Viewpoints

State labor markets in December remained in similar patterns to recent months. The vast majority of states reported statistically insignificant increases in payrolls from November; Missouri and Texas were the only ones showing significant gains. A few states reported insignificant drops.

Eight states had statistically significant changes in their unemployment rates—two down and six up. None of these changes were larger than .2 percentage point. The highest unemployment rates were in Nevada (5.7%), DC (5.5%), California (5.5%), Illinois (5.2%), and Kentucky (5.2%) The number of state with unemployment rates under 3.0% declined, with Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont remaining in that category. South Dakota’s 1.9% was the lowest in the nation.

Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate was unchanged at 5.4%, while the island’s job count was essentially stable (the point estimate fell by 100).

With price stability as a key mandate, the Federal Reserve bears a significant responsibility to guarantee that the targeted price statistics accurately reflect people's experiences and are not influenced by political or statistical manipulation. However, the Fed's price targeting regime has become misleading and unbalanced since the price measure it targets has become less relevant to "actual" inflation. The Fed nowadays lacks a "Greenspan," or an individual who is both an expert in economic statistics and methodology and possesses the political power and influence to challenge the accuracy of published statistics or request their review. The matter of accurate price measurement is not just academic; it has real economic and financial effects.

Years ago, the Price Statistic Review Committee (PSRC), a group of academics, economists and statisticians, stated that, “If a satisfactory rent index for units comparable to those that are owner-occupied can be developed" then the committee recommends that BLS to use this approach for house prices and related expenses.

The General Accounting Office (GAO), which released a comprehensive report on how housing costs are measured in inflation metrics, made a similar suggestion. The GAO stated, "Most owner-occupied housing units differ significantly from many rental units. To apply rental equivalence in the CPI, a sufficient number of rental units must be identified that are comparable to owner-occupied units in terms of size, location, and quality, allowing the BLS to create a sample that accurately reflects owner-occupied houses."

In 1983, based on recommendations from the PSRC, GAO and others, the Bureau of Labor Statistics introduced the owners' rental equivalence method to estimate housing costs of owner-occupied homes. This estimation procedure continued until 1998, when the BLS announced that it had to discontinue the owner-sample due to an insufficient sample of owner-housing units. Moving forward, they decided to link the rent estimates for owners' rent to the other rent series. Neither the PSRC nor the GAO provided any comments.

The owners-occupied rent series constitutes roughly fifteen percent of the Fed's preferred price target, the personal consumption expenditure deflator (PCE). Combined with the thirty percent of the PCE that individuals do not buy, nearly half of the PCE deflator reflects an inflation rate derived from administered and non-market prices or imputations. How can this be regarded as a reliable or accurate measure of actual inflation people experience?

Price data should represent "actual" inflation, not a statistical distortion. Considering its essential role in shaping both monetary and fiscal policy, it is crucial for the price data to be accurate, relevant, and objective. The general public benefits from "actual" sustainable low inflation. But who gains when inflation might be understated, or its cyclical fluctuations are dampened or eliminated due to a new statistical method?

Over the past sixteen years, from 1998 to 2024, the average S&P 500 P/E ratio was 26.7. In contrast, during the preceding fifteen years, from 1983 to 1998, it averaged 15. Is this just a coincidence, or could the alteration in inflation estimation for housing costs, combined with the Fed's emphasis on an inflation measure representing only half of the actual inflation rate experienced by people, partly explain this shift? This misleading measure of inflation and policy approach has led to maintaining official rates lower than they might have been otherwise, which benefit finance, especially equity investments.

According to history, "Washington" is unlikely to change it frameworks (price and policy) unless another crisis occurs. The financial press could increase public awareness of this issue, but it has not done so yet. As long as the existing price and policy frameworks remain in place, finance benefits while "Joe Six Pack" loses ground to "actual" inflation.

The persistently stronger growth of the U.S. economy relative to most other advanced nations has been the driving factor that has resulted in a stronger stock market with higher valuations, higher interest rates and a strong US dollar. A handful of charts highlight the sizable differences in economic and financial market performance across nations. Nothing is permanent, and things—particularly shifts in economic policies--can initiate sizable changes in trends. As we assess shifts in economic policies and central bank monetary policies, it’s important to keep in mind the economic fundamentals that drive financial markets.

