that, the biggest improvement that we see comes from the U.K. at eight points and then a number of countries in the five-to-six-point gain region such as France, the U.S. and Canada. Showing weakness over this period; i.e., a decline -a weaker PMI gauge in February 2022 than in January 2020- are Mexico, China, Russia, India, and Turkey. That weakness indicates that there is still a significant risk in countries that have had no improvement in manufacturing PMIs in over two years and in countries where PMI stands are still low.

  • China's manufacturing PMI in February ticked up to 50.2 in February from 50.1 in January, continuing to hug that breakeven line between expansion and contraction at 50. At a reading of 50, manufacturing is stagnant. The 12-month average for this index is 50.4, the six-month average is 49.9, and the three-month average is 50.2. China has been on the borderline of expansion-contraction in a weak mode for well over a year – easily back to 2018.

    Zero growth is not nothing, but it's not much either Apart from a period in 2017 and early-2018 and another period in late-2020 and early-2021 when the index lifted more considerably, the index has been hugging the 50 level since early-2013. China's manufacturing sector simply been in a flat mode. The three-year average for the manufacturing PMI gauge hovers between 50 and 51 from late-2013 to date. Since February 2020, that average has not been higher than 50.3 – barely above pure stagnation. Essentially China's manufacturing sector has been stagnant for a long stretch now that precedes the arrival of Covid.

    Manufacturing is slogging through a long funk The ranking of China's overall manufacturing PMI back to 2005 stands in its 29th percentile that's in the lower third of its range and during period of extended weakness.

    • Orders also are weak at their 30th percentile in just about the same relative spot.
    • Output is extremely weak, at its 5.8 percentile standing.
    • Delivery lags at a 6.8 percentile standing indicate that there hasn't been any pressure on capacity so that firms have been able to deliver goods relatively rapidly because there's been considerable slack in the manufacturing sector and extremely weak output conditions.
    • Order backlogs now are only at their 35th percentile.
    • Employment, one of the stronger components, has crept up to its 55.5 percentile, putting it above its median reading. But rising employment and weak output mean that productivity in manufacturing has had a terrible performance in this period.
    • Input prices are relatively strong at their 70th percentile standing.
    • The purchases of inputs are at only about their 32nd percentile standing.
    • New export orders stand in their 38th percentile.
    • Imports stand in their 35th percentile.
      It is a wholistic picture of a weak sector. Only prices are stirring and that is a legacy of the global virus and the shifting sands of global supply chain problems. It also reflects rising global energy costs and war…

    PMI standings are poor across the board These standings show all of manufacturing be in a very weak mode or a place-holding mode. There isn't really anything that's strong outside of input prices and this is in a global environment where inflation forces have ramped up very strongly. In this environment China, of course, is different. It has been running this zero COVID policy, trying to keep the disease COVID from spreading at all and even trying to stamp out its very existence. But totalitarian policies work better against people who can be made complaint than against a virus that spreads at will – its own will not yours… And this approach has put a real damper on activity over the last six months or so since this policy has been in effect.

    Momentum is weak Looking at momentum in China, manufacturing only output, order backlogs, and stocks have momentum easing over three months compared to over six months. However, over six months, there are more categories easing: output, order backlogs, employment, import prices, and stocks all are showing weakness compared to their levels over 12 months. Comparing 12 months to 12 months ago, the signs of slowdown are much broader with only four categories showing momentum on an upswing including delivery speeds, employment, stocks of major inputs, and new export orders.

    Whether one chooses to look at China by looking at changes in the manufacturing PMI and its components or at their PMI index levels, the conclusion is still the same: weak.

  • Japan
    | Feb 28 2022

    Japan's IP Falls Again

    Japan's industrial output fell by 1% in January after tumbling 0.8% in December. Still, output has a strong 18.7% (annualized) gain over three months on the strength of a 6.3% monthly gain in November. However, output is falling by 1.3% over 12 months and by 6.8% over six months.

    In the quarter-to-date industrial output is up at a 2.6% rate, but that is all from the momentum generated back in November.

    Manufacturing is following the same pattern as overall IP on this timeline.

    Sectors show declines in consumer goods output and in output of intermediate goods in January as well as in December. Both also showed very sharp monthly gains in November. Both sectors show double-digit annualized growth rates of gain in the last three months while their growth rates are negative over six months and 12 months.

    Investment goods are off on their own tangent. The output of investment goods rose by 1.8% in January, fell by 2.7% in December and rose by 2.8% in November. Investment goods show a gain in output over 12 months, a fall in double digits over six months and a strong but single-digit annualized gain over three months.

    In the quarter-to-date, output falls for consumer goods but is rising for intermediate goods and for investment goods.

    The mining sector shows output increases in two of the last three months but logs a drop over three months, six months and 12 months. And those declines are increasing more severely. Mining output also is falling in the quarter-to-date.

    Looking at output changes since before Covid struck, the headline, manufacturing and all sectors are still lower on balance. Japan has not recovered to its pre-Covid level of activity and that means since that a two-year period there has been no growth either as would normally occur for a two-year period.

  • GfK's projection of Germany's consumer climate in March finds a drop to -8.1 in the index from -6.7 in February. February had increased slightly from January (-6.9) which had worsened considerably, falling 5.1 points from its December value. The current string of four negative readings follows two positive readings in a row in October and November of last year. In some sense, Germany is having a relapse. The March reading is the weakest reading for consumer climate since May 2021, ten months ago.

