Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Robert Brusca

Robert A. Brusca is Chief Economist of Fact and Opinion Economics, a consulting firm he founded in Manhattan. He has been an economist on Wall Street for over 25 years. He has visited central banking and large institutional clients in over 30 countries in his career as an economist. Mr. Brusca was a Divisional Research Chief at the Federal Reserve Bank of NY (Chief of the International Financial markets Division), a Fed Watcher at Irving Trust and Chief Economist at Nikko Securities International. He is widely quoted and appears in various media.   Mr. Brusca holds an MA and Ph.D. in economics from Michigan State University and a BA in Economics from the University of Michigan. His research pursues his strong interests in non aligned policy economics as well as international economics. FAO Economics’ research targets investors to assist them in making better investment decisions in stocks, bonds and in a variety of international assets. The company does not manage money and has no conflicts in giving economic advice.

Publications by Robert Brusca

  • Among the 18 countries in the table that report manufacturing PMI data in June, only four show month-to-month improvements. These countries include China, Russia, Malaysia, and Mexico. In June, developed economies seemed to be hit much harder than developing economies.

    Over three months, there are six countries of the 18 that improve compared to their PMI readings of six months ago; these include Mexico, Russia, India, Brazil, Malaysia, and Vietnam. None of the G7 countries are on that list either.

    Over six months compared to 12 months, six countries improve including Mexico, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and South Korea. Among G7 countries, only Japan appears on that list.

    Recent data have been showing broad improvement of manufacturing areas when compared to 12 months ago. However, as of June the breadth of this improvement is being challenged. Eight countries or regions improve over 12 months compared to 12 months ago. Those include the euro area, France the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Japan, India, and Malaysia. Based on these longer-term comparisons, developed economies are faring much better among the largest G7 countries in the table; only Germany and the U.K. fail to show improvement over 12 months.

    There are also eight countries in the table that show rank percentile standings also known as queue percentile standings below their 50% mark. The 50-percentile mark designates the median observation over the sample. Our data period extends back to January 2018. Among those countries and regions that are below their 50% mark are the euro area, Germany, France, the U.S., the U.K., Indonesia, Taiwan, and Turkey. Once again you see a proliferation of G7 countries on this list.

    There are still several countries that haven't improved their manufacturing position compared to where it was before COVID hit. These include India, Taiwan, and Turkey. The countries whose manufacturing sectors have improved the most since COVID struck are Germany, Canada, the euro area and Japan.

    The data shows some widespread weakness in manufacturing particularly among the developed economies that we think of as the demand centers for global growth. China has a relatively stronger queue-ranking compared the G7 countries and it is also an important source of demand as well as supply. But China has been weak for some time and its outright manufacturing diffusion reading continues to be weak even though it ranks well on this timeline. To underscore this, China shows that since COVID struck its manufacturing reading is only 0.7 points higher, making it one of the weaker economies recovering since COVID struck.

    Table 1

  • China's economy has been under pressure. Its approach for attacking COVID known as zero COVID has implemented rolling lockdowns across the country that have interfered with manufacturing and economic activity as COVID itself has proved to be extremely hard to eradicate. The rest of the world has decided that it will live with COVID since COVID turns out to be not as lethal as once thought nor for the most part as debilitating. But China's different approach means that a portion of the world economy is at risk to COVID and that supply chain interruptions from the disease are still possible as well as a setback to global aggregate demand as China's own demand wanes under the strain of lockdowns.

    China, however, now shows signs of being able to emerge from some of its difficulties. It hasn't changed its zero COVID policy at least not formally, but there appears to be some ability of the economy to find some footing. China has implemented some targeted lockdowns that have locked down smaller more precise areas- a less ham-handed approach.

    In June, the manufacturing PMI index has moved up to 50.2 from May's 49.6. The manufacturing sector is now showing expansion (its strongest since February). In fact, the sector's average reading over 12 months is below 50 so it has been indicating a depressed or barley growing manufacturing sector for quite some time. Nonmanufacturing has jumped very sharply in June. It has reached a value of 54.7 on its diffusion index in June, up from 47.8 in May. Looking at the chart, you can see how sharp this jump appears. The nonmanufacturing index was at a reading of 41.9 just two months ago so nonmanufacturing is making great strides. And this is the part of the economy that tends to be the most harmed by COVID lockdowns. Manufacturers have found ways to run their businesses and even to keep people in the factories living and working in the factories while they are under their lockdown orders. Some factories can continue to operate under lockdown orders. But service sector businesses are businesses that are out in the open, out in the economy, out in that area that gets locked down. When a lockdown occurs, a worker can't get to that business and consumers can't get there either. Service sector businesses simply get locked down too.

