Tom Moeller

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Consumer credit outstanding eased $0.8 billion (+1.7% y/y) during February after rising $8.9 billion in January. A $15.0 billion rise had been expected in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. As a percentage of disposable personal income, consumer credit was 22.4% in February, compared to 23.0% one year earlier.

Nonrevolving credit outstanding eased $0.9 billion (+1.2% y/y) in February after rising $2.4 billion in January. Nonrevolving credit held by depository institutions declined 9.0% y/y in February. Finance company debt holdings rose 1.2% y/y while credit union holdings eased 2.2% y/y in February. Nonrevolving debt held by the federal government rose 3.4% y/y.

In February, revolving credit, which includes credit cards, edged $0.1 billion higher (3.0% y/y), following a $6.6 billion January rise. Revolving credit outstanding held by depository institutions fell 1.5% y/y. Revolving credit held by finance companies fell 7.9% y/y, while that held by credit unions rose 5.1% y/y.

The consumer credit figures from the Federal Reserve Board are break-adjusted and calculated by Haver Analytics. The breaks in the series in 2005, 2010 and 2015 are the result of the incorporation of data from the Census and the Survey of Finance Companies, as well as changes in the seasonal adjustment methodology. The consumer credit data are available in Haver’s **USECON** database. The Action Economics forecast figures are contained in the **AS1REPNA** database.

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- Nonrevolving credit declines slightly.
- Revolving credit edges up.

U.S. Consumer Credit Slips in February

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Tian Yong Woon

This week, we focus on the sweeping "reciprocal" US tariffs announced by President Trump last week. As shown in chart 1, these tariffs are primarily based on US trade deficits with its trading partners. This is in contrast to earlier indications that suggested other factors, such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, would also be considered. Using the tariff formula provided by the US Trade Representative, we derive the announced tariff rates. We also highlight the factors contributing to Vietnam’s relatively high "reciprocal" tariff rate, compared to other Asian economies such as Singapore (chart 2). However, we argue that focusing solely on trade deficits does not fully capture the trade dynamics between the US and its partners. The applied tariff rates of other economies should also be factored in (chart 3), especially in relation to trade with the US. Moreover, non-tariff trade barriers (chart 4) should also be considered, as tariffs and trade deficits alone may not provide a complete picture of trade dynamics. To present an alternate view, we introduce a “tariff scorecard”, which incorporates these factors and offers a perspective on how US "reciprocal" tariffs could have been applied (chart 5). Looking ahead, with the "reciprocal" tariffs already in place, we also discuss the initial and varying responses from Asian economies, considering their significant exposure to these tariffs (chart 6).

**US “reciprocal” tariffs**
Last week, US President Trump’s announcement of “reciprocal” tariffs caught many economists by surprise. While the tariffs themselves were anticipated, their scope and scale were far more severe than expected, contradicting much of the messaging leading up to the announcement. Prior statements—both before and during the unveiling of the tariffs—suggested that the "reciprocal" measures would account for various factors, including trade barriers (both tariff and non-tariff) and currency manipulation. However, the formula revealed by the US Trade Representative’s Office showed that the tariffs were simply based on the US trade deficit with other countries, as outlined in chart 1. This approach was far simpler than expected, relying solely on trade deficits without factoring in the other economic considerations. Also, many investors and observers were shocked by the announcement, as it contradicted earlier messaging that the tariffs would be “lenient.” Some had also expected bilateral negotiations with trading partners to influence the final tariff structure. Instead, the formula was purely based on the US trade deficit. Furthermore, even countries with low or no tariffs on US imports—or those with which the US runs a trade surplus (such as Singapore)—were still subjected to a 10% tariff floor.

