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Haver Analytics

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The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state coincident indexes were again soft in October.. In the one-month changes, South Dakota led with a .67 percent gain, and Connecticut, Ohio, and Delaware had increases above .5 percent. However, the indexes for 13 states declined, with South Carolina and Michigan both down .4 percent (Michigan saw some pronounced retrenchment in autos, and South Carolina would have been hit by the Boeing strike). Over the 3 months ending in September, 12 states were down, with South Carolina (down 1.4 percent) and Massachusetts (off 1.1 percent) once again at the bottom. Connecticut was yet again at the top, with a 1.7 percent increase, with Over the last 12 months, 3 states were down, and 10 saw increases of less than 1 percent. South Carolina’s index was off by 1.2 percent. Arizona had a 4.9 percent increase, and Connecticut was up 4.7 percent, with 7 others up more than 3 percent.

The independently estimated national estimates of growth over the last 3 months (.55 percent) and 12 months (2.55 percent) appear to be roughly in line with the state numbers.

State labor markets were little-changed in October. The Boeing strike, and Hurricane Milton, triggered statistically significant declines in payrolls in Washington and Florida. There were no other statistically significant changes, not even in North Carolina (which did have a insignificant drop). Nonetheless, the sum of payroll changes across the states was -76,400, a clear amount lower than the independent national change of 12,000.

Three states had statistically significant declines in their unemployment rates in October, and one showed an increase. None of the changes were larger than .2 percentage point. The highest unemployment rates were in DC (5.7%), Nevada (5.7%), California (5.4%), and Illinois (5.3%). No other state had rates as much as a point higher than the national 4.1%. Alabama, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin had rates of 3.0% or lower, with South Dakota at 1.9%.

Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate dropped to 5.4%--lower than both DC and Nevada, and matching California--while the island’s job count grew by 2,300.

The new administration intends to pursue an unconventional fiscal strategy. A key aspect of the strategy involves reducing or abolishing non-defense government agencies in order to create fiscal space to make the current tax law permanent, lower taxes even more, and generate extra revenue through an extensive and significant tariff program.

The success of the fiscal policy of the new administration will depend on the reaction of the bond market, which has historically influenced policy changes. Three decades ago, Bill Clinton pledged a stimulus package if he won the election, but upon taking office, he had to shift towards a "financial market strategy" instead. Stimulus spending was abandoned in favor of a deficit reduction plan to prevent long-term interest rates from increasing. Given the imbalance in the federal budget is much larger today, it is crucial for policy decisions to take into account the bond market's reaction, raising the question whether policymakers will heed the advice as they did in 1993.

The odds are in favor of the opposite happening, as the new administration is not inclined to give in to the pressures of the bond market. If bond yields jump sharply, the administration might urge the Fed to intervene, potentially worsening the situation.

The Federal Budget

In the fiscal year 2024, total federal spending reached $6.75 trillion, resulting in a budget deficit of $1.83 trillion. Currently, defense budget and social programs are deemed off-limits, as are interest payments. This shifts the attention towards cutting expenses in non-defense discretionary spending.

During the fiscal year 2024, non-defense discretionary spending amounted to approximately $950 billion. Although non-defense spending had stayed stable in nominal values between 2010 and 2019, it surged in 2020 as a result of economic recovery initiatives through additional legislation. Nevertheless, there is a pattern of downward trend in non-defense expenditure even prior to the upcoming Congressional term, with forecasts indicating a decline to 2.5% of GDP over the next ten years as per the Congressional Budget Office. The smallest proportion of such outlays in the past five decades was 3.1%.

Although additional spending cuts may still occur, the meager budget share allocated to these programs indicates that the extent of budget savings is significantly smaller than advertised. Below are some more reasons why significantly cutting non-defense discretionary spending will pose political challenges.

With a budget of $238 billion, the Department of Education provides support to almost 100,000 public schools through its programs.

With a budget of $106 billion, the Department of Commerce supports research and development in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence.

With a budget of $460 billion, the Department of Agriculture funds many projects in rural communities, including housing, community facilities, and utilities.

With a budget of $275 billion, the Department of Transportation makes billions of dollars in grants to improve and upgrade all types transportation systems.

Non-defense federal spending plays a critical role in the economy by offering assistance to businesses of different scales and types, along with state and local governments and individuals. This does not imply approval of the Federal budget or its spending preferences, but rather recognizing essential elements concerning federal spending and its economic influence.

