Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Economy in Brief

  • ISM Mfg. PMI at 52.7 in Apr. and Mar.; fourth consecutive month of expansion.
  • Production (53.4) expands for the sixth straight mth.; new orders (54.1) for the fourth successive mth.
  • Employment (46.4) contracts for the 31st straight mth.; at a four-month low.
  • Prices Index (84.6) highest since Apr. ’22; prices rising for the 19th consecutive mth.
  • Exports (47.9) contract; imports (50.3) still grow but at a three-month low.

More Commentaries

  • Unemployment rates are stable near all-time lows for EMU Unemployment rates in the European Monetary Union (EMU) continued to hover at the lowest level. The EMU all-time low unemployment rate is 6.2%, and that’s the number reported for March. There have been five of these 6.2% unemployment rates monthly in the history of the monetary union.

    Unemployment rates in March saw declines in five of the 12 early reporting countries: the Netherlands, Italy, Finland, Belgium, and Austria. Over the last three months, there were net declines in the unemployment rates in four countries, while year-over-year once again four countries—though a different four—showed declines in the unemployment rate.

    Unemployment rates, evaluated relative to their historic standings, have a median rank standing in their 33.6 percentile. That is the median unemployment rank among these 12 countries; it shows that the unemployment rate is in the lower one-third of its historic rank. Among the 12 early reporting countries, only three failed to have unemployment rate rankings below their 30th percentile; those three are Austria with a 71.3 percentile ranking, Finland with an 80th percentile ranking, and Luxembourg with a 98.8 percentile ranking. So, there are three countries among these 12 that have relatively high unemployment rates compared to their histories, whereas the rest of the reporters have unemployment rates below their respective 30th percentiles.

    • Data for both February and March were included in today’s report to catch up from delays due to the federal government shutdown last October.
    • Starts fell 3.0% m/m in February but rebounded 10.8% m/m in March.
    • The 7.2% q/q increase in Q1 was the largest quarterly gain since the economy reopened after the pandemic shutdown in 2020.
    • In contrast, permits jumped 11.0% m/m in February but fell 10.8% m/m in March and were up only 1.0% q/q in Q1.
    • March headline orders +0.8% m/m, first increase in four mths.; +0.8% y/y, lowest since Dec. ’24.
    • Defense aircraft & parts +16.9% m/m following February’s +0.5%.
    • Transportation orders +0.8%, first m/m rise since Nov.; orders ex transp. +0.9%, 11th straight m/m increase.
    • Core capital goods shipments +1.2%, sixth m/m gain in seven mths., pointing to a solid contribution to Q1’26 GDP from business equipt. spending.
    • Durable goods shipments +0.7%; unfilled orders +0.1%; inventories +0.2%.
    • Applications for loans to purchase rose, while applications for loan refinancing declined in the latest week.
    • Interest rate on 30-year fixed-rate loans rose 1bps to 6.54%.
    • Average loan size edged up.
  • Globally, money supplies are accelerating. Three- and six-month money growth rates equal or exceed the year-on-year pace everywhere, and the 12-month growth rates accelerate over the recent 12 months compared to the 12-month pace of one year ago—except for the United Kingdom, where data lag by one month. This deviation may amount to the lack of topicality since money, credit, and inflation all are caught in an updraft prompted by rising oil prices. The oil price (Brent) is up at a 468% annual rate over three months, and over 12 months the oil price is up by 31.7%, compared to a 5.5% rise over 12 months one-year ago.

    Rising oil prices do NOT create inflation Now we all know that rising oil prices do not create inflation. So, thankfully, the 468% rise in oil prices is not driving up the inflation rate. But unfortunately, it is helping to drive up the price level. So, we are drawing a distinction between the price level and the inflation rate.

    The year-over-year change in a price metric, like the CPI, is just that: the year-on-year gain. We often refer to this as ‘THE’ inflation rate. But that is only if the price level was at—and continued to rise at (about)—that same pace. Inflation is an ongoing rise in the price level. No one in their right mind thinks oil prices are going to rise by 468% year-over-year persistently. But of course, oil is a cost to producers and a price to consumers. It is a price that must be paid and cost that must be borne. The question is how much this bump-up in oil prices will contribute to the prices of the items we track in our various national price indexes in the future. Here I will refer to the CPI as the price index. And then we ask if that one-time rise in the relative price of oil will continue to bump up prices by the same amount month-after-month in the future. If it is, it is creating inflation. If not, it is creating a realignment of relative prices. The rise in relative prices is real. It may be painful to some and remunerative to others. The effects are complex.

    But the spike in oil prices is not inflation. Even though we are tracking an unknown price rise that is continuing to waffle, I will speak of it as though we know the ultimate rise and speak of that as a one-time surge.

    Expressed in this way, you should be able to see the oil price spurt as painful and as something that may be a temporary boost to inflation. If the price stays high, it will boost the price level based on the pass-through by commodity. After the oil price spurt, prices may be higher, but inflation will go back to ‘where it was.’

    But all that happens if and only if monetary policy does not accommodate—does not monetize—the rise in oil prices. Unfortunately, we see money supplies are accelerating. Central banks have stepped up their rate of printing money as oil prices have risen, in order to stabilize interest rates. Printing more money, or increasing the money stock faster, is inflationary.

    • Expectations improved slightly in April, but are still subdued relative to norms.
    • Moderately favorable view of current conditions.
    • February FHFA HPI 0.0% m/m; +1.7% y/y, lowest since Mar. ’12.
    • House prices down m/m in four of nine census divisions, led by Mountain (-1.1%); up in four, driven by South Atlantic (+0.6%); flat in East North Central.
    • House prices up y/y in six of nine regions, led by Middle Atlantic (+4.2%), but down in Mountain (-0.7%), Pacific (-0.4%), and West South Central (-0.1%).
  • Early PPI reports in the monetary union show collective pressures building over the past year, with newly emergent pressures popping up strongly in March.

    The sequence of monthly inflation observations for these five early reporters in March shows that inflation pressure has not been clearly building but did jump up suddenly in March. In February, before the Iran war, the median monthly PPI gain was -0.5%. In March, that jumped to +3.9% (median month-to-month gain). Monthly pressure does not show steady gains anywhere except moderately in Germany. Finland shows deceleration in progress (!) even through—especially through—March, as its PPI in March fell by 5.3%. But the whole Finish pattern is somewhat upside down, with prices up month-to-month by 6.2% in January and 2.9% in February. It is not a trend that is easy to understand.

    However, the March monthly gains are strong enough to drive sequential inflation higher from 12-months, to 6-months, to 3-months across all early-reporting countries. Even the German ex-energy index shows acceleration on that profile.

    On a year-on-year basis, two of the early reporters have PPI inflation below 2%. Finland has 12-month PPI inflation at 2.1%, but Italy and Spain have inflation much higher, up by 3.4% over 12 months in Spain and by 5.6% in Italy.

    The PPI has been very well-behaved in the last few years. Looking at 12-month changes for the year ended in March, the median change for this group in 2025 was -0.1%, compared to -4.6% in 2024.

    The chart shows the PPI flared sharply in 2021 and 2022, then fell quickly into line in 2023. Clearly, the inflation tune now is being called by oil prices, the same as for that spike prices in 2022 and 2023.

    The hope is that the oil price bump up will not be as long-lived, that the war will end soon, with the Strait of Hormuz reopened, and that oil prices—and other inflation pressures—will sink back to prerevision norms relatively quickly. That could happen, but so could other outcomes so markets remain wary. One problem this time is the destruction of oil facilities and the shutting of oil fields that could cause high prices to linger longer.