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**Calculation of US “reciprocal” tariffs**
Delving deeper into the calculation of the US's latest "reciprocal" tariffs, chart 2 illustrates how the formula analysed in chart 1 results in the final tariff rates—though some calculated rates differ a little from the published figures. Among major Asia-Pacific economies, Vietnam faces the highest tariff rate, primarily due to the disproportionate size of US imports from the country compared to US exports to it. In contrast, Australia and Singapore, which were net importers of US goods according to 2024 US Census data, were still subjected to a 10% tariff floor. Notably, only a small number of economies were excluded from the tariffs, including Russia. Interestingly, even territories such as Australia's Heard and McDonald Islands, which have no human inhabitants, were still subjected to the 10% tariff rate. Nonetheless, while the applied tariff formula is simple, it overlooks key aspects of trade beyond just trade deficits, failing to capture the full dynamics between the US and its trading partners. This will be explored in more detail in later sections.

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**Applied tariff rates**
As mentioned earlier, focusing solely on trade deficits does not capture the full trade dynamics between the US and its trading partners. We must also consider the effective tariff rates these economies impose, though the data is slightly dated. Chart 3 illustrates that some Asian economies hit with high US "reciprocal" tariffs, like Vietnam, actually impose relatively low tariff rates. World Bank estimates for 2022 place Vietnam’s weighted average tariff just above 1%, lower than the US rate of about 1.5%. In contrast, countries like South Korea and India have higher average tariffs. However, it is crucial to differentiate between overall tariff rates and the effective tariff rates applied specifically to US imports. For example, South Korea’s trade agreement with the US (KORUS) has eliminated most tariffs on US imports, yet South Korea still faces a 25% "reciprocal" tariff. Meanwhile, India, which currently lacks a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US and imposes higher tariffs, received only a slightly higher "reciprocal" tariff rate than South Korea’s. This discrepancy raises concerns that basing US tariffs solely on trade deficits and may seem unfair to certain economies. It is also important to note that the World Bank recently revised its methodology for calculating tariff rates, which have led to changes in historical data.

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**Non-tariff trade barriers**
In addition to tariffs, non-tariff barriers could also be considered when assessing trade relationships between economies. As shown in chart 4, Asian economies vary significantly in this regard. Major economies like India and China, according to the Fraser Institute, are seen to have relatively high non-tariff barriers compared to their peers. On the other hand, countries like Singapore are characterized by very low, almost non-existent, non-tariff barriers, reflecting its stance as a highly trade-liberal economy. The extent to which economies use non-tariff barriers is crucial, as they also impact access to domestic markets for foreign goods. Ignoring non-tariff measures while focusing solely on trade deficits and tariff rates may overlook and under-penalise economies that rely more on non-tariff measures to regulate the inflow of foreign goods.

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**US tariff scorecard**
To bring everything together, chart 5 presents a scorecard that combines the three dimensions of trade we have discussed: the US trade deficit with Asian economies, their weighted average tariff rates, and their non-tariff barriers. By ranking economies in each of these three categories, we can calculate an average score. We then compare this score to the "reciprocal" tariffs imposed by the US. This comparison offers insight into how the tariffs might have been structured if the US administration had considered other factors beyond just trade deficits.

While this scorecard offers a more nuanced perspective, it still does not fully capture the complex trade dynamics between the US and its partners. It could be further refined by incorporating bilateral effective tariff data for US imports from these economies and a more precise assessment of trade barriers specifically affecting US goods. That said, the scorecard highlights some important trends. For example, Vietnam would likely have faced much lower tariffs if its own tariff rates had been considered. South Korea, benefiting from the KORUS agreement and a low effective tariff rate on US imports, would also have had a significantly better score. Conversely, India, with high tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, would have likely seen much higher "reciprocal" tariffs despite its moderately high trade deficit with the US.