    The one month rebound in nonmanufacturing is the second largest one month rebound in that index in the last 15 years. It's a very significant jump. The two-month jump, which is also the second largest on record, is the largest increase after COVID struck China.

    The manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors are showing significant improvements. Whether they continue to do this will depend a lot on what happens with COVID and attitudes toward it in the days ahead.

  • Money supply trends show that slowing is widespread across the major monetary center countries. In the European Monetary Area, for example, M2 growth logs 6.2% growth over 12-months, grows at a pace of 5.6% annualized over 6-months and by 3.4%, annualized, over 3- months - a clear deceleration in nominal money growth is in progress.

    In the United States, the slowdown is much more dramatic, with the 12-month growth rate for M2 at 6.5%, slowing to a pace of 3.9% over 6-months, and to a skinny 0.1% pace over 3-months. In the UK money growth is at 5.4% over 12-months; it ticks slightly higher to 5.6% over 6- months then slows to 4.8% pace over 3-months. In Japan where inflation has been much less of an issue overall money supply statistics are much steadier and the growth rates of money are lower… Japanese growth show M2 plus CD's up at a 3.2% annual rate over 6-months, that becomes slightly stronger at a 3.6% pace over 6-months and then backs down to the 12-month pace again at 3.2% over 3-months.

    Real balance growth is contractionary The growth rates cited above are nominal money growth rates. They are the same as the statistics that are plotted in the chart that accompanies this article. However, we can also calculate ‘real money balances’ which reflect the local currency value of money deflated for the effects of inflation and then we can calculate growth in these ‘real balances’ after inflation effects are accounted for.

    In the European Monetary Area real money balances grow at a - 1.7% annual rate over 12-months, at a - 4.4% annual rate over 6-months, and at a -7.6% annual rate over 3-months. This is a progressive contraction that is not good for growth. Of course, The ECB is trying to slow the economy down and even in the European Monetary Area where official interest rates have not yet begun to rise, the impact on money supply growth – especially on real balances- is quite clear.

    In the United States over 12-months real money balances (RMB) contract by 1.8%, over 6-months RMB contract at a 5.1% annual rate and over 3-months it contracts and a 9.6% annual rate. This is very rapid shrinkage in the real money stock.

    In the UK. Real money balances fall at a 2.6% annual rate over 12-months, at a 6% pace over 6-months and then they contract at an 8.5% rate over 3-months. The UK pattern of contraction in real balances is also severe.

    The more severe the contract of real money balances the greater will be the risk of recession and the less likely a soft landing will be generated…

    In Japan real money balances grow by 0.7% over 12-months, they grow by 0.2% over 6-months but then they contracted a 0.8% annualized rate over 3-months. Japan is just starting to experience some monetary contraction over the last three months.

    Credit trends in EMU In the European Monetary Area, we can also look at the impact inflation has had on lending as well. In nominal terms lending continues to accelerate as credit to residents grows at a 4.8% pace over 12-months, at a 6.2% annual rate over 6-months and at a 6.3% annual rate over 3- months. If we convert these to real terms, credit to residents is falling by 3% over 12-months, it's falling at a 3.8% annual rate over 6-months and it's falling at a 5% annual rate over 3-months.

    Credit to residence is drying up as well and credit is one of the channels through which monetary policy is going to slow economic growth. Since businesses need to invest and pay for inputs and services in real terms the real balance trends are most important. Of course, firms will pay a nominal, dollar, pound, euro, or yen price, but that ‘nominal’ price is going reflect the inflation rate. By deflating the credit stock numbers for inflation, we get a sense of how much liquidity is available for firms to use in an inflationary economic environment. This is true for the credit data in each country, but we only present EMU data here.

