Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Tian Yong Woon

Tian Yong joined Haver Analytics as an Economist in 2023. Previously, Tian Yong worked as an Economist with Deutsche Bank, covering Emerging Asian economies while also writing on thematic issues within the broader Asia region. Prior to his work with Deutsche Bank, he worked as an Economic Analyst with the International Monetary Fund, where he contributed to Article IV consultations with Singapore and Malaysia, and to the regular surveillance of financial stability issues in the Asia Pacific region.

Tian Yong holds a Master of Science in Quantitative Finance from the Singapore Management University, and a Bachelor of Science in Banking and Finance from the University of London.

Publications by Tian Yong Woon

  • In our penultimate Charts of the Week publication for 2024, we turn our attention to the upcoming year and highlight several themes that are poised to mould the economic and financial market landscape. Although a soft-landing consensus for the world economy is presently implicit in most economic forecasts for next year (chart 1) that view is not without challenges. Uncertainty about the economic outlook has bolted sharply higher in recent weeks (chart 2) partly because of the likely major - and potentially disruptive - policy changes from a new US administration (chart 3). Lingering supply-side challenges, such as climate change and the energy transition, are also generating a great deal of economic and political instability at present, most notably in Europe (charts 4 and 5). In the meantime, many Asian economies face additional challenges, including the potential for higher tariffs on trade (chart 6) and lingering debt-related problems in China (chart 7). Generating sufficient domestic growth momentum to mitigate those problems is also proving to be tough for a number of countries, not least in Japan (chart 8). As Japan’s policymakers are all too aware a key reason for weak domestic demand momentum is ageing demographics, a structural problem that will likely remain in vogue in 2025, not least in the realm of healthcare provision and fiscal policy (chart 9). Geopolitical risks will also likely remain elevated even if there is some progress next year in mitigating those risks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East (chart 10). Finally, and ending on a more positive note, there are some offsets to these downside risks, not least via the productivity-enhancing potential of AI technology (chart 11). The rebound that has been unfolding in the travel and tourism sector in recent months is also noteworthy, and a push back against the trend toward a de-globalisation of the world economy in recent years (chart 12).

  • In this week’s letter, we look back at and review some of the key trends that have shaped the outlook for Asia this year. While growth picked up in several parts of the region earlier in the year, signs of a slowdown have emerged as we head toward year-end (Chart 1). Disinflationary trends have continued in many economies, welcome news for central banks across the region. However, the growth and inflation landscape remains uneven. Economies like Japan and India have experienced slower growth, while others such as Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Vietnam have seen improvements, in part driven by strong demand for electronics and semiconductors (Chart 2).

    On monetary policy, the anticipated regional alignment with the Fed's easing cycle has not fully materialized. Instead, many central banks in Asia have opted to keep policy rates higher for longer, thanks to the influence of various domestic factors (Chart 3). Touching on semiconductors, key players like Taiwan and South Korea have reaped significant benefits from the AI-driven surge in demand, while China’s pre-emptive purchases of semiconductor equipment have finally started to taper off (Chart 4). Turning to financial markets, Asian equities largely tracked their US counterparts through early October. However, market expectations were disappointed by China’s underwhelming stimulus plans, triggering sell-offs across regional markets, while US equities maintained a broader upward trend (Chart 5).

    Lastly, in the political arena, both India and Japan saw their incumbent governments retain power, although with notable losses in parliamentary seats, raising some concerns over future economic policy direction (Chart 6). And as we head into December, uncertainty remains—particularly following President-elect Trump’s recent victory in November. We will continue to explore these developments and their potential impact for 2025 in next week’s publication.

    Growth and inflation Asia-Pacific economies had plenty to celebrate this year, as growth strengthened on average while inflation remained well-behaved in many economies. As shown in Chart 1, GDP growth rates rose from the lows of 2023, averaging just under 4% y/y in both Q1 and Q2. That said, while growth momentum persisted in some economies during Q3, it slowed further in many others. Meanwhile, the region experienced further disinflation, with average CPI inflation falling from a peak of 2.9% y/y in May to just 2% in October—a level at which many central banks would likely feel comfortable. However, a deeper dive into economy-specific nuances reveals disparities in the relationship between growth and inflation across the region's economies—an issue we will explore in the next section.

