Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Robert Brusca

Robert A. Brusca is Chief Economist of Fact and Opinion Economics, a consulting firm he founded in Manhattan. He has been an economist on Wall Street for over 25 years. He has visited central banking and large institutional clients in over 30 countries in his career as an economist. Mr. Brusca was a Divisional Research Chief at the Federal Reserve Bank of NY (Chief of the International Financial markets Division), a Fed Watcher at Irving Trust and Chief Economist at Nikko Securities International. He is widely quoted and appears in various media.   Mr. Brusca holds an MA and Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University and a BA in Economics from the University of Michigan. His research pursues his strong interests in non aligned policy economics as well as international economics. FAO Economics’ research targets investors to assist them in making better investment decisions in stocks, bonds and in a variety of international assets. The company does not manage money and has no conflicts in giving economic advice.

Publications by Robert Brusca

  • The table chronicles manufacturing PMI data as presented by the S&P survey across a wide range of global economies. Notably this month there is a divergence between what the S&P PMI data say in the U.S. for manufacturing and what the ISM survey says. In the table, I present the results from the U.S. S&P survey while in the chart I plot the U.S. ISM manufacturing data that show the U.S. continuing to erode while the U.K. and the European Monetary Union show monthly improvements.

    In the S&P survey, there is an improvement in the euro area as the manufacturing PMI moves up to 48.8 in January from 47.8 in December and the two largest monetary union economies, Germany and France, also show improvement in their manufacturing sectors. The U.S. manufacturing report from S&P shows an improvement to 46.8 from 46.2. This contrasts with the U.S. manufacturing ISM reading that falls from 48.4 in December to 47.4 in January.

    Turning back to the monthly S&P data, among the 18 reporting units in the table, all but five show month-to-month improvement in January; worsening are Russia and India as well as Malaysia and Taiwan. The median S&P manufacturing gauge for January is 48.9, up from 48.0 a month ago; however, the averages for PMI data from 12-months to six-months to three-months show mixed trends.

    The diffusion data for these time-sequence cohorts shows that over 12-months there are only five countries that report improved results compared to the previous 12-months. Over six-months there are four countries that show improved conditions from 12-months ago. Over three-months there are eight countries that show improvements from 6-months ago. The number of reporting units that show improvements month-to-month Vs deterioration is at a standoff in January. The median reading is still weakening on trend. The question is whether the January improvement owes to data variability or whether it's beginning of something completely new.

    While the odds-on call is still for recession in the U.S. and in Europe, there's a growing chorus of economists arguing that a recession can be and will be avoided and so data that begin to show some economic resilience are going to have some play and get some purchase in markets. And this will occur until the transition of these economies toward recession either continues and until recession develops or unless resilience builds on itself and shows that recession avoidance is a real event.

    For the moment, there's not a great deal to go on. PMI data do show some resilience month-to-month; however, as of January there are still 11 reporters in the table with PMI values below 50 indicating the manufacturing activity is still contracting whether it is improved month to month.

    Manufacturing PMI values ranked on data back to January 2020 show only five observations above their medians for this period, Russia, India, China, Indonesia, and Turkey. The rest have standings below their 50th percentile for their queue rankings with an average percentile standing at the 25.7 percentile mark which is quite weak (just outside the lower quartile). The U.S. alone has its S&P manufacturing standing as the weakest in the table at its 8th percentile; the euro area has a standing at its 24th percentile; the U.K. has a standing at its 13th percentile; Japan has a standing at its 29th percentile and so on.

    Manufacturing sectors are weak compared to where they have been (since 2019) and this has not been a particularly robust period for economic growth. And data since January 2020, when COVID struck, show that every reporting unit in the table has a PMI value lower than it was before COVID except for Russia and Mexico. Taiwan is lower by 15.9 points; U.S. manufacturing slowed by 12.3 points. No other country is lower by double digits although Germany is lower by 9.8 points.

  • China's manufacturing and nonmanufacturing PMIs have improved in January; each of them rising significantly. The manufacturing PMI is up to 50.1 from 47.0 in December; the nonmanufacturing PMI has jumped to 54.4 from 41.6. Both were on a string of declines; January signals expansion for the first time in four months. In the case of each one of these readings, it's just an increase for one month in a row and, while it is only one month both the diffusion indexes - on top of improving - (for the first time since September in manufacturing and for the first time since June for nonmanufacturing) are above 50, indicating growth. In the case of manufacturing, it's barely any growth because the index is only at 50.1.

    Optimism grows… Still, there is growing optimism in China because it has ended its zero COVID policies and that appears to be having an almost instantaneous impact on growth. These improvements are expected to continue. However, China is coming off a period of weakness as the 12-month, 6-month, and 3-month manufacturing and nonmanufacturing PMI averages show slippages over that time sequence.

    Ranked on data since January 2019 the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing gauges are above their medians for the period, both have rankings above 50. Manufacturing has a ranking-reading barely above 50 at 51.0. For nonmanufacturing it's a much more substantial position above 50 at a 75.5 percentile standing. But both sectors are responding quite quickly which isn't surprising given the nature of the zero COVID policy and this tendency for that policy to hammer at nonmanufacturing and services sectors much harder than at the manufacturing sectors as demonstrated by the large gain in nonmanufacturing in January… as the policy was abandoned.