    The second measure of credit in the European Monetary Union is private credit. Private credit is growing at a 5.3% pace over 12-months, at a 6.5% annual rate over 6-months and at a 6.7% annual rate over three months. Nominal credit shows some acceleration. But, once again, converted to real balance terms, private credit growth is contracting by 2.6% over 12-months, it's contracting at a 3.6% annual rate over 6-months and it's contracting at a 4.7% annual rate over 3-months.

    Inflation in the euro area continues to be relatively strong. Nominal interest rates have risen as the markets are bracing for policy changes by the ECB itself and those are still to be forthcoming. However, the impact on liquidity and on credit provision clearly have been contractionary for some time in fact in the euro area credit to residence is shrinking at a 1.5% annual rate over two years and private credit is shrinking at a 1.2% annual rate also over two years. That longer term shrinkage is created by the rise of inflation rather than by specific credit tightening actions by the Monetary Authority.

    The global outlook continues to be for slowing. The IMF has recently reduced its forecasts and central bankers continue to talk about slowing inflation and avoiding recession as though it's possible. Such things are possible in the world of theoretical economics, but in the real world in which we live, significant inflation has never been slowed by anything other than a recession. So, if central bankers try to promise that there's a way to balance the needed austerity with the desire for growth, be sure to listen carefully to exactly what they're saying. Are they promising results, or speaking hypothetically or hyperbolically?

  • French confidence is weak in June 2022. The value for June at 82.2 is lower than its 85.4 rating in May. The confidence indicator has been slipping since at least February. Late in February Russia, after a prolonged period of tension, invaded Ukraine and after that invasion the French confidence measure weakened sharply dropping from 96.7 in February to 89.6 in March and then continuing to drop.

    French household confidence has a percentile standing in its queue of data since 2001 in the lower 3.5% of its historic queue of data. That means confidence has been this lower or lower only 3.5% of the time over the last 20 or so years- that's an extremely depressed reading.

    Living standards for the past 12 months fell in June to -75 from -68 in May; this series has been somewhat slower to fall, but of course it's the backward-looking series of the last 12-months and it's about actual living standards not about expectations. As such, it is benchmarked to how the economy has been performing. Still, this index has fallen to a weak 8.2 percentile standing, another extremely low reading.

    The forward-looking assessment of living standards shows a much more immediate and sharper reaction to the invasion as it has a -34 reading in February then it dropped to -61 in March. The June reading, at -69, reflects a 0.4 percentile standing and an extremely weak reading.

    Despite the clear deterioration in expected living standards, unemployment for the next 12 months has not been greatly affected. This is somewhat surprising. The reading for unemployment was -2 in February, it improved slightly to +7 in March and since had a reading of +8 in June 2022. Its percentile standing is still weak, in the lower 17.9 percentile of its historic queue of data, but not as dramatically week as for living standards or for the overall confidence indicator. What is odder is that it has improved from its February reading.

    Price developments show that inflation has been creeping up and is expected to continue to move up. In February, the assessment of past developments over the previous 12 months stood at 46; that was not changed very much as of March. However, by June that assessment had moved up to a reading of 60. Price developments are expected to generate pressure over the next 12 months as well. They were at a reading of -14 in February 2022; that moved up extremely sharply in March to a reading of +39. However, the reading has migrated back down to a level of +23 in April and to +10 in May, then to +4 in June. The current reading is still extremely high as both past and expected inflation developments have 97 percentile standings in their respective historic use of data. The expectation for future inflation is relatively high in rank but not as absolutely high as it was in terms of the level of the reading.

    Assessments for savings are generally more upbeat. The assessment of the favorability to save was 31 in February and had slipped to 23 in June. The ability to save over the next 12 months looking ahead once had a reading of 12 in February, but that had slipped to -1 in June. The favorability for savings has a 72-percentile standing whereas the ability to save for the next 12 months has a higher 81.3 percentile standing. The savings assessments continue to be relatively strong.

    The spending environment for making major purchases has been hit quite hard. In February, the assessment was at a -17, that deteriorated to a -22 in March and that continued to slip. By June, the reading had fallen to -35. That -35 reading has a 3.1 percentile standing in the historic data back to the year 2001, marking it as an extremely weak reading. Clearly French consumers are concerned about the war, they're concerned about the ECB’s ability to fight inflation, and all of this is having a detrimental impact on their willingness to spend.

