Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Robert Brusca

Robert A. Brusca is Chief Economist of Fact and Opinion Economics, a consulting firm he founded in Manhattan. He has been an economist on Wall Street for over 25 years. He has visited central banking and large institutional clients in over 30 countries in his career as an economist. Mr. Brusca was a Divisional Research Chief at the Federal Reserve Bank of NY (Chief of the International Financial markets Division), a Fed Watcher at Irving Trust and Chief Economist at Nikko Securities International. He is widely quoted and appears in various media.   Mr. Brusca holds an MA and Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University and a BA in Economics from the University of Michigan. His research pursues his strong interests in non aligned policy economics as well as international economics. FAO Economics’ research targets investors to assist them in making better investment decisions in stocks, bonds and in a variety of international assets. The company does not manage money and has no conflicts in giving economic advice.

Publications by Robert Brusca

  • UK industrial orders (CBI Survey) jumped to -20 in February from -30 in January. The jump put orders back at their 12-month average (-21). Orders had been slipping steadily with averages over 12-months at -21 over 6-months at -25 and 3-Mo at -24 (or -29 as of one month ago). This month’s rebound not only boosts the 3-Mo average reading, but it takes the current month sharply higher breaking the cycle of deterioration.

    Export orders were similarly impacted with a -21 average over 12-months and -24 over six-months. That average is cut to -21 over three months in February but last month the 3-month average was a much weaker -27. This month’s surge in export orders has turned around the deterioration for export orders as well.

    Still, total orders only rank in their 35th percentile among order data back to 1992. Export orders are relatively stronger in February at a 55.6 percentile standing, above their historic median on data back to 1992. That is somewhat surprising given the widespread weakness in Europe. Part of the reason is that about 12% of UK exports go to the US where growth is performing much better. Still, the UK’s top 25 export markets account for 54% of UK exports that go to Europe.

    Stocks of finished goods on hand weaken on the month falling to +11 from +18 in January and are now not much different from their average over 3-months, 6-months, and 12-months.

    The outlook for output volume over the next 3-months slipped from +7 in January to +4 in February but the +4 reading, while a step back, is consistent with the past averages. Output expectations are in their lower third historic ranking at a 33.5 percentile standing, weaker than export orders on a standing basis but in line with total orders.

    Pricing is a surprise...prices were last higher than this in July of last year. Prices had slipped to a reading of +7 in December and +9 in January but have now jumped in February to +17. This compares to a 12-Month average of 15, and three-month and six-month averages at +11. The UK has been showing inflation progress that has been substantial and ongoing in terms of the Consumer index followed and targeted by the Bank of England. The CBI survey reading suggests there has been a sharp reversal for industrial prices in February. Globally goods prices have been weak along with the manufacturing sector. But now CBI industrial prices’ standing has been boosted to their 77th percentile, a reading that is quite firm and bordering on "strong".

    The UK survey is a mixed report in February largely because of the inflation reading. Orders show some welcome rise is in progress. Expected output backed-off some of the recent acceleration but remains around recent average levels that show weak expansion. However, prices are sharply higher. With the UK registering recession now and the Bank of England focused on getting control of inflation, this pop in the CBI inflation survey metric is unwelcome news.

  • Dutch confidence in February improved to -27 from -28, a ‘small-potatoes’ gain mired in still-deeply net negative readings. The climate reading did worse, falling to -41 in February from -39 in January. But the willingness to buy improved to -17 from -20.

    So, what do these index numbers really mean? We can first compare them to historic readings back to 1990. On that basis the three metrics are closely bunched in terms of their ranking. The queue percentile standings that evaluate each index number compared to its own history on this same time-line back to 1990 find them all at a standing ranking from the 18th-percentile to the 22nd percentile. That’s a tight bunching and a set of readings in approximately the lower one fifth of their historic queue of values. A lower 20th percentile reading is weak.

    The progression of changes over 12-months to 6-months to 3-months shows a fairly steady increase over different periods (if you were to put them on a common per-month or per 12-month change basis). This is reinforced in the chart where there seems to be a liner progression higher that is relatively stable.

    This means the confidence metrics are improving and doing so steadily but also quite slowly.

    The table also provides change data back to just before Covid ran loose. The changes show all three metrics net lower on balance from their respective readings on January 2020. The climate variable has worsened the most followed by confidence overall with the willingness to buy metric seeing the smallest short-fall of the bunch. When it comes to shopping never underestimate the consumer. Shopping is a birthright, a palliative when things go wrong, it is a habit hard to stop even when the consumer has no money. As long as there is credit, there is shopping. Amen. No wonder willingness to buy is the least affected metric here, since Covid.

    The Dutch economy is still struggling. Industrial production in manufacturing, like confidence, is trimming its year-on year negatives and is improving- but still declining on balance.

    The Dutch manufacturing PMI survey moved up sharply in January but still did not quite climb all the way back to the neutral reading of 50.

    Retail spending is also falling on balance over 12-months, but again, those 12-month declines have been diminishing as time has passed.