  • EMU- Long slow slog of recovery? EU Commission indexes for January 2023 show continuing rebound for the European Monetary Union as it continues to climb from its October low. The January index for the Monetary Union rises to 99.9 in January from 97.1 in December. There are month-to-month improvements in all the components except for construction. The reading for construction falls to 1 in January from 4 in December. However, the industrial index rises to 1 from -1, the consumer confidence index reduces its negative reading to -20.9 from -22.1, retailing does the same, rising to -1 from -3 in December. The all-important services sector advances to a reading of 11 in January from 8 in December. These EMU indexes are net diffusion indexes that are the result of subtracting negative responses from positive responses to create the net diffusion reading. The headline sentiment reading is a different animal; it's an index.

  • Money and credit growth in December took a turn lower for the most part on a global basis. In the European Monetary Union, M2 fell by 0.4% month-to-month; total credit fell by 0.4% and private credit fell by 0.5%. In the U.S. the M2 money stock fell by 0.7%, in the UK (the November figures are the most up to date, and in November) the money stock fell by 1.6%. In Japan, in December, M2-plus CDs was flat.

    Money supply…back in the limelight? Different economists pay different amounts of attention to the behavior of the money stock. In recent years, money supplies haven't been written about as much as they were certainly back in the 1980s when the Fed was using monetarist techniques to try to gain control of inflation. The focus on money has gradually waned as central banks adopted inflation targeting and ‘black-box-methods’ to reach these targets. (‘Black-box methods’ refers to the fact that central banks give us no idea what process they will use to reach the target, they simply commit to the target.)

    In for a penny, in for a pound…or a euro, or a yen However, I don't know anyone who thinks that money supply is irrelevant. We are currently coming out of a very unusual period in history where money supplies boomed and have since busted. And this transition in money supply growth from boom to bust is usually believed to confer some amount of instability to the economy. It certainly makes forecasting anything much more difficult because to the extent that economic activity engages lags; there are the lags from this incredible boom period now beginning to interact with the lags from the bust. And how that interaction works out is complicated and may even be unknown.

    The current cycle defined: In this cycle, from January 2020 to date money supply in the European Monetary Union posted its greatest year-over-year growth rate at 11.4%; in the U.S. it was 26.9%; in the U.K. it was 13.7%; in Japan it was 9.6%. The lowest growth rates in the period were 4.1% for the Monetary Union, -1.3% for the U.S., 2.5% for the U.K., and 2.7% for Japan. If we take the current year-over-year growth rate of money in each country/region and express it as a percentage of these high and low readings for growth, the U.S., the U.K., and the European Monetary Union are currently experiencing their lowest money growth of the whole period. Japan’s money growth is in the lower three percentile of this range. In the case of the U.S., money supply growth is contracting at a -1.3% rate of ‘growth’ and it's the first contraction in nominal money supply growth for the U.S. in over 61 years. Certainly, that can't be a good thing. It does not seem to plow a path to a soft landing to me…

    Most do not focus on money supply… While many of us, I'm certainly one of them, tend to describe monetary policy more in terms of interest rates or in terms of real interest rates when inflation rates begin to perk up. But it's also important to keep an eye on what's going on with money growth. We remind you here this idea of lagged behavior. People may have a harder time attaching the notion of lagged behavior to real interest rate levels. But the idea that money supply booms and busts work through the economy with varying lags is more appealing to people and easier to explain. So the problem we have in the U.S. is that money supply growth boomed, peaking at a 27% annual rate in February 2021 about two years ago so if there are lags in this process it makes sense to think that we are still experiencing the lags from the boom and money supply rather than from the bust which is only now being recorded and will have its effects in the period ahead. One year ago, money supply growth was still strong: 7% in the EMU, 12.4% in the U.S., 6.9% in the U.K. and 3.7% in Japan. These growth rates place money growth in the 40th percentile of its (high-low) range in the EMU, nearly at the mid-point for the U.S. (48.5%), at the 39% mark in the U.K., and much lower for Japan at its 14th percentile. Japan should be receiving much less monetary stimulus ‘today’ from past actions compared to these other money center areas because of that low ranking. Monetary stimulus globally saw year-on-year money growth rates slow the most from their pace of one year ago around January 2022 (one year ago). More recently, the U.S. began to see growth slow sharply after July 2022; for the U.K. and the EMU, the sharper declines have been even more recent. Japan has not experienced any recent sharp changes only ongoing erosion. All four countries/regions have ongoing decelerations in 12-month money growth rates from the pace of 12-months ago tracing back to at least June 2021.

    Market focus is on interest rates However, the discussion in financial markets is all about the Fed's clustering of rapid interest rate increases and people have moved ahead to worry about the restricting effect from those increases and the increases for other central banks. Looking at money supply growth and remembering that there are lags involved, it's easy to see that whatever effect we're going to have from having raised interest rates those are going to be on the same timeline as this contraction in the money stock and they lie ahead.

