- Index increase slightly to -4.7 but remained in negative territory for ninth consecutive month.
- Haver calculated ISM-type index also remained in contraction territory.
- New orders still negative while shipments were positive for third straight month.
- Employment indicators still weak.
by:Sandy Batten
|in:Economy in Brief
- USA| Aug 15 2024
Philly Fed Manufacturing Index Falls Markedly in August
- The headline index unexpectedly slumped to -7.0 in August from 13.9 in July.
- The first negative reading since January.
- However, the ISM PMI version calculated by Haver remained above 50 at 52.5.
- Employment fell to back below zero.
- Expectations also fell markedly.
by:Sandy Batten
|in:Economy in Brief
- USA| Aug 15 2024
U.S. Import and Export Prices Rose in July
- Slight rise in import prices led by jump in imported food prices.
- Imported fuel prices rose 0.5% after a 1.9% decline in June.
- Larger-than-expected increase in export prices due mostly to 2.2% surge in prices of exported industrial supplies.
by:Sandy Batten
|in:Economy in Brief
- USA| Aug 15 2024
U.S. Jobless Claims Ease by 7,000 in August 10 Week
- Initial claims 10,000 lower than forecast.
- Continuing claims down 7,000 in August 3 week.
- Insured unemployment rate maintains 1.2% amount.
The chart adequately depicts the economic condition in Japan. Japan’s quarterly GDP jumped to a gain of 3.1% in Q2 2024, but that was from the Q1 decline rate of -2.3%. Together there is marginal growth in the first half of the year.
Japan’s year-on-year growth rate shows the impact of these quarterly gyrations as the 3.1% annualized Q1 gain was not enough to boost year-on-year GDP growth to positive territory. Japan’s GDP continues on a declining year-over-year path.
Growth trends Japan’s quarter GDP series became exceptionally bumpy in and nearly trendless from 2021 on in the wake of the Covid disruption. GDP growth was positive with quarterly growth rates spiking as high as 4% and 5% but after Q1 2003 quarterly growth lost its zest; two of the past five quarterly growth rates have been negative. One has been about one quarter of one percentage point, with two other quarters in the 2.5% to 3% growth range. This pattern has produced a decaying year-on-year GDP growth rate pattern.
Quarterly growth Japan’s second quarter of 2004 produced a sharp reversal of weak private spending that fell 2.2% (annualized) in Q1 then rebounded at a 4% annual rate in Q2. However, there also has been four straight quarters of real private spending declines through Q1 2024. Public spending stepped back to gain just 0.3% annualized in Q2 after growing by 1.1% in Q1.
Spending on capital formation has been erratic. It fell at a 3.5% pace in Q1 then surged back at a 6.9% growth rate in Q2. However, recently in Q1 2023, the quarterly capital spending has been as strong as 9.0%. Still, in three of the last six quarters, there have been declines. Plant and equipment spending has evolved similarly. Housing spending rose at a sharp 6.7% annual rate in Q2 following a 10.1% annual rate drop in Q1 that was part of an ongoing three-quarter decline.
On the trade front, the balance of trade has been through some substantial gyrations, including two surpluses in the last six quarters. Exports rose by a solid 5.9% annualized in Q2 but only after a drop in Q1 at a 17.2% pace. Similarly imports rose at a pace of 7.1% compared to a Q1 drop at a 9.6% annual rate.
Domestic demand rose at a 3.5% annual rate in Q2 snapping a four-quarter declining streak.
Annual trends Year-on-year GDP growth has been fairly steadily slowing and has posted declines in each of the last two quarters. Private spending has been negative for four quarters running, but the weakness was trimmed in Q2. Public consumption rose year-on-year in Q2, and that was the first net gain in six quarters.
Gross fixed capital formation has been slow and slowing. Plant and equipment spending has been erratic around small gains and losses year-on-year. Housing spending has contracted year-on-year for the last three quarters.