    The evidence on the Dutch economy is that there is some progress being made but it is razor thin and slow. Of course, the outlook is brightened by the diminishing inflation rate in EMU and the added flexibility that will give the ECB in making policy looking ahead. Still, current conditions are negative on balance but still roughly stable while undergoing a snail’s pace repair. A call for hedged optimism is appropriate.

  • Retail sales in January rose 3.9% after falling 3.7% in December and rising in November. The sequential pattern of nominal growth rates shows a pickup from 3.8% over 12-months to 4.4% over 6-months to 4.9% over 3-months.

    During a period when inflation has been on the move changes in nominal retail sales are not the best indicator of what's going on with sales volumes. However, real retail sales (sales volumes) in the UK show a pickup with real sales volumes up 0.7% over 12-months, at a 1.7% annual rate over six-months, and surging at a 5.9% annual rate over three-months. Retail sales volumes show real sales in January rose by 3.4% after falling 3.3% in December and rising in November- the same general pattern as for nominal sales.

    Passenger car registrations have fallen for three months in a row, and they show gathering weakness. Registrations are up by 7.5% over 12-months but they're falling at a 4.7% annual rate over six-months, and at a 17.1% annual rate over three-months. This is an important category for retail spending; automobile registrations are weakening and weakening more seriously.

    Surveys on retail sales are mixed in their message. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) looks at retail sales for the time of year and finds conditions worsening in recent months with a change in assessment of -6 in November turning to -9 in December and to -22 in January. That same CBI survey shows a reading change of -44 over 12 months -46 over 6-months and -37 over 3-months. All of these are net negative numbers and are simple changes unadjusted for the length of the time span. It is consistent deterioration.

    The CBI survey also offers a survey on the volume of orders looking at year-over-year changes. The year-over-year pattern monthly is irregular with a + 15 in November a - 32 in December and a + 18 in January. Over 12 months CBI order volumes year-over-year register a drop of -4 over 6-months, an increase of +3, and over three-months a change of plus one. The plus one reading shows erosion in upward momentum compared to +3 over 6 months but it's still a positive reading.

    The GFK reading on consumer confidence is a +3 in January from +2 in December, but both of those gains are lower than the +6 reading for November. Sequentially consumer confidence has slowed its gains slightly with a +26 reading over 12-months compared to readings of +11 over 6 months. The +11 ga over three months would be quite strong if it kept up for 12-months; then it would trump the +26 gain, logged over 12-months.

    The table also chronicles the growth rate for the CPIH. There we see that the inflation rate for 12 months six months to three months has gradually been coming down, which is a good development.

    Quarter to date (QTD) statistics are relatively ephemeral at this stage since we're looking only at January compared to the fourth quarter average. On that basis nominal sales are up strongly at a 10.4% annual rate, real sales are up at a 9.9% annual rate, passenger car registrations are falling at a nearly 20% annual rate. The survey data from the CBI shows retail sales for the time of year weaker with a -30 drop, although the volume of orders is higher and GfK consumer confidence improves.

    The far-right hand column evaluates the growth of the Year-over-year percentage changes for ordinary retail sales data versus ranking on the index levels for the surveys. These show a middling 55.6 percentile standing for sales growth, although for the volume of sales, conditions appear much weaker with the real sales increase at only a 33-percentile standing in the bottom 1/3 of its historic range of values. The pace for passenger car registrations the year-over-year reading still has a nearly 72-percentile standing, but shorter terms growth rates show that is being undercut. The CBI assessment of sales for time of year is a very weak 1.6 percentile standing, the volume of orders year over year has an 8.6 percentile standing, and consumer confidence reading has a 35-percentile standing. All the surveys show weak conditions. These are conditions that are very weak in comparison with historic norms.

    Summing up UK economy has been struggling. The recent GDP figure showed the 2nd decline in a row for real GDP conditions in the retail sector. Retail sales are somewhat mixed with current spending holding up better than expected but the more forward-looking gauges from the CBI and the relative position of consumer confidence would indicate caution in interpreting those events. Retail sales have had a pickup recently, but year-over-year growth is still modest and survey data on merchant plans is weak...

  • A rule of thumb recession signal? I am generally not impressed with the signal of two declines in a row for GDP as an indicator for recession. News reports today are heralding the triggering of a ' technical recession’ signal for the UK, I will once again make the point that two negative quarters of GDP growth in a row is hardly a signal that is ‘technical’ this is a ‘rule of thumb’ judgement that is being rendered.

    A rule of thumb signal, but trouble nonetheless The signal and the conclusion of recession based on this quirky measure mostly gives market participants a very quick and dirty way to assess what the economy is doing and how severe its circumstance might be. In this case, however, the depth of the GDP decline appears to be a little bit more severe than we have seen in other countries. The breadth of the declines across GDP categories suggests that this is something more serious than just the observation of two quarterly declines in GDP in a row. The UK economy appears to be in more serious trouble.

    One of the first things to notice in the GDP table above is that while GDP has declined for two quarters in a row, it has logged the more severe, 1.4% drop at an annual rate, in the fourth quarter and the more modest -0.5% at an annual rate in the third quarter. Still, domestic demand grew by 1.2% in the fourth quarter after falling by 1.9% in the third quarter, domestic demand is somewhat weak but also choppy and unstable. Yet it is showing some resilience despite the overarching decline in GDP.

