Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Introducing

Paul L. Kasriel

Mr. Kasriel is founder of Econtrarian, LLC, an economic-analysis consulting firm. Paul’s economic commentaries can be read on his blog, The Econtrarian.   After 25 years of employment at The Northern Trust Company of Chicago, Paul retired from the chief economist position at the end of April 2012. Prior to joining The Northern Trust Company in August 1986, Paul was on the official staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in the economic research department.   Paul is a recipient of the annual Lawrence R. Klein award for the most accurate economic forecast over a four-year period among the approximately 50 participants in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators forecast survey. In January 2009, both The Wall Street Journal and Forbes cited Paul as one of the few economists who identified early on the formation of the housing bubble and the economic and financial market havoc that would ensue after the bubble inevitably burst. Under Paul’s leadership, The Northern Trust’s economic website was ranked in the top ten “most interesting” by The Wall Street Journal. Paul is the co-author of a book entitled Seven Indicators That Move Markets (McGraw-Hill, 2002).   Paul resides on the beautiful peninsula of Door County, Wisconsin where he sails his salty 1967 Pearson Commander 26, sings in a community choir and struggles to learn how to play the bass guitar (actually the bass ukulele).   Paul can be contacted by email at econtrarian@gmail.com or by telephone at 1-920-559-0375.

Publications by Paul L. Kasriel

  • Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), which are marketable securities, compensate the investor for inflation by marking up/down the principal of the outstanding security every six months by the six-month CPI inflation/deflation rate. The fixed coupon rate on the originally-issued TIPS is applied to the adjusted principal every six months. If you want to know the full skinny on TIPS, Google treasurydirect.gov. But what I want to discuss is the negative yield on TIPS starting at or about the time of Covid-induced March-April 2020 recession (the red and blue lines in the chart below.) Why have TIPS yields continued to remain negative since the Covid recession? I think the answer lies in the green bars in the chart. Each green bar represents the 24-month dollar change in Fed holdings of TIPS as a percent of the 24-month dollar change in total outstanding TIPS. In the 24 months ended July 2020, the dollar change in Fed holdings of TIPS was greater than the dollar change in total TIPS outstanding, as represented by the green bar being over 100%. The green bars have continued to be above 100% through February 2022. In recent months, the Fed has been “tapering” its purchases of securities, including TIPS. But in the 24 months ended July 2020 through the 24 months ended February 2022, the Fed has been buying all of the TIPS being issued by the Treasury and then some. With a price insensitive purchaser like the Fed buying more than 100% of the new issues of TIPS is it any wonder that the yields on TIPS have been negative? Starting any day now, the Fed is going to turn into a net seller of TIPS. TIPS yields already have moved up close to zero. When the Fed begins to sell them, TIPS yields almost assuredly will rise above zero and rise rapidly. Wonder what will happen to the yield on mortgaged-backed securities when the Fed starts to unload these too?

    Viewpoint commentaries are the opinions of the author and do not reflect the views of Haver Analytics.

  • "Core" this and that is all the rage these days. Soon to be retiring Chicago Fed President Charlie Evans is now talking about a supercore CPI. What is that? A CPI that excludes all items that have increased in price? But I digress. The headline of the media reports of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) release of its first guesstimate of the annualized percent change in real GDP for Q1:2022 was "economy contracts by 1.4%". Oh my. Call off Fed interest rate hikes because the economy has one foot in the recession grave? I referred to this advance estimate of GDP as a guesstimate because the BEA does not yet have complete first-quarter data for net exports, inventories and residential investment. So, cool your jets. I will argue that the part of the economy that the Fed has the most influence on, real private domestic sales excluding inventories (or real private domestic final sales), apparently picked up in Q1:2022.

    The advance estimate of first-quarter real GDP was held back primarily by real net exports and the change in real inventories for which, again, March data still have not been released. Real net exports held back first-quarter real GDP by 3.20 percentage points; the real change in private inventories by 0.84 percentage points. And for good measure, real government, combined federal, state and local, retarded first-quarter real GDP by 0.48 percentage points. With defense expenditures likely to be increasing and infrastructure spending gearing up, how much longer will government expenditures on goods and services be a drag on real GDP?