    What is the Fed weighing? All of this makes the Fed’s behavior a little bit more curious since the Fed already seems to be bracing for a slowdown and wants to pause policy. But interest rates run below or at where the inflation rates currently reside. Certainly, the Fed is aware of these lag processes and realizes that there's some degree of slowdown coming ahead and may in fact be looking substantially at money growth rates. The money growth rates send more of a chill up your spine than real interest rates since real interest rates aren't yet restrictive because nominal interest rates have not moved up above the inflation rate. But the nominal U.S. money stock is declining for the first time in over 60 years, and slowing globally – be afraid, be very afraid...

    Net-net money growth has been TOO-strong You'll notice, looking at the data in the table, that the U.S., the European Monetary Union, the U.K., and Japan all have synchronized periods of slowing and weak money supply growth. Over the last three years even with the developing slowdown in money growth, the three-year annualized growth rate in money for the EMU was 7.3%, in the U.S., 11.5%, in the U.K., 7% and in Japan, 5.3%. All of these are more than the 4% it would have taken to accommodate 2% inflation and 2% growth on a steady basis. Even with its sharp deceleration, money growth over this entire span remains excessive relative to the growth these countries/regions are capable of and their inflation targets of 2%.

    The table shows that there are negative nominal growth rates for money supply in Europe and in the U.S. as well as contractions in both European credit measures. So far Japan and the U.K. have simply experienced the slowdown in money growth - in some cases a relatively sharp slowdown.

    Real money growth weakness is… unreal… However, looking at the bottom panel in the table: growth rates of the real money stocks - money supplies adjusted for the effects of inflation- show that money growth has been contracting on all these measures on all time horizons from two years and in. In the case of the European Monetary Union, credit has been contracting even longer. The only exception here is that Japan's M2 plus CD's measure shows positive growth over two years but then that does transition to a contraction for real M2-plus CDs over 12 months.

  • The IFO gauge improved in January. It has been improving since reaching its low point in September to October of last year. In January, the all-sector climate index improved to -7.2 from -11.5 in December. All the components improved; the service sector reading moved to a positive reading of +0.2 in January from -1.2 in December.

    Expectations are responsible for the bulk of the improvement month-to-month. Overall expectations improved to -18.8 in January from -25.6 in December. The current business situation, however, deteriorated to a 14.4 reading in January from 15.2 in December.

    While the current conditions index edged lower month-to-month, the manufacturing sector improved to a 17 reading in January from 13.7 in December. Also improving was the retail sector, which is the lone net-negative reading for January. It improved to -2.3 in January from a worse -5.4 level posted in December. Deteriorating month-to-month were the construction sector, wholesaling, and services.

    Expectations showed improvements across the board. However, all the expectation readings have net-negative values. This indicates that IFO respondents are still negative on the future. But they're not as negative as they were in December.

    Ranking data as evaluators Ranking data provide a means by which to evaluate the diffusion readings. The standings I will refer to next are based on the percentile position of the relevant categories when placed in their historic queues of values back to March 2005. In this system, 100% is the highest possible reading; 0% is the lowest. Percent of range data (percent of high-low values) also are presented in the table. These are very different concepts.

    The diffusion score for the climate all-sector index has a ranking in its 16.7 percentile. That means that since March 2005, the all-sector climate index has been this weak or weaker only 16.7% of the time. The sectors reported in the table are manufacturing, construction, wholesaling, retail and services. They show standings that range from a low of 11.1 for services, to a high standing of 21.9 for manufacturing. All of them are in the bottom 25 percentile of their respective queues of data. And some of them are much lower in that percentile cohort.

    Current conditions show the all-sector index, at a 23.7 percentile standing. The current index is in the bottom quartile of its historic queue of data. The construction sector is the only sector with a reading above its 50th percentile, which tells us it's above its historic median on this timeline. The construction sector has a standing at its 61.4 percentile. After that, the next strongest reading is a 41.4 percentile reading in retailing, followed by a 35.8 percentile reading in wholesaling and at a 33-percentile standing in manufacturing. The service sector is weakest, at a 20.5 percentile standing.

    The real weakness in the IFO framework is in expectations. The all-sector expectations standing is in its 8.4 percentile, the bottom 10-percentile of its historic queue of ranked data. The strongest reading among sector expectations is in manufacturing with an 11.6 percentile standing – still not impressive to say the least. The weakest reading is construction at a 3.3 percentile standing. The relative weakness in construction is not surprising, since it's the sector that performs the best right now in the current situation. Apparently, there are expectations that this performance is going to be short-lived. Survey respondents see it as having perhaps the farthest to fall compared to other sectors that are already performing worse in their current conditions.

    Performance since COVID As another benchmark on performance, we look at data since January 2020, before COVID struck. All the climate readings are now lower on that time horizon. Current conditions show all the January diffusion values are below their January 2020 levels except for manufacturing. That sector’s current reading is higher by 11.1 diffusion points. The largest drops in the current framework are in construction, which is 34 diffusion points lower, services that are 24 diffusion points lower, and retailing that is 21.3 diffusion points lower. Expectations also show across the board declines since January 2020. The all-sector diffusion index is 12.7 points lower. The smallest drop is from manufacturing, where expectations are only 5.3 points lower. That drop is followed by services, with the January expectations index only 15 points lower. However, there's much more severe weakness in construction, which is 34.8 points lower, wholesaling, which is 20 points lower, and retailing that is 24 points lower.