    Year-on-year weakness, too However, in the lower panel of this table, we also see that this two-quarter decline in GDP, combined with previous quarterly weakness, generates a year-over-year decline in GDP and that makes the two quarter in a row decline a more serious event. In addition to GDP weakness, housing investment is falling year-over-year, exports and imports are both falling. Although, once again, as a counterpoint. domestic demand is rising by 3.1% year-over-year after another solid year-on-year gain in Q3 that began a recovery after a previous period of year-on-yar demand declines.

    Weakening production One additional thing that I explore when I see weakness like this, is industrial production. On the industrial production front, we find even more weakness with fourth-quarter growth in the UK and manufacturing falling at a 3.6% annual rate: that's a relatively stepped-up pace of decline. In fact, consumer durables output is falling by 4% at an annual rate, intermediate goods output is falling at an 8.6% annual rate and Capital goods output is falling at a 3.7% annual rate. All of this adds to the notion of the economy weakening severely and broadly and with GDP also lower on balance over one-year this weakness assessment seems to go over the duration hurdle as well.

    What makes weakness a recession? The three-metrics we look for to assess recession are (1) the depth of weakness, (2) the breadth of weakness, and (3) the duration of weakness. UK GDP falls quarter-to-quarter at the faster pace of 1.4% annualized in the current quarter. Is weakness gathering momentum? And, while industrial production in Manufacturing falls at an annualized pace of 3.6% in Q4, IP rises by 2.3% year-on-year in December. Still, other GDP components are considerably weak, as housing investment falls by 9% year-on-year, exports drop 10.3%, imports, which are linked to international competition as well as to domestic demand, fall by 2% year-on-year. Clearly domestic demand has helped imports to grow (and domestic demand is a clear positive for the economy, even though in the GDP framework an import rise subtracts from GDP). Exports are a drag on GDP as they fall; their weakness is a clear signal that the international sector is not helping the UK economy at all.

    A profile of weakness The UK economy on profile is weaker that the Euro-Area where GDP is simply crawling at a slow-flat pace. The US is a marked contrast showing robust growth and acceleration.

    The good news is that UK inflation is falling and that the core rate is on top of the Bank of England’s target over 3-months; the six-month inflation pace is falling sharply, but the targeted 12-month pace is still sticker and well above the target.

    Consumer Confidence (GFK) has stabilized and even strengthened but it is still weak and retail sales volumes are weakening.

    The overarching view is weak The UK eco-data, not just the GDP report, paint a picture of an economy in decline hinting at several kinds of stresses – but several key stresses are missing too. The pound sterling has remained firm-to-strong on a real effective exchange rate basis. That adds to confidence, but it does not assist in generating growth through exports. Various CBI surveys show a weakening economy. Surprisingly, the UK PMI surveys for manufacturing and services have been strengthening. The cyclically sensitive passenger car sector has been relatively steady, and the UK job market has been ‘resilient.’ When recessions hit the job market that is when the fur really begins to fly and various knock-on effects spread. Moreover, the financial sector is still stable.

    Fine until it’s not… Of course, in recession, everything can be simply fine until it isn’t. The analogy that it is a little like a dam bursting is illustrative. Before it breaks, everything is fine, some may have had a premonition and may have taken action. Then, suddenly it isn’t OK. When the dam breaks, various things are set in motion and those on high ground may be protected – if it is high enough. Who is protected in a recession is always hard to say; it depends on the kind of recession, and its severity and the speed of its onset. The Covid recession, for example, was an extreme event, very sharp, very broad...and very short. But the aftermath of the recession is also a period of ongoing disruption in which repairs are being made. Normalcy does not instantly set in when recession ends. Some recoveries are still painful. For now, The UK economy is showing some unraveling, but it is also still at a measured pace. This could be an inflection point where things either get worse or where this is the worst of it, and conditions settle down. The stable jobs market and stable financial sector are points in favor of this remaining a tempest, that only modestly spills out of the tea pot. But the UK is clearly in a zone where there is merit to close-watching. The Conference Board LEI for the UK has weakened sharply and that also bears watching, however, internationally LEI signals have not been having their finest hour.

  • There will be no hearts and flowers for GDP growth in the European Monetary Union on Valentine's Day. However, the revisions to GDP have kept the growth rate from turning negative in the fourth quarter (Q/Q measure). The third quarter negative number for Q/Q growth gave rise to concerns that the revision to GDP could take forth quarter growth into negative territory and that would trigger the analysis that the economy had dipped into recession.

    Really?

    ‘Technical’ recession? Ha! You may read articles saying that the economy has avoided ‘technical’ recession. However, I don't know about you, but since very early elementary school I haven't thought of 1 + 1 equaling 2 being ‘technical’ for quite a while. The notion that two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth are recession is anything but a technical definition of anything. Instead, that is a ‘rule of thumb’ definition of recession. And a rule of thumb is anything but technical, it is ‘one-off,’ ‘on the fly,’ a ‘quick study.’