    The financial situation looking backward was assessed at -20 in February; it slipped slightly in March and continued to deteriorate. It now stands at a -30 reading in June. The financial situation looking ahead to the next 12 months had been a -6 back in February. It slipped sharply to a -22 reading in March and currently sits at a -24 reading. Those survey assessments show the financial situation for the past twelve months had a 15-percentile standing and for the next 12 months it has a 4.7 percentile standing – more extremely weak standings.

    The timing of the deterioration in the French survey quite clearly connects it with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The current assessments remain very low reflecting the risk from inflation and war as well as the ECB prepares for fighting inflation in the euro area.

    Conditions are weak the overall household indicator. Confidence is 22 points lower than it was before COVID struck in January 2020. Expected living standards are 42 points lower than they were before COVID struck. Past inflation developments are 93 points higher than they were before COVID struck although price developments for the next 12 months are only 28.8 points higher than they were before COVID struck. The spending environment is 28-points weaker than it was before COVID struck and the financial situation looking backward is worse by 15-points than it was before COVID struck although the forward-looking financial situation assessment is even weaker, nearly 22-points lower compared to where it was before COVID struck.

  • After peaking late in 2021, confidence on the part of Finland's consumers has continued to move lower over 12 months. The confidence indicator averages -2.9 points over 12 months, it averages -8.2 points over six months, it averages -12.5 points over three months, and in June, it logs a reading of -14.3 points. This is a new historic low reading. Consumer attitudes obviously are being greatly affected by the war that is going on in Ukraine and by the potential for that war to spread because of Russia's aggressive posture and threats.

    The June reading of -14.3 is the weakest reading for that index on data back to July 1999. For the economy, the current assessment is a reading of -43.2; it has a low 8.7 percentile standing, another very weak reading. The rating for the economy in 12-months has a June value of -30.4 and a percentile standing in the 1.4 percentile mark near the bottom of its historic queue of values.

    Garnering a strong response is the reaction to consumer price inflation for 12 months ahead, which is at a 6.3 reading in June compared to a 5.9 response in May. That resonates as a 99.6 percentile standing in its historic queue of data. On data back to 1995, there has not been a stronger response for expected inflation.

    Unemployment in Finland in 12 months registers a -8.5 compared to -8.1 in May. It is slightly higher, compared to April's -11.2 value and it marks a 59.1 percentile standing for the response. Clearly there are concerns about unemployment, but for the moment these concerns aren't as pressing as more general concerns about the economy and inflation. The individuals' personalized threat of unemployment this month rose slightly, moving to -2.3 from -2.6 and has a historic standing in its 60.5 percentile which is very close to the 59.1 percentile standing for the overall economy. At this time, Finish people don't seem to see any greater or lesser personal risk of unemployment than they see for the economy at large.

    Assessments of the environment cluster around weak values. The favorability of the time to purchase durables has been slipping steadily; it fell to a -20.7 mark in June from -14.8 in May that had been -8.8 in April. That slippage has been steady and quite dramatic drop; it brings the reading to its lowest ranking in the history of the report.

    The favorability at this time for saving also has slipped to -6.9 in June from -1.1 in May and +3.5 in April. This June response has a 3.6 percentile standing, a very weak standing for the favorability of the ‘time for savings.' It's not a good time to purchase durables and it's not a good time to save.

    The favorability of this period for raising a loan balance has also slipped; it fell to -34.2 in June from a reading of -28.5 in May that was at roughly the same level in April. The June value has a 2.2 percentile standing in the historic queue of data on this response. Consumers clearly don't see this as a good time for raising a loan balance and increasing debt, or for saving or for buying durable goods.

    However, on the matter of household financial situation, the assessment readings have eroded only slightly over the last three months. At 27.6 in June, the rating is only marginally weaker than 29.5 back in April and it still has an 83.3 percentile standing overall. Households' current financial situation is still quite good by historic standards, in the top 20 percentile of the various assessments that Finns have given it. They are concerned about the future and concerned about executing transactions in this economy even though they have solid current financial situations.

    The prospects for savings over the next 12 months show some slight erosion; the June value is 45 and that compares to an April value of 49.7. Its percentile queue standing is at its 47.5 percentile which is below its 50th percentile, marking it as a below median response. However, it's not below the median by very much and that marks the possibilities for savings to be not too different from the historic median and characterizable as ‘normal.'