    On balance, the IFO readings in January continue to show weak and weakening current conditions, tempered by some improvement in expectations – that are themselves still exceptionally weak. The climate index has improved month-to-month. But the individual sectors continue to have extremely weak readings on both current conditions and for expectations with across the board much weaker readings.

  • The flash PMIs from Standard & Poor’s in January resemble a Fleetwood Mac song as they go their own way. Conditions are stronger in the EMU region as well as in Germany. But the composite PMIs are weaker in France, the U.K., Japan, and the U.S. However, for manufacturing, it's a different tune. Manufacturing improves in January in the EMU region, Germany, France, and the U.K.; it weakens only in Japan and the U.S.

    Still, we're talking about month-to-month gyrations here. The historical averages show all regions weaker on average over three months compared to over six months and most regions are weaker on their six-month averages than on their 12-month averages. Japan’s headline composite and its service sector are the only exceptions. Year-over-year changes based on average data are different, with service sectors stronger in the EMU, France, the U.K., and Japan. Bolstered by service sector strength, the French composite is also stronger year-over-year. Japan’s composite is stronger year-over-year as well, and so is its manufacturing gauge.

    Period to period changes Some of the month-to-month changes (second to last column on the right) are substantial with the German composite up by 4.6 points and the EMU composite up by 2.9 points. But in France, the composite is lower by 1.2 points, in the U.S. by 1.6 points, in Japan by one point, and the U.K. deteriorates by 0.4 points, month-to-month.

    Over three months, the German composite is up by 5.6 points, the EMU composite is up by 3.1 points and the U.K. composite is up by 0.6 points, but the U.S. is lower by 1.6 points with Japan and France both lower by one point. These results indicate fewer uniform changes even over three months.

    Standings in January The queue standings show all the observations in January, below their historic medians calculated back to January 2019 - except for Japan where services and the composite have relatively strong percentile rankings for the period. The U.S. and U.K. have the weakest composite standings on this period, in their respective 12th percentile and 14th percentile. France has a 24.5 percentile standing. Germany has a 28.6 percentile standing. The European Monetary Union has a 32.7 percentile standing. Manufacturing gauges for these regions range from a low percentile standing of 6.1% in the U.S. to a 38.8 percentile for the EMU and France.

    The big picture… In the big picture, there's still a great deal of weakness in the highly developed country area, not only are the percentile standings low but most of the reports show declines for the composite and the manufacturing and in services indexes compared to the January 2020 levels, the levels that prevailed before COVID struck. The exceptions are that all three Japanese measures are somewhat higher than that level and in Germany manufacturing is now 1.7 points higher than it was in January 2020. All the rest of the gauges are lower on balance. That finding signals no growth and in fact a step back for most of these observations over a three-year span. Among the 18 PMI readings in January for the 3 sectors across six areas, only 6 (one-third of them) show PMI diffusion readings of 50% or higher – and no reading is even as high as 51%. It’s fair to say all reading are clustered around ‘unchanged’ or lower.

  • Danish confidence improved again in January marking the third monthly improvement in a row; however, the index has still been weaker only 1.2% of the time and its history back to 1995 marking the January reading as a still exceptionally weak reading. Like elsewhere in the world, Danish confidence had been negative but really took a tumble in March at the time the Federal Reserve in the United States began raising rates. In February 2022 Danish confidence had been -3.2; in March it fell to -14.4 then quickly dropped in April to -20.9. The index remained weak and skidded to a low at -37 in October 2022, and it has been gradually improving from that low-point.

    Changes in monthly consumer component readings In January, the past and future financial situations are beginning to score somewhat improved results as the financial situation over the last 12 months improved in January by 4.7 points, building on a gain of 1.5 points in December. The look ahead reading for the next 12 months is up by 4.1 points month-to-month after falling by 0.4 points in December.

    The past general economic situation has been improving slightly from November and December and that continues in January albeit at a stepped down pace. The expectations for the future stepped up in November, scoring a strong 12.2 gain compared to a 1.9-point drop in October. It continues to improve, logging a 0.4-point increase in December and moving up to a 5.4-point gain in January.

    The development of inflation has begun to get some negative responses indicating that there are some expectations that inflation will be rolled back. The reading for December fell by 1.8 points, in January it fell by 8.2 points; these are backward looking reflections for the last 12 months. Looking at 12-months ahead, November shows a 12.5-point drop, December a 7.3-point drop, in January a 10.1-point drop indicating that there is a substantially entrenched view that inflation is going to be brought to heel. At the same time, concerns about unemployment have dissipated slightly, unemployment concerns have jumped, posting a change of 14.2 points in March, as the Federal Reserve in the U.S. was hiking rates. The next biggest increase came in October 2022 at an increase of 13.4 month-to-month but that was followed in November by a slip of 5.6 points. December then brought an increase of 4.6 points, but January now brings us a negative change of -2.9 points. Clearly Danish consumers are beginning to vacillate about whether the future offers them better or worse unemployment conditions for the 12 months ahead.