    But if we look at real private expenditures for goods and services, excluding inventories, the spending most influenced by monetary policy, we find a different picture. This is just a fancy name for combined real personal consumption expenditures, real private fixed-investment expenditures, including business and residential investment. As shown in Chart 1, this measure of real aggregate spending grew at an annualized pace of 3.66% in the first quarter, up from the annualized pace of 2.57% in Q4:2021. The 2017 through 2019 median quarter-to-quarter annualized growth in real private domestic final sales has been 2.72 % (the thin blue horizontal line in the chart). So real private final demand grew in Q1:2022 faster than it grew during those pre-Covid glorious years when the US economy was great again.

    Chart 1

  • By all indications, the Fed will raise the level of the federal funds rate, currently 0.08%, by 25 basis points on Wednesday, March 16. This will likely be the first of series of Fed rate hikes this year. (As this is being written, March13, the 12-month Federal Funds futures contract has priced in a rate of 1.87%. Later in this commentary I will explain why I do not believe the Fed will hike this much in this time period. When Fed Chair Powell is replaced by the reincarnation of Paul Volcker, then we will see more aggressive federal funds rate increases.) Two years ago, when Covid began spreading here, the federal government began handing out money to the bulk of American households, whether or not their incomes were adversely affected by Covid. Where did the federal government get this money to hand out? A lot of it came from the “printing presses” operated by the Federal Reserve and the banking system. And households still hold a lot of this Covid money. This means that as households face rising prices for essentials such as food and gasoline, they will be able to rundown their cash holdings to pay the higher prices without having to cut back on their purchases of discretionary goods and services as they otherwise would. These excess cash holdings by households will blunt the effects of the initial Fed rate hikes.

    The red bars (mass) in the chart below represent the sum of currency, plus checkable deposits plus money market fund shares held by households. These cash holdings skyrocketed beginning at the end of Q1:2020. The blue line in Chart 1 represents this cash held by households as a percent of their after-tax income. This ratio also has skyrocketed, reaching a post-World War II high of 154% by Q4:2021. Think of the blue line as the inverse of the velocity of money.

  • Now that the cognescenti have judged that goods/services price inflation has transitioned from transitory to something more persistent, the Fed has signaled that it is ready to start raising its main policy interest rate, the federal funds rate, at the mid March FOMC meeting. Moreover, the Fed has suggested that a March interest rate hike will be one of several this year. By how many basis points will the Fed raise the federal funds rate this year from its current level of 0.08%? No one knows, especially the Fed. The federal funds futures market is currently priced to suggest a cumulative 150 basis point rise in the federal funds rate over the next 12 months. But just as Fed policy is "data dependent", so is the federal funds futures market. However many basis points the Fed raises the federal funds rate over the next year, it will have a fiscal effect. That is, it will contribute to an increase in federal outlays in the form of higher net interest payments. Higher Treasury debt-servicing expenses imply higher future federal budget deficits, all else the same.

    The blue bars in Chart 1 are the fiscal year values of Treasury net interest expenditures as a percent of total federal outlays. The blue bars in the shaded area from fiscal year 2022 through 2031 are baseline forecasts made by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in July 2021. CBO baseline projections of budgetary variables incorporate current laws pertaining to the federal budget and the CBO's estimate of economic variables that would have an impact on budgetary variables. Also plotted in Chart 1 are the actual and CBO-forecast fiscal year average values of interest rates for the three-month Treasury bill (the green line) and the 10-year Treasury note (the red line). In FY 2021, Treasury interest expense as a percent of total federal outlays was 4.8% -- the lowest percentage in the period starting FY 1965. Given that federal debt held by the public increased by $6.2 trillion in the two fiscal years ended 2021, this low ratio of Treasury debt service expense relative to total federal outlays is remarkable. Of course, extremely low interest rates on Treasury debt played a major role in reducing debt-servicing costs relative to total federal outlays. More on this in a moment.

    Chart 1

  • It is almost December 23rd and that means that Festivus is nearly upon us. (Actually, Festivus is floating holiday that can be observed whenever one chooses to.) It is traditional on Festivus to air one's grievances. And this Festivus, I got a lot of problems with you people. My problems with you mainly concern inflation – the cause of it rather than the description of it. Related to this is the incorrect, in my opinion, assumption made by the media and many economists that increased government spending causes higher inflation. In addition I have a problem with the media reporting that the headline number of an economic release was higher/lower than economists expected.