Furthermore, handling the distributional effects of significantly reducing non=-defense spending will pose significant controversy and implementation challenges. For example, states in the northeast pay more in federal taxes than they receive in federal spending, while various states in the south, as well as a few in the mid-west and southwest, receive more assistance than they contribute in taxes. This raises the question of whether politicians from states receiving the most aid will support legislation that significantly reduces the assistance provided to their constituents. Every state listed that gets more in federal assistance than they pay in taxes voted for the new administration.

Extending the 2017 tax cuts adds another layer of complexity to the new administrations fiscal plan. The Congressional Budget Office projects that prolonging these tax cuts could result in a $4.6 trillion increase in the deficit over the next ten years. To counterbalance this, Congress would need to enact spending cuts averaging more than $450 billion a year, affecting almost half of non-defense spending. Moreover, there are discussions about proposing further reductions in federal taxes.

Implementing a comprehensive and substantial tariff program could lead to increased revenue. However, the effectiveness of this strategy is uncertain, as it relies on the assumption that foreign trade partners will not retaliate. Additionally, foreign entities play a crucial role in aiding the US in meeting its federal borrowing needs, hence implementing a tariff strategy is like informing your creditor that you intend to cease transactions with them but expect them not to demand repayment of your loans.

The tariff plan could potentially create complications for both the economy and the bond market. Significant risks include the possibility of higher consumer inflation, which may raise the expenses of social programs (such as inflation indexation) and widen the budget deficit. Additionally, it could lead to higher interest rates, affecting policy rates accordingly.

The new administration has expressed interest in influencing the Federal Reserve's interest rate decisions and has even proposed replacing the Fed Chair before his term expires in 2026. Unlike other government agencies that report directly to the President, the Federal Reserve is an independent agency accountable to Congress. Altering the Fed's independence would require legislative action, potentially causing disruption in the financial markets. The odds of changing the status of the Fed is minimal, but that does not mean the new administration will not publicly expressing its views, which pose challenges for the Fed and confusion (volatility) in the financial markets.

The new administration faces a specific challenge when it comes to dealing with the bond market, particularly due to the fact that it is commencing with an excessively large budget deficit that is forecasted to grow over the next decade. The sheer size of the bond market renders it impervious to being swayed solely through rhetoric or public persuasion. Irrespective of the new administration's declarations or viewpoints, the bond market will express its position on fiscal policy. Three decades ago, the Clinton administration changed direction when the bond market rejected a stimulative fiscal plan. If the new administration's fiscal strategy indicates larger budget deficits and increased inflation, the bond market's rejection will be more significant than that of 1993.

More Commentaries

  • Regardless of who was going to become the next US President, Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, US debt is headed one way and that is up, it is only a question of magnitude. It is not just the US, globally public debt is rising, led by advanced countries and China. World public debt is forecast to exceed US$100trn in 2024, of which 35% will be accounted for by the US and 100% of GDP 2030 according to IMF forecasts (Figure 1).

  • On Sunday, October 27, 2024, Elon Musk claimed that he could find at least $2 trillion of potential spending reductions in the federal budget if Donald Trump were elected in the upcoming November 5, 2024 presidential election. I assume he could find the same magnitude of budget cuts if Donald Trump were not elected. Well, if Musk can return a rocket to its launch pad, why wouldn’t we expect him to identify $2 trillion in federal budget cuts? After all, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, federal net outlays were $6.75 trillion. Surely, Musk could identify $2 trillion of “fat” to trim. Or could he?

    Shown in the Chart below are net federal outlays in FY 2024 minus net outlays for national defense, interest payments on the public debt, Social Security, Medicare and veterans’ benefits/services. The amount remaining of net federal budget outlays after these subtractions is $2.3 trillion. That’s $2.3 billion for Medicaid, SNAP (food stamps), civilian retirement, earned income tax credits and the operating /capital costs of nondefense federal departments, including, but not restricted to, Justice, Agriculture and Transportation. So, if Musk had been able to identify $2 trillion of cuts in FY 2024 federal outlays, net of defense, interest, Social Security, Medicare and veterans’ benefits/services, that would have left him with $300 billion to fund the rest of federal outlays. Would you want to fly on commercial airlines knowing that airline regulations might not be enforced? You might want to start growing your own vegetables and raising your own animal protein, because the FDA might not be able to inspect food. Those Venezuelan gangs might be taking over more towns because of a lack of FBI agents to stop them. You get the picture. Unless Musk is going to cut spending on defense, interest, Social Security, Medicare, and veterans’ benefits/services, cutting $2 trillion from federal outlays would not leave enough to fund the rest of the government adequately. And if Musk, as part of a Trump administration, were to cut Social Security, Medicare and veterans’ benefits, the Democrats would likely win large majorities in the House and Senate after the 2026 midterms. So, although Musk can return a rocket to its launch pad, I don’t think he can cut $2 trillion from federal outlays in one year without causing severe political problems for a Trump administration.