    After a string of negative changes and two-months of improvement, the backward-looking assessments on conditions for making a major purchase, deteriorated in January. The forward-looking responses, however, have improved for three months in a row, gaining by 2.6 points in January, building on a 4.2-point gain in December and a 1.7-point gain in November.

    The ability to save over the past 12-months as well as over the next 12 months shows improvements in both December and January.

    The general financial situation shows improvement of 3.4 points in January after a decline in December; that followed two months of improvements. It's hard to call any of this a lasting trend. Consumers still seem to be trying to puzzle out where things are going.

    The rankings on the level of the responses in January provide the bottom line on where consumers stand. The consumer confidence indicator has been weaker 1.2% of the time, the financial situation over the past 12 months, over the next 12 months and the general economy situation over the last 12 months all have standings in the lower 5% of their queue of historic values. The look-ahead for the economy over the next 12 months shows some improvement with a nearly 18 percentile standing; that's better than a lower 5 percentile standing, but still not impressive. Consumer prices over the last 12 months have a 97.6 percentile standing, indicating there has been a lot of inflation. Over the next 12 months, that standing is down to 25.2%, indicating that an abatement of inflation and a decline in inflationary pressures is more widely anticipated. However, the unemployment trends over the next 12 months continue to have a high 94.5 percentile ranking, indicating that there are concerns that there will be an unemployment price to pay for getting inflation under control.

    The current favorability of the environment for spending is in its lower one percentile. Looking ahead, to the next 12 months, it's still only in the 1.2 percentile of its queue of historic data. Favorability to save both in the past 12 months and the forward-looking 12-months is near its median at a 47-percentile standing. The general financial situation for households has a lower 5 percentile standing - extremely weak.

  • U.K. consumer confidence, according to the GfK survey for January, slipped back to -45 from -42 in December. The index has been as weak as -49 back in September 2022, when it reached its all-time low. Since then, there has been some moderate rebound and now a relapse. But generally what we see is that the GfK readings continue to bounce around near their all-time lows (apart from two lower readings in October and September of 2021), the January reading is lowest on record back to January 1974). These lows can be seen to be significantly below the weakest levels reached during COVID and substantially below the lows reached during the Great Recession and the financial crisis in 2008. The U.K. is undergoing challenging economic times amid political upheaval that even extends to turbulence within the royal family. The Bank of England continues to fight excessive inflation in the U.K. The rule of thumb right now is this: if you're looking at the U.K., and if it can go wrong, it is going wrong.

    GfK is mostly deteriorating In the GfK survey, 4 of 12 of the components showed month-to-month improvement, and here I'm excluding, of course, the increases logged in the CPI where the monthly rise actually marks deterioration. However, included among those components that rose on the month is ‘expectations for unemployment’ which is a bad result. But then again, on the expectations for the next 12 months, the CPI reading from consumers does decline giving them another bit of good news this time from the falling component as the Bank of England's fight against inflation is expected to yield some results. This does leave the count of ‘positive changes in components’ at 4 for the month- but that is based on the above adjustments in the count, not on a simple tally of the columnar changes.

    A few survey metrics do improve, but to little avail… The other components that improve month-to-month are the household financial situation which registers a -27 net diffusion reading in January, slightly better than the -29 issued in December. That reading still sits at the lower 2.5% of its queue of values experienced over the last 20 years. The ability to save improved slightly on a diffusion value of 10 up from 8 in December. And the evaluation of confidence by upper income persons has improved to zero from -23, a relatively sharp improvement that elevates their response to the 58.5 percentile of their historic queue of responses above their historic median. But that reading contrasts sharply with confidence readings by lower income people that slipped to -56 from -47 and sits at the 0.4 percentile mark among its historic queue of data, very near its all-time low. The rich-poor divide in the U.K. appears to be undergoing a tremendous amount of stress at the same time U.K. politics is ongoing a tremendous amount of stress. This causes me to evaluate the improved assessment by upper income persons as a less than positive development. Whatever ‘good’ it implies for upper-income individuals, it may imply also much more political stress that will undermine the economy more.

    Current assessments Current assessments in January show that household financial situation slipped to 15 from 17 in December and present savings slipped to 14 from 20 in December. The household financial situation has a 15-percentile standing which is quite low while savings are still above their historic median and at a queue standing at the 61st percentile.

    Previous 12 months evaluated As a benchmark, assessments of the previous 12 months show deterioration in the two major components, with the assessment of inflation having gotten worse. The household financial situation assessment slipped to -31 in January from -28 in December and reached an all-time low at least over the past 20 years. The general economic situation slipped to -71 from -66 and resides in the lower 4.7 percentile of its historic queue of data - an extremely weak reading.

    Little if any good news: There's little in the way of good news in this survey. It, however, is good news that the Bank of England is expected to make progress on inflation and that the ranking of inflation in the 12-months ahead is below the ranking of the 12-months behind although here we're comparing a standing that's near 100% to a standing that is only reduced by 14 percentage points to the 86th percentile. Inflation expectations are still relatively high even though progress is expected to be made. The prospects for savings to improve is a flip compared to the current situation where there was a month-to-month deterioration. Despite the improvement on the expectation front, the percentile standing for savings in the period ahead is much lower than it is for the current situation. And, of course, the difference in perceptions of conditions by income class is stark and troubling.