    The faster rise in consumer prices began to be noticed in the spring of this year. Rather than discussing the cause, economists and the media tended to describe the faster increases in various consumer price indices. For example, the rate of consumer price inflation was increasing because used car prices were racing ahead. And if were not increases in used car prices one month resulting in an increase in a consumer price index, it might be restaurant meals the next month. This reminds me of President Calvin Coolidge's "analysis" of unemployment, to wit, "[w]hen more and more people are thrown out of work, unemployment results." I suspect Cal wished he had been silent on this one. But this was the initial "analysis" of rising consumer price inflation this past spring. Inflation went up because the price of this or that item in a price index went up. This is merely a description of an increase in price inflation.

    Then soon we had new definitions of "core" inflation such as all items excluding the prices of food, energy and used cars. In other words, if we exclude items with rising prices, higher inflation rates vanish. In December 2021 energy prices have fallen, which likely will moderate the rate of increase in consumer price indices. I wonder if a new "core" definition will be trotted out, this one including energy prices but excluding shelter costs.

    In my opinion, the concept of "core" inflation has done a lot to discredit economists. Fed Chairman Arthur Burns is responsible for its inception. In 1973, the global economy suffered two negative supply shocks – the failure of anchovies to show up off the coast of Peru, which indirectly caused a sharp increase in animal protein prices, and OPEC's decision to cut oil production. Chairman Burns asserted that the increases in food and energy prices were not caused by his management of monetary policy. He was right about food prices; not so much about energy prices. In August 1971 the Nixon administration discarded the 1944 Bretton Woods international monetary arrangement whereby the US dollar was fixed to gold at a price of $35 an ounce and other foreign currencies were tied to the US dollar at fixed rates. So, an era of floating exchange rates was entered into after August 1971. Leading up to and after the 1971 Nixon "shock", Burns oversaw an explosion in the growth of thin-air credit (the blue bars in Chart 1). The foreign exchange value of the US dollar collapsed after the Nixon "shock", as illustrated in Chart 1 by the decline in the US dollar vs. the German D-mark (the red line). What does this have to do with the price of oil? OPEC was receiving US dollars for its sales of oil, US dollars that were declining in terms of purchasing power. In an attempt to restore the purchasing power for the US dollars it was receiving for its oil sales, OPEC raised the US dollar price of their oil by cutting production. And, oh yes, there was the matter of a war between Israel on one side, Egypt and Syria on the other side in October 1973, after which OPEC imposed an embargo on oil sales to countries viewed as Israeli allies. Whether the Yom Kippur War was the real reason for the OPEC embargo or just convenient cover for the action could be debated, as I am sure it will be in comments to this epistle. Why not? ‘Tis the season to air one's grievances.

  • I know that I have said that "it is different this time" are the five most dangerous words in economic forecasting. But, this most recent recession and recovery are different from the preceding cycle. Qualitatively this current cycle [...]

  • In April, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by 0.8% driven, in part, by the 10% (not annualized) increase in the price of used cars and trucks. Although the relative importance of used cars and trucks in the CPI is a low 3%, [...]

  • The future course of consumer price inflation has been a hot topic of discussion in the financial media of late. On the one hand, there some analysts, myself included, who believe that higher inflation is on the way, and not just a [...]

  • While I was still trying to "process", as the kids say, the events that took place the Wednesday before, on January 13, the Treasury released its December 2020 budgetary data. In the Calendar Year (CY) 2020, the federal government ran [...]

  • While I was still trying to “process”, as the kids say, the events that took place the Wednesday before, on January 13, the Treasury released its December 2020 budgetary data. In the Calendar Year (CY) 2020, the federal government ran [...]

  • It is almost December 23rd and that means that Festivus is almost upon us. It is traditional on Festivus to air one's grievances. And this Festivus, I got a lot of problems with you people. My problems with you include the so-called [...]

  • It is almost December 23rd and that means that Festivus is almost upon us. It is traditional on Festivus to air one's grievances. And this Festivus, I got a lot of problems with you people. My problems with you include the so-called [...]