  • In this week’s letter, we focus on Southeast Asia (ASEAN). While exports have become increasingly important to ASEAN economies as drivers of real GDP growth, secondary growth drivers offer a buffer in the event of dampened external demand. A deeper look at the composition of ASEAN’s export value added reveals that intermediate goods account for the largest share, compared to finished goods. This highlights the region’s key role as a hub in the global supply chain. We also explore the differences among ASEAN economies. On the one hand, resource-rich countries like Indonesia and Malaysia benefit from their role as exporters of raw or partially processed commodities. On the other, resource-scarce economies like Singapore have carved out a niche in higher-end manufacturing, often relying on inputs from other regions.

    Overall, ASEAN remains a bright spot for growth, with IMF forecasts suggesting that the region is poised to outpace other Asian economies, including China, over the next decade. However, the region’s prospects are not without risks. The US trade deficit with many ASEAN economies, particularly Vietnam, could provoke trade-related actions from US President-elect Trump. Ironically, Vietnam’s rise—largely driven by its strategic positioning amid US-China tensions during Trump’s first term—may also lead to increased scrutiny in his second term. Finally, we examine the industrial policies of certain ASEAN economies, particularly Indonesia. While the success of its nickel ore export ban is notable, similar export bans on commodities like bauxite have had more mixed success.

    ASEAN’s place in trade and the world Trade has long been crucial to the economies of Southeast Asia (ASEAN), with export revenues serving as a significant driver of growth for several countries in the region. In recent quarters, this role has become even more pronounced, as evidenced in Chart 1, which shows rising export contributions to growth for Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. In contrast, the Philippines continues to struggle to generate growth from its exports. However, unlike advanced Asian economies such as South Korea and Taiwan, many ASEAN countries have benefited from strong secondary growth drivers, particularly private consumption. A robust domestic consumer base has supported business activity across the region. This dynamic provides a buffer in times of reduced global demand, which may dampen export performance. Even if external conditions weaken, these economies may still rely on internal demand to sustain growth, provided their domestic situations remain stable.

  • In this week’s letter, we focus on China. The Chinese economy has shown early signs of a pickup in recent weeks, following a series of easing measures. However, these signs do not yet suggest a full-scale economic rebound, and observers remain uncertain about whether the economy will meet its 5% growth target for the year. We also explore China’s latest debt swap program for local governments, which many see as a positive step. Nonetheless, some are underwhelmed by the scale of the RMB 10 trln program, which is small compared to the estimated size of local governments’ "hidden debt". In addition, we address broader structural issues likely to continue as points of contention between China and other major economies, and most notably the US. Issues include China’s persistent current account surplus and concerns about its overcapacity. We examine the potential impacts of this overcapacity, from its detrimental effect on domestic industries in receiving economies to the deflationary pressures from Chinese exports. Additionally, we touch on the financial flows resulting from China’s export revenues. Finally, we end on a more positive note, highlighting China’s progress in its green energy transition, with some forecasters predicting that China will reach peak carbon emissions within the next year or two.

    Recent developments The Chinese economy has picked up pace in recent months, following a series of easing measures introduced by authorities. These measures include interest rate cuts, relaxed property restrictions, and, more recently, a debt swap program for local governments. Of particular note is the official manufacturing PMI, which has returned to expansionary territory (Chart 1) for the first time in six months. More broadly, the economic surprises from China have shifted back to more neutral levels, following a period of disappointing results. However, while there are encouraging signs of a turnaround, these developments do not yet point to a full-scale economic rebound.

  • In this week’s letter, we explore the potential impacts of President-elect Trump’s recent electoral victory on Asia. One key implication is that Trump’s policies could limit the room for policy easing by Asian central banks, particularly if his policies prove inflationary and prompt the US Fed to enact a tighter-for-longer monetary policy. As a result, market expectations for yield differentials between the US and other Asian economies may turn less favourable for the latter, potentially putting downward pressure on Asian currencies.

    Beyond this, the most significant effect of Trump’s win could be on trade. Proposed tariffs of up to 60% on US imports from China and up to 20% on imports from other countries create a substantial risk of trade disruption. These measures could provoke retaliatory actions from affected economies or, alternatively, lead to the US negotiating bilateral agreements to reduce the impact, as we saw during Trump’s first term.

    Additionally, Trump’s trade policies might prompt a fundamental shift in business strategies, both in the US and abroad. Companies could reconsider their global supply chains, potentially accelerating reshoring or onshoring efforts, while investments in overseas operations could be discouraged. Finally, while Trump’s “drill, baby, drill” stance may be initially expected to lower energy prices, the overall impact on global oil prices may not be so straightforward. This is due to the role of other major producers, such as OPEC+, as well as the potential for renewed geopolitical tensions and changes in global demand dynamics.