Real growth comparisons. Chart 1 shows the cumulative percent change in real GDP since 2000 in the U.S., UK, Europe and Japan. In general, the faster growth in the U.S. reflects a combination of healthier gains in labor force and productivity. Real GDP growth in the UK matched the U.S.’s pace from 2000-2008, while Europe nearly kept pace, benefiting from the boom in global trade fueled by the China super-cycle. While the decade following the Great Financial Crisis was lackluster in the U.S., it was markedly slower elsewhere, particularly in Europe, which was hampered with ongoing financial crises during 2010-2014.

Chart 2 shows the same data but indexes real GDP to 2019Q4, which highlights the U.S.’s continued healthy growth following the pandemic-related contraction in the first half of 2020, while growth in Japan, the UK and Europe has been particularly weak. The persistent outperformance of the U.S. economy is sizable.

Has the traditional business cycle become obsolete? Not entirely, but major substantial changes in monetary policies and in the methods for calculating price measurement statistics, have altered the manner in which business cycles end. Business cycles consist of two components: an economic cycle and a financial cycle. Changes in policy and price measurement have shifted the pressures and excesses of the business cycle from the economy to the financial sector. In other words, high P/E ratios have taken the place of high CPI figures.

What Causes the Ups and Downs of a Business Cycles?

Some analysts and academics argue that the traditional business cycle characterized by increasing inflation and interest rates that eventually leads to an end of the cycle no longer exists. This perspective is somewhat supported when comparing business cycles before 1990 with those after.

For instance, since 1990, every business cycle has concluded with relatively low headline and core inflation. In contrast, from 1960 to 1990, business cycles ended with inflation rates of at least 5%, sometimes reaching double digits, with official rates significantly exceeding reported inflation.

However, to assess whether the traditional business cycle is now obsolete, it is crucial to first ascertain if the expansion and recession phases are influenced by government fiscal and monetary policies, developments in financial markets, or an exogenous shock. (Note: The business cycle that ended in 2020 was initiated by an unforeseen event, the pandemic, unlike the recessions of 2000 and 2007. However, in all three instances, both headline and core inflation were relatively low).

Essentially, significant technological advancements and globalization from the mid-1990s and beyond have decreased business cycle volatility, limiting or postponing price pressures that previously would have arisen during a typical business cycle. However, there are other factors at work as well.

During the mid-1990s, the approach to conducting monetary policy shifted from focusing on money and credit growth to targeting real interest rates. Most financial market analysts, myself included, did not initially see this shift in monetary policy as a major transformation. However, it turned into one when the BLS altered its method of measuring consumer prices in 1998.

In the late 1990s, the BLS stopped surveying the owner-occupied housing market to estimate owners' equivalent rent and began using data from the primary rental market, despite the fact that these two housing markets are influenced by different factors and frequently exhibit significantly different supply and demand patterns. At the same time, non-housing financing costs were removed from the CPI, continuing the previous exclusion of housing financing costs in the 1980s.

At that time, participants in the financial market did not consider these changes in price measurement to be significant. However, they were extremely important. During the housing bubble of the early 2000s, while housing prices experienced double-digit increases, the CPI indicated housing cost increases of only 2% to 4%. If the BLS had not implemented the measurement changes in the late 1990s, reported inflation would have been easily double what was reported.

(Note: The BLS excluded housing prices from the CPI in 1983, but continued to survey owner-occupied housing to estimate the implied rent for homeowners, maintaining a direct connection between housing inflation and increases in owners' rent. This connection was severed with the measurement changes in 1998).

The removal of non-mortgage interest costs also had a big impact on reported inflation. A joint research project by economists from Harvard and MIT found that the CPI from 2021 to 2023 would have been twice as high if consumer financing costs for were still included in price measurement.

Still, altering the methods for measuring prices had notable economic and financial impacts. Indeed, the revised CPI measure exhibits significantly less cyclicality, leading the Fed to aim for lower nominal and real interest rates than it would have if the BLS had not made these adjustments. This has led to considerably higher P/E ratios since 2000.