    The notion of two consecutive quarters as a recession I believe has been popularized because it can take the official agencies that designate periods as recessions quite a while to make the call that the economy is in recession. And the notion that two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth mark a recession is something that's simple and can be known immediately.

    On the other hand, taking a rule of thumb like this as something that is literally true obviously has shortcomings. There are also good reasons not to have a knee-jerk fast declaration of recession. European Monetary Union GDP fell by 0.5% at an annual rate in the third quarter of 2023; it's now risen by 0.2% at an annual rate in the fourth quarter. Had it been three tenths of a percentage point weaker (at an annual rate in the fourth quarter) would it really have made that much difference to anything?

    I don't think so.

    One bullet dodged The U.S. has already, in the post COVID period logged two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth without having anyone (except a few with a political axe to grind) seriously suggesting that the U.S. economy was in recession during those two quarters. The declines in GDP for the U.S. were modest and at the same time job growth was enormous during those quarters.

    What recessions are Recessions are special periods; and, while the extreme economic weakness in the U.S. economy during COVID was barely three months long, that period has been designated a recession. It should not be a poster child for recession dating. The point is that the COVID period was very unusual. The decline in GDP was extremely severe, and it was broad across the economy. However, the period was also extremely short. When recession daters look at recessionary candidate periods, they're looking to find economic activity that has been (1) severely impacted, (2) that has affected the economy broadly, and (3) that has lasted for a sufficiently long period of time to disrupt the economy and earn the designation as a recession. This is why it generally takes recession-dating experts some time before they pull the trigger on calling a period a recession or not. The COVID period is a notable example of a period that was very short and did not fulfill the length criterion but had impacted the breadth and the depth criteria so deeply that it was construed as a recession anyway. The main reason for this is probably the severe increase in the unemployment rate that occurred even though that unemployment rate during recovery came down quite rapidly.

    The trappings of recession In Europe, we see none of the trappings of recession. The sense already is that inflation has flared and is starting to come down. We are not left with the opinion that the central bank is going to have to keep pounding interest rates higher until the economy is pulverized. Unemployment rates throughout the European Union remain extremely low and among the the lowest as a group that the Monetary Union has had since it was formed. But there are still a lot of economic risks and things that could go wrong. But the economy simply does not exhibit a lot of the characteristics we would need to see to support the call of recession. Financial distress is mostly absent.

    Soft growth and political pressure However, the European economy is in a definite soft spot, a flat spot, and it's underperforming. The proximity of the European Monetary Union to the war in Ukraine is one of the main reasons. And now with more conflict in the Middle East with the Suez channel shuttered, there is another blow that the European economy will have to deal with. Europe, like the U.S., is beginning to creak under the burden of supporting the war in Ukraine. And there has been political backlash from this support in the U.S. in the form of concerns about all the spending that helps people on foreign shores. While in the European Monetary Union, the most immediate recent impact has been on farmers who are concerned about cheap Ukrainian grains in the EMU and the removal of gasoline subsidies to the farm sector that is already under pressure.

    Growth data have some positives The table shows both quarter-to-quarter data for the most recent three quarters and year-over-year data for the previous four-quarters. Year-over-year data show only one country’s growth rate observation in Q4 is decelerating compared to the year-over-year growth rate in the third quarter. GDP on a year-over-year basis is not broadly decelerating in the European Monetary Union or across most of its early reporting members- the Netherlands is the lone exception. This is a far more important observation than the fact that 0.2% is a positive number and it's not -0.1%. Similarly, quarter-to-quarter growth shows broader increases in Q2 compared to Q1 and broadly increases in Q4 compared to Q3, while the third quarter shows widespread growth decelerations that appear now be a one-quarter phenomenon- peak weakness was Q3.

    The U.S. as bellwether If the U.S. is an indication, the global economy is beginning to pick up. Global PMI data already are showing indications that the service sectors have stopped slowing and the manufacturing sectors - on whatever metrics they have been reporting - are not getting weaker.

  • Global| Feb 13 2024

    ZEW Divergence!!

    The current macroeconomic situation The assessments of the ZEW experts on current macroeconomic conditions show conditions moving in opposite directions in the United States versus Germany and Europe. In February, U.S. conditions are improving as the economic situation moves up sharply to a reading of 34.0 from the previous reading of 15.3. For Germany, conditions worsen from a January rating of -77.3 to a reading of -81.7 in February. For the euro area, conditions do improve slightly, moving from -59.3 in January to -53.4 in February. However, the chart shows that broadly, conditions in the U.S. are moving up sharply as conditions in Germany and Europe have been deteriorating even with the euro area making a small move toward better conditions in February.

    Expectations Expectations in Germany, however, improved slightly, moving up to 19.9 in February from 15.2 in January. In the U.S., there's a small improvement in expectations from -8.3 in January to -6.1 in February.

    Rankings for the diffusion metrics In terms of rankings, the queue positioning of the U.S. and Germany on these two important macroeconomic statistics are quite different. The U.S. has an economic situation that ranks in its 51st percentile, above its historic median. Germany’s queue percentile reading is in its 9.6 percentile and the euro area reading is in its 30th percentile for the economic situation. In terms of expectations, the German expectation is higher at its 49th percentile, near its median standing, while U.S. expectations stand at their 40th percentile, still below their median. U.S. economic performance may be strong and trending higher, but expectations are not hitched to that rising star.