  • Italy's consumer confidence fell month-to-month. Consumer confidence is down 12.5% over three months and down by 14.6% over 12 months. The mean for consumer confidence in Italy is at a value of 102 so that its level of 98.3 is well below its mean. The percentile ranking of the June reading is at 28.2% which means that it has been lower than this 28.2% of the time and since the median occurs at a 50% reading, it means it is significantly below its median as well as the mean.

    Month-to-month the overall situation has fallen off sharply. Evaluated over the past 12 months compared to where it stood last month, the reading is at -112 compared to -78 last month. However, the overall situation for the 12 months ahead improved slightly with a -15 reading where the May reading is -17. The mean reading for this category is at -2 making its -15 reading (although better than it was in March 2022) quite weak and well below its mean. Unemployment expectations have fallen back to reading of 5 in June from 6 in May and from 13 in March. Household budget considerations have eroded to a mark of 16 in June down from 19 in May and that compares to 18 in March.

    The household financial situation over the last 12 months is now assessed as worse than it was back in May; the June -42 assessment is below the -36 in May and also below the -32 for back in March. The next 12-month outlook has -26 assessment in June, worse than May's -24 although not as bad as the March reading of -34.

    The environment for savings has improved a bit month-to-month with a reading of 66 in June compared to 64 in May. Future savings are unchanged at -12 compared to -12 last month and compared well to a -10 reading it back in March.

    The business index rose to 110 in June from 109.4 in May; it's only slightly below its March 2022 value which was 110.2. Over three months the business index is lower by 0.2%; over 12 months it's lower by 2.9%.

    That percentile standing for the overall situation is at 19% in the lowest 1/5 of its range for the assessment of the overall situation in the last 12 months; for the next 12 months the overall situation is assessed at a 23.9 percentile standing- better but not by much. Unemployment is at a very high 70.8 percentile standing. Clearly there are concerns of higher unemployment. The household budget has a 64.6 percentile standing, more or less a midstream position. The financial situation over the last 12 months has a 35.4% outstanding, a week result but much stronger than the assessment for the next 12 months which is at 5.6 percentile. Household savings currently are considered easy to have at a 92.8 percentile standing and only slightly harder to come by in the future at an 85.2% standing. The environment to make major purchases is at a weak 29.8% standing, in the lower 1/3 of its range. Quite apart from consumer responses, the business index has an 82.3 percentile standing; businesses are not feeling or fearing anywhere near the pressure or concerns about the current environment compared to consumers- that's quite a split.

  • The S&P Global PMI indexes weakened across the board in June; the exception to the weakening was only in Japan where services have improved month-to-month and where the composite also improved month-to-month. The U.K., France, Germany, the U.S., and the European Monetary Union each saw weaker services, manufacturing, and composite readings. This is a sharp worsening from May when the composite index weakened in the U.S., and in the U.K. with the U.K. seeing weakness in manufacturing and services. The U.S. composite index weakened on the month due to service sector slowing. Germany also was weaker in May on a weaker manufacturing sector that dragged the composite lower. The EMU registered a weaker manufacturing sector and its composite index rose in May along with that sector in France and Japan.

    Over three months composites increased in the EMU, Germany, France, and the U.K., with Japan and the U.S. showing weaker composites as well as weakness in both manufacturing and services sectors. Over three months the U.K. saw a weaker manufacturing sector as did Germany and the EMU alongside an improvement and their overall composite index. However over six months all countries in all sectors show all sector weakness -except for Japan that shows contrary three sector improvement. All countries show strength over 12 months in all sectors with no exceptions.

    The queue percentile standings show an average composite for this group of countries that is below 50, manufacturing gauges that are below 50, by a substantial margin and a service sector average that is below a 50-percentile standing as well. All sectors are below their respective historic medians (below 50) on this timeline. However, including the U.S. in this run of data makes things look worse. After leading the way higher post Covid, the U.S. is now leading the way lower with S&P PMI flash values at standings below their respective 30th percentiles. In sharp contrast, Japan is sporting queue percentile ratings in the 90th percentile for services and for the composite- but a manufacturing reading only at its 66th percentile.