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**Disruption, retaliation, and uncertainty ahead**
Regardless, with the "reciprocal" tariffs already in place, affected economies now have only two possible responses (or both) to the US’ latest actions: fight (retaliate) or flight (capitulate). At first glance, it appears that many Asian economies are leaning towards the latter, while China has already opted for the former. Specifically, China has announced a 34% tariff on all US imports, effective April 10 — a significant escalation from its more measured responses to previous rounds of US tariffs. In contrast, Vietnam, which received the steepest "reciprocal" tariffs in the region, has reportedly offered to remove all tariffs on US imports. Similarly, Taiwan is now offering zero tariffs to the US in response to the tariff fallout. These three economies — China, Vietnam, and Taiwan — have the highest exposure to the latest round of tariffs in Asia, as shown in chart 6. This is calculated by multiplying the US’ 2024 imports from these economies by the respective "reciprocal" tariff rates imposed on them. While US importers bear the brunt of the tariffs, and these costs are often passed on to US consumers, the reduced demand for foreign goods due to tariffs will also negatively impact US trade partners, including those in Asia.

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Asia

Economic Letter from Asia: Just Tariffic

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Nonfarm payrolls increased 228,000 (1.2% y/y) during March after rising 117,000 in February, revised from 151,000, and 111,000 in January, revised from 125,000. Expectations had been for a 130,000 rise in the Action Economics Forecast Survey. The latest figure left the three-month average change at 152,000 in March, down from 232,000 in January.

Average hourly earnings rose an expected 0.3% during March after increasing 0.2% in February, revised from 0.3%, and 0.4% in January. Earnings growth of 3.8% y/y was below the 5.9% high in March 2022.

The unemployment rate, measured in the household survey, edged up to 4.2% last month and added to the February increase to 4.1% from 4.0% in January. The Action Economics Forecast Survey expected 4.1%. It reached a low of 3.5% in July of 2023. The unemployment rate, including employees working part-time for economic reasons plus all marginally-attached workers, eased to 7.9% from 8.0% in February.

In the **establishment survey**, private-sector employment rose 209,000 in March after a 116,000 February increase. Factory sector jobs edged 1,000 higher (-0.6% y/y) after an 8,000 gain. Construction sector employment increased 13,000 (1.8% y/y), after rising 14,000 in February.

Private service-producing sector employment increased 197,000 (1.2% y/y) in March after improving 90,000 in February. Increases varied greatly amongst service sector categories. Education & health sector employment rose 77,000 (3.4% y/y) following a 60,000 February decline. Leisure & hospitality employment rose 43,000 (1.3% y/y) following a 17,000 decline. Trade, transportation & utilities rose 48,000 (1.0% y/y) following a 21,000 increase. Professional & business services employment rose 3,000 (-0.2% y/y) following a 7,000 rise and financial employment improved 9,000 (1.0% y/y) after a 16,000 gain.

Government sector payrolls rose 19,000 (1.3% y/y) last month after increasing 1,000 in February. Local government jobs increased 17,000 (1.3% y/y) following a 16,000 gain. State government employment rose 6,000 (2.1% y/y) following a 4,000 February decline and federal government payrolls fell 4,000 (0.0% y/y) after declining by 11,000.

Private-sector average hourly earnings rose 0.3% (3.8% y/y) in March after increasing 0.2% in February. Earnings in the goods-producing sector improved 0.5% (4.3% y/y) following a 0.4% gain. Earnings in construction rose 0.3% (3.9% y/y), while factory sector earnings rose 0.7% (4.6% y/y). In the private services-sector, earnings rose 0.2% (3.7% y/y) for the second straight month. Trade, transportation & utilities sector pay increased 0.5% (2.8% y/y) last month. Leisure & hospitality earnings gained 0.6% (4.2% y/y). Professional & business sector earnings increased 0.2% (4.8% y/y). Information sector pay increased 0.2% (4.2% y/y) and financial activities earnings rose 0.5% (4.0% y/y) last month.

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The length of the average workweek held steady at 34.2 hours in March. The workweek in the goods-producing sector rose to 40.0 hours from 39.7 hours. The construction sector average workweek improved to 39.3 hours while the factory sector workweek edged up to 40.2 hours. The average workweek in the private service sector held at 33.1 hours and remained below the 34.0 hour high in early-2021. Professional & business service hours rose to 36.4 hours but leisure & hospitality hours were marginally higher at 25.5 hours.