    Inflation is subdued Inflation expectations are still low everywhere; they weaken in the euro area and in Germany. Expectations for inflation rise slightly in the U.S. to -58.6 in February from -64.6 in January. However, these are diffusion indexes that, in these ranges, don't have a lot of meaning, since the U.S. ranking for inflation expectations is in its lower 5-percentile, for Germany it's in the lower 9.6 percentile, and for the euro area expectations are in their lower 6-percentile. All these are very weak readings for inflation expectations. The ZEW experts continue to believe inflation is under control.

    Interest rates For interest rates the readings for both the euro area and the U.S. weakened as in both areas the ZEW experts are looking for easier monetary policy. The readings for long-term interest rates also eased to lower levels as well in the U.S. and Germany. And for the U.S. and the euro area and monetary policy as well as for the U.S. and Germany for longer term interest rates, all the rankings run in their lower 10-percentile, continuing the outlook for low rates.

  • Portugal’s inflation data trends paint a mixed picture if looked at strictly. However, looked at more broadly, it is clear that the minor inflation backtracking is the exception while inflation falling and behaving is the rule.

    Portugal’s HICP index in January rose by 0.5% month-to-month after being flat in December and falling 0.3% in November. Portugal’s national CPI also rose relatively sharply on the month, gaining 0.6% month-to-month in January after rising by 0.1% in December and being flat in November. The core rate in the national CPI rose by just 0.2% in January, the same as December, compared to a November performance that was flat month-to-month.

    Inflation trends The overall HICP measure shows inflation decelerating despite the month’s jump. Twelve-month inflation is up 2.6%, over six months it rises by 1.9%, and over three months the inflation rate is at a 1.0% rate. The national CPI is more equivocal, rising by 2.3% over 12 months, accelerating to a 2.9% pace over six months, and settling at a 2.8% annual rate over three months. Despite that slight acceleration and stickiness for the headline, the core for the national CPI shows clear deceleration from a 2.4% gain over 12 months, to 1.7% at annual rate over six months, to a 1.4% annual rate over three months. On balance, inflation trends in Portugal seem to be in good shape and not only are the three-month and six-month inflation rates homing in on the ECB's target, but the 12-month inflation rates also are only a stone’s throw from the target set for the euro zone established by the European Central Bank.

    Inflation acceleration/deceleration Inflation diffusion in January shows month-to-month inflation across categories accelerating in half of them, the same as in December. Despite the weaker November headline performance, inflation accelerated in 58% of the categories in November.

    Looking at inflation acceleration trends sequentially on broader periods, we have a much more satisfying result. Over 12 months inflation accelerates in 25% of the categories, while over six months inflation accelerates in 41.7% of the categories. That's a step up in the proportion accelerating but still less than 50% of them. And over three months, inflation is back to accelerating in only 25% of the categories. All of this is descriptive of an inflation rate that is coming to heel and doing so consistently.

    Price declines Looking at the 12 categories in the national CPI rate in January, six of them showed declines in prices month-to-month; that compares to only two that declined month-to-month in December and seven that showed month-to-month declines in November.

    The broader sequential data show prices declining over three months in six of the categories; over six months, prices decline in four categories; over 12 months prices decline in only two categories.

    It's not that surprising to see fewer price declines over 12 months than over three months because the shorter-term data are intrinsically more volatile. However, there's also a powerful sense of trend here in which inflation is behaving and part of that behavior has prices not just decelerating but declining. Over three months there has been a double-digit decline in prices measured at an annual rate for clothing & footwear. There is a decline of 2.7% at an annual rate for household furnishings and a decline of 2% at an annual rate for transportation as well as a 1.9% drop at an annual rate for recreation & culture. Inflation is falling at a 1.6% annual rate for alcoholic beverages & tobacco.

  • German inflation falls- German inflation fell in January with the HICP headline falling in the month, logging a decline of 0.1% in January after spurting by 0.6% in December. The core HICP wave accelerated to 0.3% in January from 0.2% in December.

    German inflation rises- The German domestic CPI inflation measure accelerated to 0.4% in January from a 0% performance in December; the CPI ex-energy rose by 0.3% after rising 0.2% in December.

    What really matters in how it’s trending, not its month-to-month gyrations- What you conclude about inflation depends a lot on how you tend to look at it. The year-over-year HICP rose by 3.1% in January, down sharply from its 3.8% pace in December. But then, in November, inflation had been up by only 2.2% so the path for German headline HICP inflation is somewhat jagged. Core inflation that tends to be more stable rose by 3.7% year-over-year in January compared to a 3.7% increase in December. That’s stable, but both of those are down from where inflation had been which is 4% in November, 4.9% in October, and 5.5% in September; that compares to 6.9% in August and a rate of more than 7% in June and July of 2023. Clearly inflation is and has decelerated in the big picture. Core inflation, which does a better job of nailing down the sustainable trend, has flattened out over the last two months. More broadly, a core measure shows German inflation has come down quickly and is hovering in a much lower range than it was in 2023. But at 3.7%, inflation in Germany is still a far cry from the 2% target that the European Central Bank has for the euro area.