Economic downturns can stem from asset markets, as shown by the stock market crashes in 2000 and 2007, followed by recessions. The S&P 500 is trading at 22 times the projected earnings for 2025, and even higher compared to free cash flow projections. Other market indicators, such as the price-to-sales ratio, are also exceptionally high.

Therefore, the equity market is susceptible, particularly to an additional increase in market interest rates. Historically, the risk of recession increases when the yield on the 10-year Treasury surpasses the growth in Nominal GDP. According to current figures, there is merely a positive spread of 20 basis points with GDP outpacing the yield on the 10-year Treasury. However, current yields might still be too high given the lofty levels of the equity market.

However, the primary threat to the equity market and the economy lies in the fiscal strategies of the new administration. With the existing budget approaching $2 trillion, it is not financially viable to make the 2017 tax cuts permanent, as they are estimated to cost $4 trillion over the next decade, along with introducing further federal tax cuts. Even if the new Administration succeeds in reducing federal spending, it will not be significant enough to offset both past and new tax cuts, resulting in a budget deficit as large or larger than the current one.

More than three decades ago, President Bill Clinton shifted from his new economic agenda, which featured a middle-class tax cut, to a deficit-reduction strategy in response to the threat of increasing interest rates. At that time, the US was dealing with projected budget deficits ranging from $300 to $400 billion, compared to today's deficits exceeding $2 trillion.

Should the Trump economic team ignore the lessons from 2000, 2007, or even 1993, there is a genuine risk of a significant increase in interest rates. Market interest rates have previously impacted the fiscal strategies of a new president, and they have the potential to do so again, if not, the risk of financial chaos will increase.

A soft landing has been achieved, and the world economy is in the expansion phase of the business cycle. There will be greater geopolitical and pollical stability. However it is important to understand the headwinds and tailwinds that will shape the global economy in 2025.

Household net worth, the value of all financial and nonfinancial assets net of all debt held by households and nonprofit organizations, reached an all-time high of $168.8 trillion in 2024Q3 (Chart 1). While GDP and its components that describe the flows of national expenditures and income receive the most attention from economic commentators and financial markets, the quarterly household net worth data collected and published by the Federal Reserve Board and Haver Analytics are nevertheless important. They are both a reflection of economic performance and a significant contributor to it.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state coincident indexes continued to be soft in November. In the one-month changes, Washington (likely aided by the end of the Boeing strike) led with a .62 percent gain, and Delaware and Montana had increases above .5 percent. On the other side, 18 states had declines declined, with Maine, Michigan, and Alabama all down close to .4 percent. Over the 3 months ending in November, 10 states were down, with Massachusetts and South Carolina clocking declines of nearly .7 percent. Delaware, Connecticut, and Missouri were each up more than 1 percent, with Delaware’s 1.27 percent increase the highest. Over the last 12 months, 5 states were down, and 9 others saw increases of less than 1 percent. South Carolina’s index was off by 1.52 percent. Connecticut had a 4.6 percent increase, Arizona rose 4.54 percent and Connecticut was up 4.7 percent, with 4 others up percent or more.

The independently estimated national estimates of growth over the last 3 months (.55 percent) and 12 months were .70 and 2.64 percent. These both appear to be roughly in line with the state numbers.

State real GDP growth rates in 2024:3 ranged from North Dakota’s -2.3% to Arkansas’s 6.9%. A large distribution of growth in agriculture output played an important role in distributing growth across the states, with farm losses hurting states in the Great Plains, while boosting output in some others, most notably Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Vermont. Growth was more evenly distributed in less agricultural states; among the largest Texas was on the high side, with a 4.2% growth rate, while New York lagged with a 1.8% figure.

The distribution of personal income was comparable to that of GDP, with North Dakota’s -0.7% rate of decline at the bottom and Arkansas’s 5.4% on top. Again, developments on the farms contributed to the outliers. Dividends, rent, and interest fell in every state (and DC), while the dispersion in transfer income was fairly modest, though the aggregate income figures for New York, California, and Texas were all aided by faster-than average growth in this category.