The **household survey** indicated a rise in the jobless rate to 4.2% in March as both employment and the size of the labor force edged higher. The labor force participation rate edged up to 62.5% last month from 62.4% in February. It remained below the high of 63.3% early in 2020. The rate for teenagers improved to 37.6%. For workers aged 20-24, the rate increased to 72.1%, up from 70.7% six months earlier. For workers aged 25-54, the rate fell to 83.3% from a high of 83.9 last August. For individuals 55 and over, the rate improved to 38.2% in March.

The employment/population ratio for all workers in March held at 58.9% and remained below the 60.3% level twelve months earlier. It is still below its peak reading of 61.1% in February, 2020 just prior to the pandemic.

The employment and earnings data are collected from surveys taken each month during the week containing the 12th day of the month. The labor market data are contained in Haver's **USECON** database. Detailed figures are in the **EMPL** and **LABOR** databases. The expectations figures are in the **AS1REPNA** database.

**Economic Outlook** from Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell can be found [here](https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20250404a.htm).

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- Job strength is concentrated in	three sectors.
- Earnings growth trend decelerates.
- Jobless rate is highest in four months.

U.S. Payroll Growth Improves in March, but Downward Revisions & Higher Jobless Rate Cloud Employment Picture

Robert Brusca

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German orders came up flat in February after falling by 5.5% in January. It's been a turbulent period for orders. The January drop came after an increase of 5.6% in December, so orders have been chopping around the last few months and are not really going anywhere. Foreign orders rose 0.8% in February after falling 0.5% in January and being flat in December. Domestic orders fell 1.2% in February after falling by 12.1% in January but that had followed a 13.9% increase in December. Once again, there is a lot of volatility and little trend.

The trend path for orders looking at 12-month, 6-month, and 3-month growth shows not much stirring. Total order orders fall 0.2% over 12 months; they rise at a 2.7% annual rate over six months and then fall at a 0.9% annual rate over three months.

Foreign orders rose 0.1% over 12 months; they were up 1.9% at an annual rate over six months and they rose by 1.4% at an annual rate over three months. Foreign orders are showing some sustainable growth over three months and six months although they have very little to show for it over 12 months. Domestic orders fall by 0.9% over 12 months; they gain at a 3.5% annual rate over six months and then fall at a 4.3% annually over three months. Domestic orders display the same kind of volatility that we see in the headline overall and not the tendency toward creeping growth that we see looking at foreign orders. Moreover, the domestic series updates with a 3-month growth rate that's negative which is not encouraging. Real sales data show a small increase in February of 0.2% for manufacturing after falling 1.0% in January and rising 0.8% in December. The sequential growth rates hint at some improvement but not much with a 3% decline over 12 months, a 0.4% decline at an annual rate over six months and then a swing to positive growth at 0.4% at an annual rate over three months; this is creeping and good news, but it's very moderate growth.

Industrial confidence measures for Germany, France, Italy, and Spain the four largest economies in the European Monetary Union, show a modest improvement from January to February in Germany and in France, unchanged conditions in Italy, compared to some slight slippage in Spain. Viewed sequentially, the industrial confidence data don't show much movement from 12-months to 6-months to 3-months for these countries; Germany and France get slightly weaker; Italy and Spain have even smaller moves although they also get slightly weaker. The rankings on the levels of these industrial confidence measures in February give us rankings that are below the 50% mark, putting them below their median for all four countries. The reading for Germany is the lowest with 5.9 percentile standings; the others have rankings between the 20th and 40th percentile on that timeline.