    Shorter periods show lower HICP inflation- Of course, the German data also show a lot more inflation behaving if we measure inflation over shorter periods. For example, the HICP inflation rate expands by 3.1% over 12 months, at a 1.9% annual rate over six months, and at a 2.5% annual rate over three months. The core HICP rises by 3.7% year-over-year, by 2.1% at an annual rate over six months, and then takes up to a 2.3% annual rate over three months. Inflation is not sequentially deteriorating, but it clearly is on its way lower as the three-month inflation rates for the headline and the core are both markedly below their year-over-year pace. That's a strong score for the concept of inflation unwinding.

    Domestic prices are even better- The domestic CPI, the headline shows clearer deceleration from 2.9% over 12 months, to a 2.2% annual rate over six months, to a 1.4% annual rate over three months. The CPI excluding energy on the domestic measure rises 3.4% over 12 months, at a 2.8% annual rate over six months, then steps down to a 2.5% annual rate over three months. The domestic gauge shows inflation much more clearly decelerating and the deceleration takes the inflation pace to a much lower and more benign rate. The headline on a three-month basis is already below the target for the ECB and the six-month pace for inflation is within a stone’s throw of it while for the CPI excluding energy the 2% target is getting in range.

    Monthly breadth- Diffusion indexes for inflation measure the breadth of inflation: is inflation accelerating (breadth>50%), or decelerating (diffusion<50%). In January and in December inflation diffusion is over 63%, implying that inflation is accelerating in more categories than it's decelerating. However, the January and December results come after November; in November inflation did not accelerate in any categories! Diffusion was zero so there was a broad slowdown for inflation in November and then a rebound in December and in January.

    Sequential inflation breadth- Sequentially inflation diffusion is better behaved over broader periods. Over 12 months diffusion is 27%, over six months it's 36%, and over three months it's back to 27%. On all these horizons, 12-month, six-month, and three-month, inflation is clearly decelerating compared to the period before. In the case of these statistics, we compare 12-month inflation to inflation one-year ago; six-month inflation is compared to 12-month inflation; three-month inflation compares to six-month inflation. Note that the deceleration of inflation is made off the domestic report where both headline and core inflation rates are showing sequential inflation falling.

  • Japan's economy watchers current index fell to 50.2 in January from a level of 51.8 in December; its queue standing is in its 70.4 percentile, still well above its historic median that occurs at a rank of 50% but more in the range of readings that are indicating relatively firm economic activity.

    In contrast, the economy watchers future index rose to 52.5 in January from 50.4 in December. The future index has an 83.8 percentile standing, considerably stronger in ranking than the current index and more clearly at a standing level that indicates more strength.

    The Current Index The index showed a decline in the headline as well as declines in six components of the index. The reading for households fell, the reading for the retailing sector fell, the reading for eating and drinking places fell – and fell relatively sharply, the reading for services fell, and the reading for corporations, generally, fell led by a decline in the assessment of nonmanufacturing corporations.

    Among the various entries under the current index, the strongest, despite the sharp drop in January, is the 86.6 percentile standing for eating and drinking places, followed by an 80.6 percentile standing for manufacturers. In the case of manufacturers, this likely is the result for Japanese firms benefiting from what has been a chronically weak yen at a time that international activity has begun to strengthen in a number of places. The U.S. economy continues to show stronger growth and the U.S. is Japan's second largest trading partner. However, Japan's largest trading partner is China, and that economy is struggling. The weakest ranking in the current index is for employment; it has a 47.8 percentile standing, leaving it below its historic median; however, the diffusion index still has a reading at 53.3 that improved month-to-month and continues to indicate employment is expanding. While the employment metric is the weakest current reading, housing is in second place at a 59.7 percentile standing.

    The Future Index Japan's future index is quite solid with a headline standing at its 83.8 percentile. Three of its components have rankings in their 90th percentile or higher: one is for households at the 90.1 percentile, another is for eating and drinking places at the 98.4 percentile, and a third is for services at the 92.1 percentile. Only one category weakened month-to-month; that was services. It weakened to a diffusion reading of 54.9 in January from 55.2 in December but continues to have a percentile standing in its 90th percentile at 92.1. The weakest future reading is the same as in the current indexes- employment. Employment in the future framework has a 53.8 percentile standing, only modestly above its historic median. The monthly future reading for employment stands at 53.2, up from 52.9 in December.

    Momentum Current- The current index shows weaker increases over 12 months than what occurred over 12 months one year ago; that's true up and down the line for components as well as the headline apart from manufacturing that shows a gain. Only retailing shows a decline in diffusion compared with the level of one year ago. Over six months, seven of the categories plus the headline show declines in value. Over three months, five categories plus the headline show declines in their surveyed diffusion indexes. The current index clearly has been losing momentum for a while.