  • Japan's trade deficit in December was at 1.7 trillion yen, approximately the same as in November, down from the level of 2.4 trillion in October. Exports fell in December at a sharp 3.5% pace while imports fell at an equally sharp 3.4% pace. In November exports fell by 1.4% while imports fell by 6.3%. Trade flows have suddenly contracted sharply.

    Sequential growth rates for exports show a 12.5% annual growth rate in nominal yen terms over 12 months that falls to a 1.4% growth rate over six months and degenerates to a -12.5% growth rate over three months. Imports are up at a 26.4% annual rate on the same basis over 12 months then decline at a 2.5% annual rate over six months and then decline at a 19.2% annual rate over three months. Much of this is on the back of changes in oil prices.

    The exchange rate has also been on the move as the yen has fallen 18.5% against the dollar over 12 months and 11.5% on a broad trade weighted basis over the same period. Over three months, however, the yen is rising at a 21% annual rate against the dollar and an 18% annual rate on a broad trade-weighted basis.

    Export prices are up by 12.2% over 12 months then they fall at a 2% annual rate over six months and fall at a 13% annual rate over three months. Import prices are up by 23% over 12 months, fall at a 7.1% annual rate over six months and then fall at a 32.7% annual rate over three months.

    Trade volumes show real exports up by 0.2% over 12 months at a 3.4% agreed over six months and by 0.8% at an annual rate over three months. Exports are clinging to growth, but there's not much of it. Real imports on the other hand have been strong; they rise at a 2.7% annual rate over 12 months at a 4.9% annual rate over six months and at a 20% annual rate over three months.

  • The HICP inflation rate in Ireland fell by 0.3% in December after rising 0.3% in November and gaining 1.5% in October. The domestic CPI index followed the same pattern except for the gain of 1.8% in October. The domestic CPI index for the core showed a 0.3% gain in December, a 0.5% gain in November and a 0.5% gain in October. While there's some evidence of a break in inflation in October, the drop hasn't been enough to reduce the pace of inflation although the more moderate seeming consistent increases in the rate of inflation on the CPI core shows some very modest deceleration over three months.

    The trends: The sequential inflation rates from 12-months to six-months to three-months show the HICP total inflation rate at 8.2% over 12 months, falling back to a 4.7% pace over six months, then reaccelerating to a 5.7% pace over three months. There is a net reduction from 12-months to three-months. The domestic measure of inflation is quite similar with an 8.1% 12-month gain, a moderate 5.2% six-month gain and an annual rate expansion of 7.2% over three months that is only slightly weaker than the 12-month pace of 8.1%. The domestic core CPI grows at a 5.4% annual rate over 12 months and over six months and then decelerates to a 4.8% annual pace over three months. There is some true deceleration in the core. On the other hand, it's small following only by six-tenths of one percent on an annualized three-month inflation rate.

    Inflation’s breadth: Looking at inflation diffusion, we see that the inflation rate for 12-months compared to the 12-month period of one-year ago has a diffusion reading of 58.3, which indicates that inflation was rising in more sectors than it was falling since the diffusion index is above 50 (above 50%). However, over six months the diffusion index is at 41.7%, indicating deceleration because inflation is lower over six months compared to 12 months across more than half the CPI categories. Over three months there's a further step down and the diffusion index falls to 25%; this reading shows that across the various categories, inflation was rising in three-months compared to six-months in only 25% of categories.

    Breadth vs. the headline and core metrics: While inflation itself has not changed very much and while its deceleration on the three-month pace compared to the 12-month pace is somewhat uneven across the headline and core measures, the breadth of the fall across CPI categories is relatively wide. The reason that headline inflation doesn't fall as much as the breath statistics seem to indicate has to do with the weighting of the CPI. Those components that are showing acceleration have larger weights than those that are showing deceleration; therefore, a broader-looking deceleration measure is not to reflected the headline or core as much. Still, this is solid evidence that inflation is being tamed; that monetary policy is having an impact.

    And in the quarter to date, which is now a complete statistic for the fourth quarter compared to the third quarter, we see the inflation metrics are still relatively high. The HICP total inflation rate is at 7.2%. The domestic headline inflation rate is at 8.5% and the core inflation rate is at 4.6% - all are ‘too-high.’

  • The trade deficit for the European Monetary Union (EMU) in November contracted sharply to €15.2 billion from €28.1 billion in October. Over three months the deficit averages €26.6 billion, over six months €33.0 billion, over 12 months the deficit is €26.5 billion. One year ago, the monthly trade balance was in surplus for the 12-month average with a surplus on the order of nearly €12.7 billion.

    What went wrong…(what’s going wrong) There are two prongs in this fork in the road as it takes the European Monetary Union from being in surplus on balance in 2021 to being in significant deficit today. The first item, and the one of lesser importance, is the balance on manufacturing trade. In November, this is in surplus with manufacturing trade logging a premium of exports over imports of €31.1 billion; that's sharply higher than the October surplus of €23.8 billion. Over three months, the surplus averages €26.7 billion, over six months it's €22.3 billion, and over 12 months it's €22.2 billion. One year ago, the 12-month average of monthly surpluses was €30.2 billion. There's been a steady slippage in the surplus for manufacturing trade since that; it has just started to reverse as the surplus in manufacturing is back up this month.