The data on orders in real sales on a ranking basis we find overall orders and domestic orders are moderate-to-weak with an overall order of ranking in the 53rd percentile compared to a domestic ranking at the 25th percentile and foreign orders have a firm 71.5 percentile standing. These calculations are based on the levels of orders. Then expressed in terms of growth rates, these three orders metrics have rankings between their 36th and 40th percentiles putting them below their median growth rate for the period. Real sector sales, for manufacturing sales for example with a 48-percentile standing based upon the level of sales, logs a 19-percentile standing based upon the ranking of its year-over-year growth rate.

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However, we have to look at these data and offer a caveat because there's a step up in military spending coming from Germany and we expect that to affect the German industrial sector, its orders, its industrial output and the economy at large. And then, of course, there's the new spread of tariffs that have been issued by the United States just this week that is going to turn a lot of apple carts upside down and cause most data series released before the announcement of the tariff data to be branded as old and executed under old rules. We are going to want to reassess what's being done and beyond these new administration policies and that simply means that everything we're looking at is going to be turned upside down. Tariff data push countries toward a profile of weaker growth while the military spending that we see coming to Europe should push things to stronger growth. At this time, it's hard to tell which of these two factors is going to dominate in the short run.

Germany

German Orders Fall

Andrew Cates

**Trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical stress**
Our first chart this week illustrates the sharp escalation in US trade policy uncertainty that has unfolded over the past few months. The US Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for trade policy has specifically surged to multi-decade highs, reflecting heightened concern about the direction and credibility of US trade actions under the new administration. This jump unfolded ahead of the major policy announcement from the US administration on April 2nd. Simultaneously, the Caldara and Iacoviello Global Geopolitical Risk Index has also moved sharply higher in recent weeks, indicating growing unease over multiple flashpoints, including tensions in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and US-China relations. Together, these indicators highlight the growing complexity and fragility of the global economic environment. They also underscore why financial markets are finding it increasingly difficult to anchor expectations—caught between shifting trade alignments and mounting geopolitical stress.

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**US data surprises and stagflation**
Chart 2 below highlights the recent divergence between economic and inflation surprises in the United States. The Citigroup US Economic Surprise Index has fallen sharply and into negative territory in recent weeks, reflecting a consistent pattern of weaker-than-expected growth data. At the same time, the Inflation Surprise Index has been climbing, indicating that inflation readings are coming in above consensus expectations. This combination—disappointing growth alongside stubborn price pressures—reflects a stagflation-lite scenario, and one that could now worsen in the immediate months ahead.

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**Consensus expectations for Central Bank policy** 
This next chart illustrates the latest consensus expectations from Blue Chip Financial Forecasters panel for policy rates across major economies over the next 12 months. These were pulled together before this week’s US announcement so may now be a little dated. Still, the consensus had already been pointing firmly toward an easing bias, particularly in the UK, Euro area, and United States. And this reflects growing concern about weakening economic momentum and the need for monetary policy to counteract downside risks. The UK, where rate cuts are most aggressive, is facing one of the sharpest growth slowdowns among developed economies, while the Eurozone’s dovish pivot has been supported by softer-than-expected inflation data, as we discuss below. In contrast, Japan stands out as the only major economy where modest rate hikes are still anticipated, driven by nascent signs of inflation persistence and the Bank of Japan’s desire to normalize policy.

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**The euro area labour market** 
This next chart shows two important indicators of labour market dynamics in the Euro Area: employment expectations (from the EC survey) and posted wage growth based on Indeed job ads (line). Both series have been trending lower, suggesting that the euro area labour market is cooling. The decline in employment expectations signals increasing caution among employers about future hiring plans—likely a response to slower growth, tighter financial conditions and, more recently, US trade policy uncertainty. At the same time, wage growth has eased steadily over the past year, reinforcing the view that second-round inflation pressures from the labour market are subsiding. This softening in labour indicators has given the European Central Bank additional room to begin discussing further interest rate cuts, particularly as headline inflation readings have also surprised to the downside.