  • The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state coincident indexes in September remained soft. Connecticut was, yet again, on top, with a fairly modest .57 percent increase. New Hampshire was the only other state up more than .5 percent. 11 states saw declines, with Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Montana all down .29 percent. Over the 3 months ending in September, 14 states were down, with Massachusetts dropping 1.9 percent, while South Carolina was also down more than 1 percent. The odd New England pattern was ongoing, with Connecticut was on top with an increase of 1.95 and New Hampshire rising more than 1 percent. Over the last 12 months, 3 states were down, Ohio was flat, and another 8 saw increases of less than 1 percent. Rhode Island’s index was off by .6 percent. Arizona had a 4.99 percent increase, and Connecticut, New Hampshire, Idaho, Texas, and Utah had gains of more than 3 percent (Maine was up 2.98 percent—there certainly has been some odd variation in New England).

    The independently estimated national estimates of growth over the last 3 months (.7 percent) and 12 months (2.8 percent) appear to be roughly in line with the state numbers.

  • State labor markets were a bit firmer in September than in other recent months. Five states, plus DC, saw statistically significant increases in payrolls. New Jersey had the largest absolute gain (19,200), while Idaho saw a .7 percent increase (Texas reported an increase of more than 29,000, but this was seen as not statistically different from zero; the gain was only about .2 percent).

    Five states had statistically significant increases in their unemployment rates in September, and one (yet again Connecticut) showed a decline. None of the increases were larger than .2 percentage point. The highest unemployment rates were in DC (5.7%), Nevada (5.6%), California (5.3%), and Illinois (5.3%). No other state had rates as much as a point higher than the national 4.1%. Alabama, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin had rates of 3.0% or lower, with South Dakota at 2.0%.

    Puerto Rico’s unemployment rate dipped to 5.6%--very unusually, matching Nevada and a touch below DC--while the island’s job count grew by 3,600.

  • India’s economy is rebounding, with the business cycle upswing becoming more pronounced and widespread. Although GDP growth slowed slightly in the second quarter, moderating to 1.1% quarter-on-quarter (QoQ) from 1.3% QoQ, this was largely due to a contraction in government spending, inventories, and exports. Importantly, both consumption and investment spending grew robustly, marking the fastest pace since late 2021 and early 2022, respectively. Leading indicators remain positive, and the economic fundamentals are supportive of continued growth.

    The corporate profit cycle is in full swing, with company balance sheets in rude health, positioning businesses to increase investment. Corporate debt-to-equity ratios have declined significantly, and corporate debt as a percentage of GDP is well below global averages. Consequently, the debt service-to-equity ratio is now below the 2007-2023 average, and the interest coverage ratio remains stable—44x for IT, 7.5x for manufacturing, and 1.7x for non-IT services. Infrastructure companies, buoyed by optimism, are increasing their spending, according to the RBI’s Q1 FY24/25 Services and Infrastructure Outlook Survey. Capacity utilisation is tight, and order backlogs are rising. Additionally, monthly data shows upward trends in the capital goods sector and the eight-core industry infrastructure index.

    Public sector banks, which dominate the financial sector, have never been stronger. Non-performing loans (NPLs) are at a 12-year low due to a sustained reduction in new NPLs and higher write-offs. Provisioning levels are at their highest since 2007, and asset quality among large borrowers continues to improve. The sector is well-capitalised, with average capital adequacy ratios of 16.8%, comfortably above the RBI’s 11% regulatory minimum. Private credit is growing at double-digit rates, with strong borrowing demand across industries, services, small and medium enterprises, large corporations, mortgages, and big-ticket consumer goods.