    The German service sector and the U.S. service sector as well as the U.S. composite are below their respective levels compared to where they stood in January 2020 before Covid struck.

    Month-to-month, of 18 sector and composite readings, only three rose. The composite fell month-to-month on average by 1.8 points led by a 2.5-point drop in manufacturing and a 1.7-point drop in services.

  • U.K. inflation rose by 0.5% in May after rising by 1.9% in April and 1.0% in March. Inflation acceleration was far less common in May with inflation accelerating in only 18% of the categories. In April inflation had accelerated in only 36% of the categories. That compares to March when inflation had accelerated in over half the categories with the diffusion value 54.5%. Despite seemingly tamer performance of inflation, inflation continues to rise and to accelerate from 12-months to six-months to three-months. Core inflation also broke lower in May at 0.3%; in April it was up by 0.5% but in March it had risen by 0.8%.

    If we look at sequential trends, the U.K. headline CPIH rose 7.9% over 12 months, and at a 10.2% pace over six months, and logged a 14.4% pace over three months. The CPIH, excluding energy, food, alcoholic beverages & tobacco - the core measure, rose 5.2% over 12 months, at a 5.9% annual rate over six months, and at a 6.4% annual rate over three months. Inflation in the U.K. is accelerating over these sequential periods.

    U.K. inflation is clearly excessive, but the Bank of England has prevaricated in taking firmer steps perhaps partly because of this less broad inflation in April and on the lower gain for inflation in May. But the Bank of England is still well behind the inflation curve, like the U.S. Federal Reserve and like the European Central Bank. Central banks need to get out ahead of the inflation problem and not chase it from behind, and become complacent when there's some sign that inflation might be slowing ‘organically.’ Central banks have come to dwell on the idea that they don't want to create a recession and that possibly they can create a soft landing. However, they are all so far behind the curve in terms of inflation fighting; it's hard to see how they can run hard enough to catch up without doing damage to the economic landscape.

  • United Kingdom
    | Jun 21 2022

    U.K. Industrial Orders Remain Strong

    U.K. orders moved lower in June, falling back to 18 from the previous value of 26 in May. The reading for total orders is still up strongly from its 14 value in April. Export orders slowed relatively sharply in June to a ‘plus one’ reading from 19 in May; they registered a -9 reading in April.

    However, total orders remain close to their 12-month average. The current value of 18 compares to a 12-month average of 20. Export orders also are close to their 12-month average which is minus-two versus the June value of plus-one. The queue standings of orders in the U.K. ranks strongly among data from 1991 as the current reading of 18 has a 97.6 percentile standing while orders are up for exports whose plus one reading has 87.5 percentile standing. Both orders series are quite strong on this historic timeline.

    Data for inventories (stocks) show that stocks are at a +2 diffusion reading up from -15 in May as the appetite for inventories has improved. That is a bit stronger than the -3 reading for June. Stocks, however, are at a very low historic reading; the queue standing for the plus-two reading in June is at its lower 7.7 percentile standing.

    The CBI also gives look-ahead data for the next three months. Total output is expected to be solid at 20 for June, slightly down from the 23 reading in May but stronger than the 17 reading in April. The 20 reading for June is also below the 12-month average which is at 27. The ranking for the June outlook figure is still relatively firm at 79.3% standing. That means the reading for output is higher only about 21% of the time.

    The outlook for average prices fell relatively sharply in June to 58 from a 75 previous reading that had been at 71 in April. There is some tailing in the outlook for prices; the average for prices over last 12-months the reading of 62 putting the June 58 reading below the average. Although the 58 reading has fallen sharply over the past couple of months and is below its 12-month average, it still has a 97.6 percentile standing on data since 1991. The outlook for prices signals strength.

    Note the right-scale left-scale chart and the tendency for overall orders and export orders to have to tracked one another fairly closely on these two preset scales. It shows that historically there were broad, common, and consistent movements on the two series. However, in this recent recovery from Covid, we see that the domestic orders series has recovered a lot faster than the export order series. That suggests the international economy is not contributing the same kind of jolt to the domestic economy as it did in the past.