    The second prong of deterioration is the balance on nonmanufacturing trade, and this is where the deterioration has been the most dramatic; it is mostly because of the rise in commodity prices. But with commodity prices now softening, we see a reversal in the deterioration here as well. Nonmanufacturing trade is in deficit in November to the tune of €46.4 billion; that's lower than October's €51.9 billion deficit. Over three months the nonmanufacturers deficit is at €53.3 billion; that's down slightly from €55.3 billion over six months but up from a deficit of €48.7 billion over 12 months. One year ago, the 12-month average of the monthly deficit was at €17.5 billion. Nonmanufacturing trade has chronically been in deficit in the EMU, but the deficit, traditionally, has been offset by the surplus in manufacturing trade. Over the last year, there has been some further deterioration that is now in flux, but the big shift is in the average for 2022 compared to 2021. The deficit in nonmanufacturing trade has ballooned sharply over the last 12 months as the surplus in manufacturing trade has withered and this has caused the widening gap in the balance of trade by the European Monetary Union. But recent data show how a reversal of that trend is in progress.

    Trends in percentage terms… These values in euros have corresponding percentage trends. Looking at the percentage trends we can see that the worm is starting to turn because of growing import weakness as exports do a better job of holding their own…

    For manufacturing exports, the year-on-year gain is nearly 16%. Over six months it's at an annualized game of 11%; over three months that gain is holding around the 11% pace. The pace of exports in manufacturing is slipping, but only slightly. For nonmanufacturing exports, the pace over 12 months is 22.4%. Over six months that sags to a decline at a 5% pace, but then, over three months, the pace is at steadies at -4% annualized.

    EMU imports show manufacturing imports up 14% over 12 months. For six months imports fall at a pace of 1.5%, but then, over three months, imports fall at an 18% annual rate. Nonmanufacturing trade shows imports up 36% over 12 months. Over six months this reverses to log a decline at a 6% annualized rate, then, that pace decelerates sharply to a -48% annualized rate over three months. This is for imports into the European Monetary Union area from outside countries and includes a good deal of energy imports where prices are falling.

    Trade flows in the European Monetary Union are slowing down and they're slowing down dramatically. They're slowing slightly for manufacturing exports, more for nonmanufacturing exports, they're slowing significantly for manufacturing imports and they're slowing dramatically for nonmanufacturing imports where commodity prices particularly for energy have broken.

    EMU Members and Other Europe Turning attention to individual countries we see some slightly different patterns in German exports that have held up more steadily rising 14% over 12 months, gain to a 21% pace over six months, then settle back to a 15.5% pace over three months. This compares to German imports where the gains are nearly 30% over 12 months, accelerate to 33.5% over six months, and then decelerate sharply to about 6% over three months.

    France shows some similar trends with exports up 16% over 12-months slowing to an 11% pace over 6-months and then falling at a 9% annual rate over 3-months. Imports also show deceleration, rising 19% over 12-months, gaining at a 10% pace over 6-months, then falling sharply at a 20% annual rate over 3-months.

    The United Kingdom, a European country outside of the European Union, shows its exports up 29% over 12 months, slowing slightly to a 25% pace over six months then falling at a 13% annual rate over three months. U.K. imports follow the same trajectory only slightly magnified with the 22% gain over 12 months, a 7% annual rate fall over six months and a sizable 27% annual rate fall over three months.

    In all cases, we see imports are slowing down. Imports are contracting over three months in France and the U.K. but just crawling at a slower pace in Germany. German imports grow on all horizons, and they decelerate over six months; they're relatively flat over 12 months whereas, in France and in the U.K., exports clearly decelerate and then decline sharply over the recent three-month period.

    In other Europe- Finland and Portugal, show export flows rising over 12 months, decelerating and declining at about a 15% annual rate over six months. Portugal shows a 10.6% annual rate drop over three months. Finland shows a 23.3% annual rate drop over three months. Weakening trends are everywhere.

    Clear weakening trends…crystal The data are clear and indicative of a broad economic slowing. Both exports and imports have been pulled under the spell of deceleration. Exports are somewhat more diffused because they go to different countries, and they spread to areas according to different weights and trade patterns across the countries. Export performance can be fairly varied for this reason. Still, we see a great deal of consistency in the patterns with only Germany showing some export resilience. On the import side, of course, imports are tied very strongly to domestic GDP growth. We see sharply weaker negative numbers in France and in the U.K. suggesting that domestic demand has declined abruptly. In Germany, while imports grow at a 6% (nominal) growth rate, that is much weaker than the 30% posted over three and six months so that the trend also indicates a substantial slowdown and domestic demand weakness, but perhaps not the same degree of weakness that we see in France and in the U.K.