  • Living in a “swing” state, I am bombarded with political television ads. The GOP ads blame the 2021-2022 surge in inflation on Bidenomics and, by association, Harrisomics. A number of the elements of Bidenomics increased the federal budget deficit. But I will argue that federal budgetary deficits do not cause higher inflation. Rather, the actions of the Federal Reserve and the depository institution system cause higher sustained inflation rates by their combined ability to create credit figuratively out of thin air. The Federal Reserve and the depository institution system are, in effect, legal counterfeiters, i.e., they have the unique ability to create credit, figuratively, out of thin air. (Thin-air credit here will be defined as the sum of the Federal Reserve liability items, reserve deposits and vault cash of the depository institution system, currency held by the non-depository institution system, and the sum of depository institution system items, debt securities and loans. (An equivalent definition of thin-air credit is the monetary base, created by the Federal Reserve plus credit created by the depository institution system.) When credit is created out of thin air, the recipients of this credit are able to increase their spending without necessitating any other entity to reduce its spending. With some exceptions, when an entity other than the Fed/depository institution system lends to another, the lender reduces its current spending, transferring spending power to the borrower. This is called saving on the part of the lender.

    Let us look at some data relating net federal borrowing as a percent of nominal GDP versus thin-air credit growth to goods/services price inflation. The inflation measure I will use in this analysis is the chain-price index for Gross Domestic Purchases. This inflation measure includes the prices of personal consumption expenditures, business expenditures, residential real estate services expenditures and government expenditures on goods/services. It excludes the prices of US goods/services exports. I have tested lead-lag relationships between net federal borrowing and inflation and thin-air credit growth and inflation. For both variables, the highest correlation coefficients occur when both net federal borrowing and thin-air credit growth lead inflation by two years. So, this year’s inflation rate is most highly correlated with net federal borrowing and/or thin-air credit growth two years prior.

    If federal government net borrowing influences inflation, we would expect a negative correlation between the two series. And that is what we observe in Chart 1. The correlation coefficient between the two series is negative 0.14. Although the correlation coefficient has the correct sign, the absolute value of its magnitude, 0.14, is low, suggesting that there is not much association between the two series.

  • State real GDP growth rates in 2024:2 ranged from Alaska’s -1.1% to Idaho’s 5.9%. There was an odd distribution of agricultural output growth, with pronounced gains in Vermont, Wisconsin, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Wyoming, but sharp losses in North Dakota, Arkansas, and Mississippi. Elsewhere, New York’s numbers were swelled substantially by a surge in finance. The industrial Midwest benefitted by increases in durable goods output. As expected, Pennsylvania has become the sixth state with an annual rate of nominal GDP above $1 trillion (with the annual revisions, the Keystone state went above that mark in the first quarter). California’s GDP is now estimated to be higher than $4 trillion, at an annual rate. The five currently above that threshold are California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois; Ohio is the only other state with nominal GDP above $900 billion; New Jersey, Georgia, North Carolina and Washington are above the $800 billion mark.

    Idaho also led in personal income growth, with an 8.3% rate of increase. North Dakota was last at 2.1%. The above-noted distribution of agricultural output growth also appeared in the income numbers, with the indicated high farm output growth states seeing important growth in farm income, and the others unusually large declines in income from that sector. Transfer income growth was, as usual, dispersed, but probably less so than has usually been the cast; a drop in Massachusetts, virtually no change in Texas, and double-digit growth rates in Iowa, South Dakota, and California being of some note.

  • The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state coincident indexes in August were again soft. Connecticut continued to be on top, but its relatively modest .6 percent increase was the only state’s above .5 percent. 24 states saw declines, with Massachusetts and South Carolina down by more than .5 percent. Over the 3 months ending in July, 15 states were down, with Massachusetts dropping 2.1 percent, while South Carolina and Michigan were also down more than 1 percent. Repeating the odd New England pattern, Connecticut was on top with an increase of 2.4 percent, while Alabama and Oregon rose more than 1 percent. Over the last 12 months, 5 states were down, and another 8 saw increases of less than 1 percent. Rhode Island’s index was down 1.6 percent. Arizona had a 4.8 percent increase, and Texas, Idaho, Utah and Connecticut had gains of more than 3 percent (and Nevada was up 2.99 percent).

    The independently estimated national estimate of growth over the last 3 months (.6 percent) and 12 months result (2.7 percent) both appear to be roughly in line with the state numbers.