    Monetary policy The impact of the recent US election – resulting in President-elect Trump’s victory – is set to reverberate globally. Governments, businesses, and market observers alike are now likely scrambling to assess the potential policy implications. One key area of focus is the future direction of US monetary policy, which, in turn, may lead to reassessments of monetary policies across Asian economies. Specifically, the US Fed may not need to cut interest rates as aggressively as previously expected, thanks to the potentially reflationary effects of some of Trump’s proposed fiscal measures. This could result in a higher terminal rate for the Fed in its current easing cycle. Such a shift may, in turn, influence the policy paths of central banks in Asia. If yield differentials become a factor in their decision-making, these banks could face more limited room for easing should they need to adjust rates (see Chart 1). However, several Asian central banks have yet to begin easing cycles due to country-specific factors. These include high household indebtedness, persistent inflation, or simply the absence of a compelling reason to ease, as growth remains strong in some economies.

  • In this week’s letter, we focus on political uncertainty and its potential risks to economic growth. We begin with Japan, where the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faced a significant electoral setback last weekend, losing its ability to form a majority in the lower house, even with its coalition partner's support. This development has sparked a period of political flux, complicating efforts to predict Japan's policy trajectory. Market reactions have partially reflected these concerns (Chart 1), though responses to the Bank of Japan's decision to maintain its current policy settings have been muted (Chart 2), which is understandable given that the outcome was largely anticipated.

    The uncertainty surrounding elections extends to the United States, where the presidential race between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris remains too close to call by many measures. Observers are particularly interested in how the election results might impact relations with China. US-China relations have been the focus of various trade-related measures by the US over the past decade, including tariffs and product controls (Chart 3). However, it's worth noting that the US's hawkish stance on China may well persist regardless of the incoming president. On a more optimistic note, expectations for China’s near-term growth have improved (Chart 4), bolstered by a recent series of easing measures from its authorities. Nevertheless, uncertainty lingers regarding the economy's ability to achieve its 5% growth target for the year.

    Finally, we examine developments in other advanced Asian economies, where industrial production growth has shown signs of easing in recent months (Chart 5). We discuss the potential implications of continued declines in this growth on exports and, consequently, on the growth rate of these economies, many of which rely heavily on exports as a primary growth driver (Chart 6).

    Japan’s lower house elections and the October BoJ meeting Japan’s ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), experienced a significant electoral upset last weekend, losing its majority in the lower house of Parliament. Even with the support of its coalition partner, Komeito, the LDP is now unable to form a majority. This shift puts Prime Minister Ishiba's position at risk, as he may need to seek support from parties outside his usual allies to advance his policy agenda if he remains in office. Given this uncertainty, political maneuvering is expected to intensify in the coming weeks, with a special parliamentary session scheduled for November 11 to elect Japan’s next Prime Minister. In response to the initial news, the yen weakened further, reflecting market concerns, while equities saw a slight uptick (Chart 1).

  • In this week’s letter, we examine the reactions of China’s equity markets following the Golden Week holidays, highlighting investors' disappointment over the latest stimulus announcements (see Chart 1). Despite this, forecasters have slightly raised their growth expectations for China (Chart 2), although pessimism lingers regarding the economy's ability to meet its 5% growth target for the year. Turning to monetary policy developments across Asia, several easing cycles have now been initiated across the region. For instance, New Zealand has begun its easing cycle with a 50 bps rate cut, driven by cooling inflation and weak domestic growth (Chart 3). In India, while the central bank kept policy rates unchanged, it made a significant move by officially shifting its stance to neutral, indicating a closer alignment with an easing approach. This comes amid a robust growth outlook, although inflation risks remain (Chart 4). In South Korea, the central bank has also commenced easing with a 25 bps cut, acknowledging cooling inflation and slower household debt growth (Chart 5), while signalling potential for further reductions ahead. Looking to the week ahead, we anticipate more rate decisions across the region, with additional easing moves seen likely (Chart 6).

    Post-Golden Week China Chinese equity markets resumed trading last week after the Golden Week holidays, showing a marked repricing of market expectations (Chart 1). Initial optimism over central bank easing measures faced a reality check following government announcements. Specifically, China’s National Development and Reform Commission outlined initiatives for October, including 200 billion yuan ($28.3 billion) in advance budget spending. However, despite the significance of these measures, a larger-scale stimulus package that many had anticipated was not announced. After initial market disappointment, Financial Minister Lan held a press conference last Saturday, pledging to bolster China’s economy. However, some observers were still underwhelmed by the lack of specific numerical commitments. Looking ahead, China will release its Q3 GDP figures on Friday, which are keenly awaited as indicators of the economy's health. This will be accompanied by a range of monthly data, including industrial production, retail sales, fixed asset investment, house prices, and unemployment figures. However, insights from these figures on the impact of the recent easing measures are expected to be limited.