  • Europe
    | Jun 15 2022

    EMU Trade Deficit Balloons

    The trade deficit for the European Monetary Union (EMU) ballooned to 31.7 billion euros in April after logging a 17.8 billion-euro deficit in March. The balance on manufacturing trade slipped to a smaller surplus in April of €20.8 billion, down from €23.5 billion in March; however, the deficit balance for nonmanufacturing trade widened to 52.5 billion euros in April from 41.3 billion euros in March. It's the widening deficit on nonmanufacturing trade that has driven the overall European Monetary Union trade position into deficit, and it is now driving it deeper into deficit.

    The EMU deficit has weakened sharply Over 12 months the average trade deficit for the EMU is a deficit of €3.1 billion that consists of a €26.2 billion surplus in on manufacturing trade and at €29.3 billion deficit on nonmanufacturing trade. Comparing that to the 12-month average for the year 12-months previous, the EMU had posted a €20.4 billion surplus. That was generated by a manufacturing surplus of €30.1 billion versus a nonmanufacturing deficit of €9.7 billion. Compared to those averages, the current balance on manufacturing trade has lost one third of its surplus while the deficit on nonmanufacturing trade has expanded by a factor of 5.5 times.

    EMU exports Rising commodity prices are wreaking havoc on trade positions globally. The EMU area shows manufacturing exports growing at a 12.4% annual rate over 12 months, at 17.4% annual rate over six months, falling off to a 4.4% annual rate over three months. On that same timeline, nonmanufacturing exports grow 35.2% over 12 months, accelerate to a 47% annual rate over six months, and accelerate again to a nearly 72% annual rate over three months.

    EMU imports For imports, the EMU manufactured imports are up to a 23.3% annual rate over 12 months, increase to a 31% annual rate over six months, then fall back to a 17.4% annual rate over three months. Nonmanufacturing imports rise 94.6% over 12 months, accelerate to a 125% annualized rate over six months, and then log blowout growth at a 207% annualized pace over three months. While nonmanufacturing flows are accelerating for both exports and imports, it's on the import side where nonmanufacturing imports have simply gone wild.

    Germany, France, and the U.K. The lower panel of the table shows export and import trends for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. In two of three cases, imports grow faster than exports by about a two to one margin or more over 12 months. Over three months, once again, import growth rates dominate export growth rates. France shows tighter margins between export and import growth rates although import growth rates continue to dominate export growth rates over all three horizons for France.

    Other export trends Export trends for Finland, Portugal, and Belgium show strong growth for exports. Strength for the period is evident particularly for Finland and Portugal. Finland shows a slowing in exports, but that slowing only takes export growth rates from a 37% pace over 12 months to a 28% annualized pace over three months. Portugal shows exports at a 21.5% pace over 12 months and at a slightly stronger 23.4% annualized pace over three months. For Belgium, there's a clear slowdown in place with exports at a 27.5% pace over 12 months dipping to a 7.6% annual rate over three months.

  • The amplitude adjusted OECD leading economic indicators in May continue to show weak conditions. The overall OECD index declined in May month-to-month. The index for the top seven OECD countries declined, the index for the euro area declined, the index for Japan was unchanged and the index for the United States was unchanged.

    The OECD prefers to look at its leading economic index signals in terms of six-month changes. Viewed in that way, the OECD overall index is down by 0.5%, the index for the seven largest OECD countries is down by 0.5%, the index for the euro area is down by 0.7%, the index for Japan is flat, and the index for the U.S. is down by 0.4%. Over six months the index for China is down by 0.8%. Those figures are for six-month averages; to the right of them, in the table, we see changes over six months calculated on point-to-point data and those changes also show broad weakness and weakness that has been in train over the past 12 months (two nonoverlapping weak six-month modules in the table back-to-back).

    The indicators show that growth broadly is below its steady state pace in most of the aggregate presentations. The levels of the normalized amplitude adjusted leading indicators in the bottom panel of the table, reveal readings below 100; for the month of May they indicate weakness for every country or region except for Japan and Germany; Japan and Germany are also exceptions in April. Much of this weakness came on in April since in March these same indicators show slowing tendencies in only 5 of the 12 entries in the table. However, those slowdowns were for important economic areas as they included the U.S. and China. China's 'Covid zero' policy has been a drag on global growth and has been particularly hard on Asian economies.

