Economy in Brief

What Are Central Bankers Thinking about Inflation?

The focus on inflation and its implication for central bank policy has become a very widespread sport, especially now that inflation rates have declined substantially from their peak and have come much closer to central banks targets (2% all around). Lower inflation rates have taken some of the ‘air out of the inflation ball’ and the call-to-arms to maintain high rates. But that ball is still in-play and inflation is still excessive in most places, Germany, the EMU, the United States, the United Kingdom…just to name a few.

However, with elections on the boil in the U.K. and on the horizon in the U.S., decisions to change interest rates begin to leave the economic spectrum and enter the twilight-zone of the political world, one of very different dimensions. Or maybe we’ve reached the outer-limits…hard to tell.

The Bank of England met today and did not change rates with a 7-2 vote. But we are told three members were ‘on the fence.’ Had they shifted to a rate cut mode the vote to approve a cut would have gone 5-4 in favor. We are now told if things go as planned, an August cut is possible (likely, according to some). Many headlines about the BOE decision today note that the BOE did not cut rates even though inflation has been falling. Well, the data show roughly 2.9% headline inflation in the U.K.; core measures coalesce around 4.4% to 3.9%. These all are above target, but the financial press is not mindful of that. This is the sort of reporting that we have become used to in the U.S. as well.

Is all policy now derivative...or based on derivatives? Apparently, we have crossed some barrier and no longer live in a world where inflation levels or actual price levels matter! But changes matter. We live in derivative land! Biden supporters tout the drop of the inflation rate as do BOE-bashers. They neglect to mention that the level of inflation is still over target, and the rate of decline in inflation’s pace has slowed… or worse. No one is interested in targets anymore. In the U.S., where inflation has made prices high, people say yes, prices are high, but inflation is much lower- as though I can buy goods for the inflation rate instead of at the price level. Sheese…

What I see in progress in the U.S., the U.K., and the EMU is that policy decisions are longing to be made and looking for the right argument to justify them. This is not what should happen-this is backwards. Economics first, policy result, second. But economics has been captured by politics and the emerging view that no one ever need suffer if policy is just fine tuned correctly, as that great economist Steven Tyler wrote…’Dream on.’

Germany’s PPI dilemma So, the German case here with the PPI looks at an indicator but not the one with most skin in the game (the CPI/HICP). This is the PPI, a more volatile less comprehensive index. But we include in the table German CPI trends (CPI and CPI ex-energy) and see that inflation is above 2% and stuck sequentially. In any event, the ECB makes monetary policy for the Monetary Union and Germany is only a portion of that. But as the Union’s largest economy, what happens in Germany matters. And since Germany is not Las Vegas, what happens in Germany does not necessarily stay in Germany. The CPI is ‘stuck,’ and the PPI is accelerating.

German PPI inflation is transiting (overall and ex-energy) to higher inflation rates from 12-months to 6-months to 3-months. Will that sequence spread?

The German research house Zew has updated its monthly poll of members which shows little change in current conditions, some small improvement in still very-weak expectations, perceptions that inflation is still well corralled, and the view that lower rates in the US are more likely, while less likely in the Euro-Area (but still very likely everywhere!).

Macro conditions and expectations Zew experts see no change in the current situation in the Euro-Area in June, a small step back for Germany and a step back in the US. Still, US conditions have a queue standing of 54.5%, above their historic median while the Euro-Area’s weaker standing is at its 41.2 percentile, Germany is still viewed as much weaker with a 15.9 percentile standing in its current conditions metric. Expectations reverse those queue standings as Europe improves expectations slightly in the month to a 69.3 percentile standing, well above its historic median. The US marks a 4.5-point improvement month-to-month but still logs a net negative assessment and sports a below-median queue standing in its 37.8 percentile.

Inflation and interest rates Inflation expectations remain deeply negative as inflation is broadly and intensely viewed as not a problem. The queue standings for the inflation readings range from a 7.4 percentile standing low in the US to a ‘high’ standing at 15.9% in Germany- the EMU reading is below the German reading. Not surprisingly, interest rate expectations are broadly negative across short- and long-term rates. Expectations for lower US short term rates rose this month while for EMU expectations were reduced. Still, we are splitting hairs here with 5-percentile and 6-percentile standings for each of them- both extremely low. Long-term rate expectations follow the same pattern, with lower US rates expected- not so for EMU. Both queue standings are exceptionally low at a three-percentile standing for EMU and at a 0.8 percentile standing for the US. We simply have rarely seen expectations so weak for long-term yield reduction in either the US or EMU.