  • In this week’s newsletter, we explore regional monetary policy, China’s Golden Week holidays, and Japan’s political landscape. Despite the Fed's 50 bps cut in September, many central banks in the Asia opted to maintain their current policy rates, largely due to domestic factors (Chart 1). However, we may see more exceptions this week, as both New Zealand and potentially South Korea appear poised to reduce rates (Chart 2). Inflation trends are also crucial, with recent price pressures easing thanks to declining energy costs. Nevertheless, escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle East could hamper progress toward disinflation (Chart 3). Turning to China, recent easing measures have been positively received by markets. However, we observed preliminary signs of price stabilization in Hong Kong markets as Chinese markets undergo the Golden Week holidays (Chart 4). We also examine the potential spillover effects of China’s easing, particularly through currency fluctuations (see Chart 5) and the impact of the easing measures on consumer sentiment and spending. Finally, we examine Japan’s political landscape, focusing on market reactions to Ishiba’s appointment as Prime Minister. His dovish remarks have bolstered Japanese equities while contributing to renewed weakness in the yen (see Chart 6).

    Updates on monetary policy While the Fed's 50 bps cut in September opened the door for central banks in the Asia-Pacific region to follow suit, many chose to maintain their current policy rates (Chart 1), primarily due to domestic considerations. Notably, the central banks of Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and Malaysia left their rates unchanged in September. For instance, Australia's central bank remains concerned about inflation, while Taiwan's central bank is focused on issues like household debt and the property market. Meanwhile, Malaysia's central bank sees no immediate need to begin an easing cycle, as inflation is under control and growth remains steady. Additionally, maintaining the current policy rates may be beneficial for some economies from a yield perspective, as yield differentials have either become more favourable (or less unfavourable) for their respective currencies.

  • In this week's newsletter, we delve into key developments in Asia, focusing on China. Last week, China’s central bank (PBoC) announced a series of easing measures, including cuts to reserve requirements and interest rates (Chart 1). It also implemented targeted assistance for the struggling property sector, lowering mortgage rates and down payment requirements (Chart 2). Also, China’s Politburo pledged new support to bolster the economy, particularly for real estate, amidst disappointing economic data that have amplified concerns about meeting the 5% growth target for the year. Notably, these measures were announced just before China’s Golden Week holidays, starting this Tuesday. While initial market reactions have been positive (Chart 3), scepticism lingers due to the limited time remaining for these measures to impact growth.

    Shifting to Australia, the central bank (RBA) maintained its policy settings in September, diverging from the easing trends seen in many G10 economies. This decision reflects ongoing inflation concerns (Chart 4), particularly from high services inflation (Chart 5). However, justifications for future easing remain, given weak domestic growth and increased mortgage burdens on households.

    Finally, in Japan, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) maintained a dovish stance following July's financial market volatility, signalling continued patience regarding further tightening as inflation measures remain subdued for now (Chart 6). Additionally, in the political arena, the leadership change in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is worth monitoring, having prompted negative market reactions so far and with observers now focused on the upcoming general elections on October 27th.

    China’s fresh easing measures In an effort to strengthen a struggling economy, China's central bank (PBoC) announced a series of easing measures last Friday 27th September, following Governor Pan's earlier remarks a few days before. The central bank specifically reduced the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) for banks by 50 bps and lowered the 7-day reverse repo rate by 20 bps (Chart 1). Pan also hinted in his Tuesday remarks that the RRR could be further decreased by an additional 25 to 50 bps, depending on market liquidity later in the year. Furthermore, he indicated that these measures could lead to a decline in the medium-term lending facility rate by about 30 bps and a decrease in the loan prime rate by 20 to 25 bps.