    Future- The future index also shows smaller increases over 12 months than it logged over the previous 12 months for all categories except for eating and drinking places, manufacturers, and for employment. Each of those 3 categories show a step up in 12-month changes compared to what they had reported one year ago. Over six months, changes are weaker than they are over 12 months for most components; all components are weaker on balance over six months including the headline except for manufacturers. The manufacturers’ future reading shows persistent acceleration over three months and over six months as well as over 12 months (compared to 12 months ago). The headline reading over three months in the future index shows broad-based increases; these increases are larger than the changes posted over six months for the most part. There is only one exception to that and that's housing; it is weaker on balance over three months.

  • German industrial output fell in December by 1.6%, extending the episode of continuous month-to-month declines to the last four months and making it part of a period of an eight-month stretch in which there were six month-to-month declines interrupted by two months when output was stagnant. This has been very difficult stretch for German industrial output. The country depends on its industrial sector for economic leadership and growth. Germany has been a significant exporting country. The war in Ukraine has severely disrupted the functioning of the German economy partly because Germany was also doing a good deal of business with Russia before the war began.

    Industrial output trends German industrial output is falling sequentially, at a 3.1% annualized drop over 12 months, a 7.7% annualized drop over six months, and a 7.8% annualized drop over three months. Consumer goods and capital goods sectors show declines over each of these three horizons, but they don't show declines that are becoming sequentially worse. And both consumer and capital goods sectors show smaller annual rates of decline over three months than over 12 months. However, intermediate goods reveal a great deal of weakness as output falls by 4.6% over 12 months; that drop steps up to a pace of minus 15.9% over six months then the drop accelerates sharply over three months logging a minus 22.7% annual rate of decline.

    Construction The construction sector has also been logging steady declines in output construction shows sequential and worsening declines in output, falling 1.4% over 12 months but dropping at a 25.5% annual rate over three months.

    Other economic measures Manufacturing output shows worsening sequential declines, dropping by 3.9% over 12 months and contracting a 9.4% annual rate over three months. Real sales and manufacturing decline in all three horizons and the drop over three months at a 4.7% annual rate is greater than the pace of drop over 12 months which is kind of -3.4% pace; however, the decline in output in Germany is at a slightly slower pace over three months and over six months. Chair wheel manufacturing orders break this pattern of weakness showing a 2.1% increase over 12 months and a 20.4% annual rate of increase over three months, but this was propped up by some unusual aircraft orders the increase reflects a one- off event that isn't likely to be repeated.

    Surveys of industrial activity or expected activity Surveys of the German economy from ZEW, the IFO, and the EU Commission show weakening trends. The EU Commission and the ZEW indexes are diffusion indexes that show negative values over all three horizons and values that are gradually worsening. The IFO constructs indexes and these show manufacturing weakening from 12-months to three-months as well as expectations that are weaker over three months than over 12 months, but they managed to improve slightly from what they averaged over six months.

    IP snapshot from Other Europe Industrial production elsewhere in Europe is more mixed in December. French and Norwegian output rise while Spanish and Portuguese output falls. Sequentially French output is accelerating along with Portuguese output. Spanish output is decelerating, transitioning from a growth rate of -5.3% over 12 months to -20% at an annual rate over three months Norway fails to show a clear trend, but over three months output is up by 2.7% at an annual rate, better than its 0.9% gain over 12 months.

    Quarter-to-date (completed Q4) In the quarter-to-date, all the German industrial production measures show industrial declines. Real manufacturing orders show a minor increase of 0.4% at an annual rate. Three out of four surveys weakened over the quarter, with the IFO manufacturing expectations the exception, which improves slightly. Quarter-to-date output changes for other European reporters show a decline from Spain, against a small 0.2% increase in France, a small 0.8% increase in Norway, and a substantial 12.9% annual rate increase from Portugal.

    Historic assessments of performance The column on queue standings compares the various industrial measures to their appropriate measure of performance evaluated in the context of the last 24 years. Industrial production ranks in the lower 14.2% of its queue of growth rates over this period. The strongest industrial sector is capital goods and that has a 23.8 percentile standing, in the lower quartile of its historic queue of growth rates. Economic signals are weak for construction, for manufacturing, and for real sales; real manufacturing orders that have the distortion of one-time aircraft orders have a very strong 95.5 percentile standing. The various industrial surveys have standings that range from a low 5.2 percentile standing for manufacturing by the IFO, to a high 18.1 percentile standing for the EU Commission survey - all of these are quite weak standings. The growth rates of IP for the other four European countries show France above its median with a 55.1 percentile rank; Norway is close to its median of 50 with a 45.9 percentile rank. Spain and Portugal sport rankings in their 14.8- and 21.5-percentile, respectively.

  • Developed economy trends The OECD leading indicators for January show slight increases of 0.1% for the OECD Major 7 members. Japan shows a flat performance. The United States shows an increase of 0.1%. All of these top-of-the-table metrics are month-to-month changes. They follow identical month-to-month changes posted in January and December for each country or grouping.