    The queue percentile standings for six-month growth show ranked values below 50% which means below the median for five of six entries in the table with Japan being the exception. Looking at a broader array of countries and areas and applying the queue percentile standings to the levels of the indicators instead of the six-month changes, there are only three with readings above 50% indicating values that are above their historic medians. Those three countries are Japan with a standing at its 77th percentile, Germany with a standing at its 77th percentile, and France with a standing at its 50th percentile. A few countries have standings in the lower quartile of their range; that includes China and Greece as the U.K. barely escapes that designation. The European Monetary Union has a standing in the bottom one-third of its historic queue of values.

    The OECD indicators are clearly indicating that there is a great deal of moderate weakness and subpar growth in train across these economies. Only a few developed economies are experiencing more extreme weakness such as China where it's Covid-zero policy is responsible for curtailing growth.

  • Italian manufacturing industrial production rose by 1.5% in April on a strong gain in the intermediate sector of 2% and a solid gain in the consumer sector of 1.6% while capital goods output remained flat month-to-month. Over the last three months among these three sectors, there was only one month in which a sector’s output declined - that was a 0.6% decline in intermediate goods output in March.

    Recent strength meets longer lasting breadth This strength is part of an ongoing process in Italy where 12-month output is up by 3.7%, six-month output is up at a 6.2% annual rate, and three-month output is up at a very strong 25.5% annual rate. Industrial output in Italy is accelerating across these horizons and what's more it is accelerating in each of its major sectors: consumer goods, capital goods, and intermediate goods.

    Strength in growth no matter how you cut it Over 12 months the strongest sector is consumer goods on a gain of 9.7% with capital goods the weakest on a gain of just 0.5%. Skipping ahead to three-months, the strongest sector is consumer goods on a gain of 38.1% at an annual rate, followed by intermediate goods at a 21.6% annual rate followed by capital goods at 13.6%. These trends show that Italian output has been strong in the current month, in the last few months, and has been accelerating over the last year across all three major industrial sectors. This is a very strong showing.

    Adequate to very strong standings If we rank the industrial sectors based on year-over-year growth rates, Italian performance ranges between adequate to strong. At 3.7%, manufacturing output year-over-year has an 80th percentile ranking on data back to 2000. That's a top 20% position, which is strong. Consumer goods output, running at 9.7% over 12 months, has a 97.7 percentile standing and that is excellent and extremely strong. Intermediate goods output, with a 2.0% increase over 12 months, has a 66.7 percentile standing; that's a top one-third ranking for the sector and that is a solid performance. However, capital goods show an increase of just 0.5% over 12 months; that performance has a ranking of 48.9% which puts it just about one-percentile point below its median on this timeline. Growth at the median is adequate but no more than that. So, when we evaluate the growth rates for Italian production across sectors, the bottom line is that growth by sector ranges between adequate to quite strong.

    Great results but are they sustainable? The second part to the story about ranking is that, of course, the three-month growth rates are going to rank a lot higher. And so will the six-month growth rates. Italian industrial production looks very-solid over 12 months and then, because of the increasing growth rates, it's looking stronger and stronger over these shorter periods. The question is whether Italy will be able to sustain this kind of increase in output given the challenges in Europe.

    Other metrics are not so glowing... Manufacturing PMI: The Italian manufacturing PMI (S&P Global) has been slipping during this period. It has declined from a 12-month average of 59.8 over 12 months to average 58.6 over six months to a 56.2 average over three months. The index has further slipped from February to March to April although the April level for the manufacturing PMI is still a solid 54.5 reading. What we see in looking at the PMI data is that the trends are opposite to those that we get from looking at the performance of industrial production outright. And that could be something to bear in mind when considering trend and future performance.

    EU and Istat surveys: Other indicators for Italy like the EU industrial confidence index, current orders from Istat and the Istat outlook for production also are less upbeat. These surveys show withering responses from 12-months to six-months to three-months but fail to do so sequentially – they do so only indicatively. However, the levels of the indexes generally are still strong: the rank standing of the EU industrial confidence index is strong at its 87.5 percentile. The Istat current orders reading has a strong 95.1 percentile standing. However, the outlook for production from Istat has only a 30.4 percentile standing, a standing that has been weaker only about 30% of the time. That is worrisome.