Stock market expectations show below-median values for all three areas: EMU, Germany, and the US. The US queue standing evaluation is the highest at a still below-median 40-percentile standing while Germany and the Euro-Area had standings in their ‘teens.’

The current situation in EMU and Germany has remained depressed since Ukraine invasion. Europe and Germany came out of Covid with the same initial vigor as the US, but then both suffered relapses as the Russian war on Ukraine emerged. The US regather momentum to work higher from mid-2022 while Germany and EMU have been unable to mount a sustainable reaction. Inflation expectations have gradually ‘risen’ from deeply negative values and remain still very weak at large negative values. There have been no significant changes to interest rates or inflation expectations, just very slow-moving changes.

With central banks moving rates slowly no one seems to be expecting anything to change abruptly anytime soon. Perhaps if there is a sharp change in the works it will come from some unexpected geopolitical event, but even the shock attack on Israel by Hamas and the Israeli response have had minor impact on markets and on economic expectations...so far.

The new data today from Japan are for orders and these are presented at the bottom of this table. Total orders fell by 3.6% in April with core orders (those being the series excludes large projects such as ships and electric power plants) falling by 2.9% month-to-month. Foreign demand was the only category that rose on the month, it was up by 21.6% but that's following the only decline from March when foreign orders fell by 9.4%. Domestic demand fell by 15.1% in April.

The ranking of the levels of the indices for orders are relatively high with core orders being the weakest at 85.8 percentile standing the rest having standings above the 90th percentile. However, over time and with inflation orders should grow so it might be more meaningful to look at the growth rank and on that basis core orders have a 44.8 percentile standing the growth rate rank, below its median - the median for ranking statistics occurs at the 50th percentile. However, in terms of growth rankings total orders, foreign demand, and domestic demand, all have standings from the mid-70th to low-80th percentiles which are quite solid metrics.

Beyond Orders Other metrics in the table also assess the performance of Japan's economy in various ways. The first block in the table considers the economy watchers’ index. These diffusion indices are largely below scores of 50, indicating contraction for these survey items. In terms of rankings, the growth ranking for the economy watcher components are all quite weak - all below their 28th percentile in terms of levels- and these are more meaningful since these are diffusion indices. Eating and drinking and service sector indices have standings above their 50th percentile, but the rest are below the 50th percentile indicating performance for these sectors below their respective historic medians.

The Teikoku surveys also employ diffusion indices. They are slightly weaker in their diffusion values than the economy watchers’ numbers. The rankings of the Teikoku diffusion indices in terms of index levels are all over the map, with manufacturing extremely weak, at a 35-percentile standing, and services at the other extreme, strong with an 80.7 percentile standing. In terms of the growth rankings all of them are weak with construction as high as a 38-percentile standing but after that nothing as high as a 32nd percentile standing.

The METI tertiary index moved up in April to 101.9 from 100 in March. It has an index standing at its 85th percentile and growth standing at its 66th percentile, both above their medians. For industry we use the industrial production index which dips in April compared to March. It has an index rank that's low at 6.8% and a growth rank that's only at 12.8%. The weakness in industrial production reinforces the weak reading we see on manufacturing in the Teikoku survey.

Japan's leading economic index in April ticks down slightly to 111.6 from a 111.7; that index has a ranking on its level at its 59th percentile and a growth ranking at its 74th percentile both mildly firm entries.

Against the background of the surveys in the table, the orders responses in April show standing growth rates and order index levels that seem relatively stronger than some of the responses from the surveys in the table above. However, there's little indication according to any metric in the table there's much strength in Japan's economy, in the manufacturing sector, or across the service sector entries. The far-right hand column simply looks at changes in the various indices from January of 2020 when COVID struck. Recognizing that these are changes over a four-year period, they indicate a good deal of weakness across the Japanese economy. Against that background the orders data have better responses than the surveys.

Still, the bottom line for Japan is that the economy is struggling, and the Bank of Japan is still trying to feel its way with policy being somewhat hesitant to raise rates too much despite excess of inflation because it's unsure whether the inflation is going to stay; the BOJ is still being very mindful of the long period of deflation it hopes it has put behind it. The sharp weakness in the yen that has developed this year is simply another policy challenge for the Bank of Japan and so far, this yen weakness has not particularly ignited either domestic growth or domestic inflation. But it has contributed to the increase in the price of energy and that has created some consumer distress.