    Annualized growth rates for these metrics show growth rates over 12 months, six months and three months that reveal acceleration for the OECD 7 group as the 12-month growth rate is -1.9%, the six-month growth rate rises to 0.8%, and the three-month growth rate is a slightly-improved 1.0%. Japan logs negative growth rates for all three periods, but its three- and six-month growth rates are less weak than its 12-month growth rate. The U.S. shows acceleration with the 12-month growth rate at -1.9%, a six-month growth rate of 1%, and a three-month growth rate of 1.3%. The far-right hand column ranks these three OECD units on their index levels; all three regions stand below their respective medians which means they have rankings below the 50th percentile on data back to late-1999.

    The OECD prefers to view the signals of its indicators over six months. The next panel on the table looks at changes in six-month averages. On this metric, six-month growth rates from six months ago, are positive for the OECD 7, for the U.S., and for China, while Japan posts a flat performance on this measure in January after rising in December. Sequential growth rates are presented to the right for six-month periods on a point-to-point basis for nonoverlapping rates of growth. The OECD 7 shows accelerating results. Japan shows mixed results. U.S. growth rates show acceleration and Chinese growth rates show acceleration. China’s growth rates are in sync with those from the U.S. The right-hand column offers percentile standings against six-month growth rates for data back to 1999. Each of the OECD metrics shows a standing above its median (which occurs at the 50% mark) except for Japan that has a 45.5 percentile standing. Japan scores as weak when the data are applied using different methods.

    The bottom panel in the table presents levels of the OECD LEIs. The level ‘100’ represents normal growth; anything below 100 represents sub-normal growth. The table shows subnormal growth indicated everywhere except in the U.K., Japan, and China. However, the ratio of the current indexes to their value of six-months ago shows improvement everywhere except Japan; only France, the U.K., and China in this lower panel have queue standings for the LEI indexes above their respective medians (50% ranking).

    On balance, the OECD indicators in January show some mild improvement underway with LEI indexes at weak levels but beginning to grow at a faster pace.

  • Stability settles in for the composite PMIs in January 2024. The average for all 25 members in the table is 50.5 in November; that rises to 51.1 in December and to 51.5 in January 2024. It’s a small set of increases, but the improvements offer a picture of stability. The overall metrics show an average of 51.6 for the composite PMIs over 12 months, which falls back to 50.8 over six months but then rises back to 51.0 over three months. This set of data confirms that these PMI gauges have been floating around in a narrow range for the past year. The medians for these same time periods also show a great deal of stability; there is some slight uptick over the last three months, preceded by considerable stability over 12 months, six months and three months.

    PMI values vs. their queue standings The composite PMIs are a weighted average of the manufacturing and service sector PMIs for the various countries/reporters in the table. The average for all 25 countries is a queue standing of 48.7% on an unweighted basis while the median queue standing is a 46.9 percentile standing. The standings which are expressed in percentile terms should not be confused with the PMI gauges that are diffusion gauges expressed as all the rising observations plus half of the unchanged observations as a percent of the total number of observations in each country as reported by participants in each reporting region. With the queue standings, we look at the current PMI diffusion data that populate the table and rank them in their own history for each reporter. Queue standings are presented in only two columns differentiated in presentation with percent signs.

    The table shows that in January there are 9 jurisdictions below a diffusion value of 50, which is the breakeven mark (dividing line between expansion and contraction) for the composite compared to 11 being below the composite of 50 in November and December. The number jurisdictions below 50 has fluctuated and a fairly narrow range with 8 averaging below 50 over 12 months, 10 averaging below 50 over six months and 9 averaging below 50 over three months.

    Another metric of how conditions are evolving is to look at the changes period-to-period. On that metric, we see that nine of the 25 jurisdictions are slowing month-to-month in January and in December and those are smaller amounts than the 12 that were slowing in November compared to October. The 12-month average shows that there are 13 slowing comparing the 12-month average to 12-months ago. There are 18 slowing comparing over six months to the average over 12 months, marking the 6-month period as the period of the most intense weakness over this past year. Whereas looking at 3 months compared to 6 months, there are only 10 jurisdictions indicating slowing.

    The far-right hand column creates percentile standings for all the metrics in the table over the last four years. Only ten of these jurisdictions show standings above the 50th percentile, marking only 10 as having standings above their medians for this four-year period. The average queue standing for these metrics is in the 48.7 percentile, while the median among these is at 46.9 percentile, a weaker figure. Fifteen of the jurisdictions currently are below their medians for the previous four-year period. This represents a reading below their four-year median standing.

    On balance, these data depict a global economy that has been through a period of considerable slowing and weakness where conditions are beginning to stabilize and have been stabilizing to various degrees over the last year. The diffusion indexes, viewed broadly, suggest that contraction is somewhat prevalent but not common as there are many fewer jurisdictions below 50 and then above 50 on all horizons. Period-to-period slowing has also lost momentum; it reached its point of peak weakness over 6 months compared to 12 months and has since shed some of that weakening tendency. Percentile standings, however, mark the average and median readings as below their four-year averages and medians. The BIC countries excluding Russia are an exception with averages for their percentile standings at the 78th percentile. Meanwhile, the U.S., the U.K., and EMU regions have queue percentile standings in their 40th percentile, still quite weak. The large, developed countries continue to show some of the weakest performance during this time.