  • In this week's newsletter, we explore the recent series of central bank decisions in Asia, framed by the Fed’s 50 bps rate cut last week. The Fed's move to begin its easing cycle has opened the door for regional central banks to follow suit, particularly in light of yield differentials (Chart 1). However, unique economic conditions may lead individual central banks to pursue independent paths. For instance, we examine the Bank of Japan’s decision to maintain its policy stance last week, discussing the implications of financial market volatility and the potential for future tightening moves this year (Chart 2). In Taiwan, the central bank kept its policy rate high due to persistent inflation, while also raising reserve requirements to address property market –related concerns (Chart 3). Conversely, some central banks, such as Indonesia’s, have preemptively cut rates, benefiting from more favorable yield differentials for the rupiah (Chart 4). Looking ahead, we will also cover the Reserve Bank of Australia’s upcoming decision, where observers largely expect no changes to the policy rate, also due to inflation concerns, despite significant financial strains on households (Chart 5). Finally, we will touch on the monetary policies of other central banks in Asia, specifically those of Thailand and Malaysia (Chart 6).

    The Fed’s easing cycle The US Fed officially began its easing cycle last week with a 50 basis point rate cut, meeting the expectations of some economists while surprising others who anticipated a more conservative 25 basis point cut. This decision reinforces the broader trend of easing among G10 central banks and creates opportunities for central banks in the Asia-Pacific region to consider similar actions, depending on their domestic conditions. The Fed's move also alleviates concerns about the potential impact of yield differentials stemming from their easing policies. Notably, some central banks in the region had already initiated interest rate cuts ahead of the Fed, a topic we will explore in more detail below.

  • In this week's newsletter, we examine China and highlight growing economic concerns. Investors had already expressed scepticism about China’s growth prospects even before the recent data were released (Chart 1). But this scepticism has been further validated by the latest figures, which show ongoing – and often worse than expected - deterioration (Chart 2). However, there is a hint of optimism: China's exports surpassed expectations in August, although import figures were disappointing (Chart 3). Consumer price pressures are increasing, but not severely, while producer prices continue to decline (Chart 4). As for the labour market, youth unemployment remains in double digits, with a significant rise in July, but potentially due to seasonal factors (Chart 5). Lastly, investor sentiment remains cautious, as indicated by continued outflows from Chinese equities, falling stock prices, and a generally negative market mood (Chart 6).

    The China outlook China’s recovery remains uneven, with GDP growth slowing significantly to 4.7% y/y in Q2 versus 5.3% in Q1 (Chart 1). And pockets of instability persist. The property sector, for example, continues to struggle, with house prices having fallen more sharply in recent months despite numerous efforts by the authorities to address excess supply and stimulate demand. China continues to face external challenges as well, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector, among others. Major economies, including the EU and Canada, have recently followed the US in imposing tariffs on imports of China-made EVs. Against this backdrop, Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BCEI) panelists downgraded their outlook for China this month. They now forecast GDP growth of 4.7% for 2024 and 4.3% for 2025, down from respective projections of 4.8% and 4.4% last month. These adjustments suggest that China is now seen unlikely to achieve its 5% growth target for this year.

  • In this week's newsletter, we explore Asia’s manufacturing activity, with a particular emphasis on the semiconductor sector. While that sector continues to expand overall, some economies are experiencing a slowdown in growth (Chart 1). We also assess the growing role of electronics in Asian exports, highlighting Taiwan's significant increase in electronics export share and South Korea's ongoing recovery in this area (Chart 2). Focusing further on the electronics sector, we note an interim stall in global semiconductor sales growth, although it remains robust with double-digit increases (Chart 3). We then delve into specific Asian economies, starting with Taiwan. Here, we identify dual drivers of industrial production: consumer electronics and electronic parts, including semiconductors (Chart 4). Next, we examine Malaysia, which has developed a strong semiconductor ecosystem with expertise in back-end processes and is more recently making headway in front-end areas like chip design (Chart 5). Finally, we consider India’s emerging semiconductor sector, which, despite being in its early stages, is poised for growth thanks to recent initiatives aimed at bolstering domestic prowess (Chart 6).

    Asia’s manufacturing complex The manufacturing sector across much of Asia continues to expand, although recent months have seen a deceleration in the rate of growth for some economies. As illustrated in Chart 1, Taiwan's manufacturing PMI peaked at 53.2 in June 2024 but subsequently moderated to 51.5 in August, reflecting a significant slowdown in growth for output and new orders. A similar trend is evident in Southeast Asia (ASEAN), where the PMI has recently edged closer to the neutral level of 50. Within ASEAN, Indonesia has been a notable drag, with its PMI slipping into contractionary territory in July, while Vietnam's PMI has remained above the regional average. In contrast, South Korea's manufacturing sector has shown robust momentum, with output growth reaching a 40-month high in August, thereby supporting the overall manufacturing PMI for the country.