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**China’s economy**
Chart 5 below illustrate the Yicai High Frequency Economic Activity Index (YHEI), which tracks real-time fluctuations in China’s economy based on a range of mobility, transport, and consumption indicators. After several quarters of sluggish activity, the index has recently rebounded to its highest levels in over a year. This upswing suggests a tentative revival in domestic economic momentum, supported by targeted fiscal stimulus, easing credit conditions, and a modest improvement in consumer sentiment. The rebound clearly comes at a critical moment for China, as policymakers seek to offset US tariff policies and persistent weaknesses in the property sector. These imply that the sustainability of this pickup remains uncertain, but they have reinforced the narrative that China is leaning more heavily on proactive fiscal and quasi-fiscal tools to stabilise growth in 2025.

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**World trade**
Our final chart this week combines two leading indicators of world trade: South Korea’s merchandise exports and the Global Real Economic Activity Index in Industrial Commodity Markets. Both series have turned decisively lower in recent months, underscoring some persistent weakness in global goods demand. South Korea, often considered a bellwether for global trade due to its exposure to tech and industrial supply chains, has reported multiple months of year-on-year export declines. At the same time, commodity-linked activity—an important proxy for industrial production and construction globally—has also faltered. The high historical correlation between these two series amplifies the signal that global trade is under stress. And with the US administration unveiling additional trade barriers this week, downside risks to export-dependent economies are becoming much more acute.

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For some further views on the impact on the world economy of recent US tariff policies please see [Liberating the Downside](https://www.haver.com/articles/liberating-the-downside) on our Viewpoints section.

The return of protectionist trade policies under the new US administration had already added a significant layer of uncertainty to an already fragile global landscape. And this has now been dramatically amplified following the decision by the US administration to announce a sweeping package of tariffs on a broad range of imports from key trading partners—including the EU, China, and several emerging markets. These measures were more expansive in both scope and scale than markets had anticipated, and they carry the potential for significant global economic disruption—particularly if targeted trading partners respond with retaliatory countermeasures, escalating the risk of a full-scale trade conflict.

The announcement has sent a fresh wave of volatility through financial markets. Equities in export-dependent economies have sold off sharply, while European capital goods manufacturers and global logistics firms saw their valuations marked down in anticipation of disrupted supply chains and rising input costs. Treasury yields have also declined on expectations of weaker investment and slower growth, while emerging market currencies came under pressure amid renewed concerns over capital outflows and global trade fragmentation.

The impact on business sentiment and investment planning could be immediate. Firms with international exposure are likely reassessing capex plans and supply chain configurations, while some have accelerated domestic sourcing strategies in anticipation of longer-term decoupling. Early survey data suggest that capital expenditure intentions, particularly in globally integrated sectors, are already weakening—a signal that could weigh heavily on productivity and future potential output.

Against this backdrop, central banks face a challenging policy recalibration. While disappointing US growth data had already tilted expectations toward monetary easing, the scale of trade disruption now adds an additional layer of urgency (charts 1 and 2). Economic forecasters broadly anticipate that most major central banks will lean further into rate cuts in the coming months to offset downside risks (chart 3). That view has gained further traction in Europe, where softer inflation prints (chart 4) have reinforced expectations of imminent ECB action. Meanwhile, more activist fiscal policies in Europe and China (chart 5) provide some offset to the gloom, though these too now face bigger headwinds in an increasingly fragmented trade landscape.

Ultimately, the burden of adjustment is now falling most heavily on trade-dependent economies (chart 6). With the global system inching closer to bifurcation, the downside risks to growth, investment, and policy coordination are rising sharply. The next few months will test not only the resilience of the global economy but also the credibility of the policy frameworks designed to support it.

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U.S. Consumer Credit Slips in February

Summary

Tom Moeller

More Economy in Brief

Economic Letter from Asia: Just Tariffic

U.S. Payroll Growth Improves in March, but Downward Revisions & Higher Jobless Rate Cloud Employment Picture

German Orders Fall

Charts of the Week: Trade Shocks