    In the European Monetary Union overall, we can gauge domestic demand a little bit better by looking at manufacturing trends since the price element will have a slightly lesser weight in those flows than in nonmanufacturing flows where commodities are involved. There, we see a reduction in the growth rate of imports from about 14% over 12 months, to a drop at an 18% annualized rate over three months; we see a decline of 3.1% in the month of November compared to a rise of 0.1% in October. Slowing domestic demand is evident (mixed in with weakening prices) for the European Monetary Union where the demand slowdown for the union as a whole is like the experience of France. Demand is weakening, and we can see that in the PMI surveys that have shown encroaching weakness and both the goods and services sectors. Note that EMU and member import and export statistics are different. EMU trade is only for trade between EMU members vs. non-EMU members- that nets out intra-union trade among members that national statistics include as ‘exports’ and as ‘imports.’ This data quirk could understate the weakness in EMU domestic demand, since developed economies seem to be weakening faster than developing economies.

  • Japan's surveys continue to show a struggle for growth. The Economy Watchers Index for November weakened to 48.1 from 49.9 in October; it has risen from its August low. However, the last four months show readings below 50 which indicate contraction. Similarly, the Teikoku indexes show all sectors with diffusion readings below 50 although sectors evidence a minor bounce in November compared to October. The METI index for industry shows a modest drop in November to 95.2 from 95.3 in October and that is part of an ongoing trend of weakness. The LEI for Japan fell to 97.6 in November from 98.6 in October and is on a declining trend.

    Economy Watchers Current: These metrics uniformly show Japan with already weak again our performance is sliding into a period where growth appears to be weaker. The Economy Watchers Index fell in the month as the retail sector dropped to 46.6 in November from 48.8 in October. The eating & drinking sector, which had shown some promise in October as it rose to 61, plunged back to 47.9 in November, its lowest reading since August. The services sector is an exception with a diffusion reading of 52.6, above its breakeven reading but below the 56.8 reading in October; it indicates only bare-bones growth in the sector. As of November, the Future Index fell to 45.1 from October’s 46.4 and it is also on a weakening trend – it points to contraction ahead.

    Economy Watchers Assessments: Assessing the level standings in the Economy Watchers index, standings of the headline and its components generally are above their 50th percentile, a level indicating they are above their historic medians (employment is the exception). Index level rankings show a great deal of variation with the services sector reading at a 90.7 percentile standing versus a low at its 26.7 percentile for employment. The Future Index is below its 50th percentile. However, ranked on year-over-year growth, the readings are all below their medians and below their respective 20th percentiles indicating weakness in momentum.

    Teikoku Indexes: The Teikoku indices all are below 50 and have been that way for a series of months. However, evaluated against their index levels since August 2009 all the indices are at or above the 50th percentile indicating they are at or above their median values for that period. Still those rankings range from a 50th percentile reading for the construction sector to a high rating of only 64.5% in the wholesale sector. Alternatively ranked against their year-over-year growth rates only one sector, retailing, has a ranking above its 50th percentile; all the rest show growth rates that are below the median growth rates they had previously experienced. Manufacturing has the weakest growth ranking of all at its 31st percentile but that's not much better than construction at its 32.9 percentile, or wholesaling at its 39th percentile.

    METI Industry Reading: The METI industry index increased month-to-month and has a ranking of its index level that is only in its 12.8 percentile back to 2009 - an extremely weak ranking for an index level that grows over time. The METI survey creates indexes of activity and is not a diffusion index, like the surveys above. The one-year growth ranking for the industry index is in its 33rd percentile, also below its median, indicating below normal and unsatisfactory growth in Japan's industrial sector.

    The Leading Economic Index: Japan's LEI index while fall month-to-month has a level ranking only at its 30.8 percentile, well below its historic median with a growth ranking at its 28th percentile similarly below its historic medium for growth. The LEI index, like the METI industry index, is not a diffusion reading and should growth over time with the economy- a weak level index is a very poor reading.

    The Situational Wrap-up These surveys paint a picture for the Japanese authorities that's quite challenging. The current assessments of the state of the economy indicated by the index level ranks are for the most part moderate or weak with few indications of strength. However, the growth rankings are unequivocally weak and pointing to deteriorating prospects. The Economy Watchers Futures Index is particularly weak and disturbing from the standpoint of the growth that it points to, and it agrees with the weakness from Japan's leading economic index that has only a 28th percentile standing.

    Policy and Global Conditions The Bank of Japan has been fighting against the moderate inflation and it's in a much different position than other G7 central banks who, as a rule, seem to have much more work to do. But Japan is renowned internationally for its massive government debt levels; fiscal policy is not a tool that Japan can use. Meanwhile, deteriorating conditions and rising interest rates around the world are going to make the international situation more challenging for Japan, but with one key exception. Japan's most important trading partner is China and China has recently broken away from its zero Covid policies greatly enhancing its prospects for growth. Having better growth in China is more important to Japan than having better growth in Europe. Still, apart from this reintroduction of China, whose prospects for growth are still a little difficult to handicap, the prospects for global growth are getting worse as the World Bank has just cut a series of forecasts on global growth for the year ahead. The reduction slashes its former outlook for 3% growth to only 1.7% for 2023. Despite China lifting its zero Covid rules, the World Bank cut its outlook for growth in China, too, from 5.2% to 4.3%. Japan's current performance, its current assessment, and its prospects for future growth, put Japan in a very difficult position in this challenging global environment.