    The GfK index cratered at -23.1 in May 2020 and had a second downdraft in which it bottomed at a level of -15.5 in February 2021. The German economy has been on the virus rollercoaster, and it looks like the ride is continuing.

    Further details on the German climate situation expand on readings for expectations for the economy and for income expectations as well as look at the current buying climate. These readings lag the headline by one month.

    The economic situation improved in its most recent observation for February, rising to 24.1 from January's 22.8. The February reading is above its January and December levels, but it is below all readings from May 2021 to November 2021.

    Income expectations also for February backed off sharply, falling to 3.9 from January's 16.9. The February reading is below all expectation readings since February 2021. The last three months seem to represent a more striking drop compared to the earlier values.

    The buying climate also eroded in February. It fell to 1.4 from January's 5.2. It was also lower in December for that single month and was previously lower for a single month also in January 2012. It has not been lower except for one-off monthly readings since December 2008 that ended a 16-month period of greater weakness during the global financial crisis when the reading was persistently weaker. That means the current propensity to buy reading is at an unusual point of weakness.

    The percentile standings for the March headline and the February components tells the story in stark quantitative terms. The headline ranks as lower only 2.5% of the time- that is extremely weak. The economic expectation reading, at its 74.1 percentile, a much more solid position and well above its median. Income expectations, however, are weak at a 32.2 percentile standing placing them in the lower one third among all their historic readings. The propensity to buy at a 27.5 percentile reading also is in the lower one-third of all its historic readings.

    German data are somewhat at loose ends as we get to February and March as the IFO index released yesterday, and with more detail today, shows a good deal of variance across sectors. The Markit survey has showed a step down in German manufacturing and a sizeable step up for services in February. The improvement in services is in sync with Germany's infection roll-off but the roll-off is gradual and while services improve in February climate erodes in March.

    The outlook for the period three-months ahead (made as of February) in the fresh IFO release shows strength across the board in activity and orders in manufacturing and in orders for retailing at a rank standing in the 90th percentile – extremely strong. The lowest standings in the three-month outlook are from exports with readings in the 55th to 75th percentile on data back to 2002. Apparently, businesses and industry in Germany are more confident than are consumers.

    In other European economies whose data only are updated through January, we find some weakening in confidence for Italy, France, and the U.K. Still, Italy's confidence has a 90.2 queue percentile standing, France has a 68.5 percentile standing, and the U.K. has a 28.1 percentile standing.

  • The IFO business index climate readings all improved in February; the aggregates improved for current conditions and expectations as well. In fact, the lone monthly set back was to expectations in the construction sector.

    Climate readings stand above their pre-Covid (January 2020) level overall for manufacturing and in wholesaling. It is hard to see where the rebound has come from since it is not in any obvious way virus-related. In Germany, the infections rates continued higher through January, peaking in the second week of February and coming down slowly. The death rate curve, which is known to lag., reached a local low point in late-January and early-February but has since risen slightly. So the German revitalization either represents some autonomous increase in activity or it reflects less fear of the virus by the German population. The services reading for Germany in climate, current conditions and expectations all stepped up on the month, but also rising sharply was the Markit reading on the services sector. This is the sector that tends to respond the most to changes in the virus and we can expect that it also will be the litmus test for economic responses drive by changes in attitudes toward the virus.

    However, retailing, while improving, is also a lagging sector in the IFO framework that needs to improve to play catch-up. This limits the conclusion that the changing attitude on the virus may be driving these responses. Retailing climate did gain substantially month-to-month, but current conditions only made a modest rise (one tenth of a tick higher, rising to -1.2 in February from -1.3 in January) while the expectations reading pushed strongly higher rising in February to -5.5 from -16.9.

    There are two concepts at work here. One is the assessment currently of the change month-to-month. The other is the historic standing of activity levels in the various sectors. Overall, the standings show climate at a solid 78.5 percentile mark while the current standing is at its 51.2 percentile and expectations are only at their 51.7 percentile. The climate reading is quite solid by itself while the current and expectations readings are only at a thin margin above their respective median values on data back to 2005. The current standings for retailing and services are below their median with readings of 42.0 for retailing and 25.4 for services- their respective historic median occur at rankings of 50.0. Thus, both of these show below-par readings. Wholesaling and construction show solid/strong readings with construction at an 87.8 percentile standing and wholesaling at a 91.2 percentile standing. Manufacturing, once the strongman of this series, has a still solid reading at its 76.1 percentile.

    If you wonder where German businesses think they are going, apparently, they wonder too. Their overview ranking is only at the 51.7 percentile mark, just tad above its median (on data back to 2005). The outlook is weighed down by three standings below their medians: a 20.5 percentile standing for construction, a 34.1 percentile standing for services and a 35.6 percentile standing for wholesaling. Boosting expectations above the 50 mark that represents its median is the 58.5 percentile standing for retailing and the 68.3 percentile standing for manufacturing. The 'bad news' here is that no expectation reading is higher than its 68th percentile which suggests that there is no real pent-up optimism. There is some optimism but no significant optimism. And this, even though there are signs of the virus slowing, being less lethal, and putting fewer in the hospital.

    Over one, two and three months, climate readings have improved on back across all sectors as well as for current conditions and business expectations in the aggregate. But over four, six, seven and eight months, there are sector declines as well as mixed declines for the current and expectations indexes.