The annual GDP net exports result has been a positive balance in four of the last five quarters but in Q2 that four-quarter change has turned negative. Exports have logged low positive growth until this quarter when the year-on-year growth rate posted at -0.2%. Imports have been declining over the previous four quarters but logged growth of 2.5% in Q2 2024 to break that string.
Domestic demand has been shrinking year-on-year for four quarters in a row. The tendency, however, has diminished; it produced a small 0.1% contraction in Q2.
- USA| Aug 14 2024
U.S. CPI Total & Core Prices Increase Modestly in July
- Services prices pick up m/m, driven by shelter.
- Core goods price decline is broad-based.
- Food prices rise modestly while energy costs are unchanged.
by:Tom Moeller
|in:Economy in Brief
- Mortgage loan applications jumped in the week ended August 9.
- Purchase applications edge higher while refinancing continues to surge.
- Interest rate on 30-year fixed-rate loan held steady at lower levels not seen since May 2023.
- United Kingdom| Aug 14 2024
U.K. Inflation Is Too High and Not Falling
Inflation in the U.K. measured by the CPIH rose by 0.3% in July after rising 0.3% in June; these two months reflect a step up from May’s increase of 0.1%. The CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco (core) rose by a sharp 0.5% in July after rising 0.3% in June and 0.2% in May. The pattern and path of the core inflation rate for the U.K. is much more stubborn and worse than for the headline (which, itself is high and stubborn). Nonetheless, in its last meeting, the Bank of England instituted a rate reduction amid split views among Monetary Policy Committee members. At the time, it was noted that the rate cut may turn out to be an isolated one, and it could be some time before the next reduction comes around. A number of members (MPCs) had thought it was premature to cut rates and you can clearly see why by looking at the level and trend for inflation now.
The BOE rate cut was criticized by some as having substantial political overtones and the same charge was made in Japan about its recent rate hike. Meanwhile, with presidential elections coming in the U.S., and inflation over the top of its target for over 40 months and running, the Fed has a policy that seems to be tilted toward producing rate cuts. While, so far, U.S. data seem to be ‘somewhat amenable’ towards that glide path, it still is not a locked-deal that the Fed is going to cut rates in September, although some people think so. Not only does the U.S. have a long period of inflation overshooting but both presidential candidates seem likely to further expand the already massive U.S. fiscal deficit. What exactly should Fed policy consider? Legacy misses? Prospective profligacy? Or short-term inflation that is behaving? Politics seemed to be intruding on monetary policy globally but also in response to very separate and individual national pressures. It’s ice cream everywhere, but in each country a different flavor of the month.
Sequentially headline U.K. inflation is up 3.1% over 12 months; it's up to a 3.2% annual rate over six months and steps down ever-so-slightly to a 2.9% annual rate over three months. The core rate, referred to above, is up by 4.1% over 12 months, accelerates to a 4.9% annual rate over six months, then steps back to a 4.1% annual rate over three months. The core rate is clearly an excessive rate of change, and the headline is certainly stubborn and possibly stuck at its current excessive pace.
Globally, economies have slowed in the wake of the recovery from the Covid recessions; governments are eager to try to either restore or to preserve growth quickly. The task of making monetary policy has been greatly complicated by having had COVID and having had strong responses from fiscal and monetary policy, a legacy that currently is in the late stages of producing lingering stimulus. The success of Covid stimulus in reviving growth has emboldened policy officials. In addition, as the Covid process was winding down, a war was started by Russia by invading Ukraine and that created a secondary inflation surge it has made policy more difficult. Of course, during this period, the U.K. was also undergoing a transition known as Brexit. This is just a little bit like taking all the colors on your palette and mixing them together and wondering what sort of wonderful result you'll get, and being disappointed that all you wind up with is muddy brown.
Inflation diffusion measures the breadth of inflation and shows that inflation is decelerating on a timeline in more places when it's below the 50% mark. Diffusion for the U.K. shows that monthly inflation from May to June to July, which had indicated deceleration was now transformed to acceleration as diffusion in July moved up to 54.5% after having approached the neutral 50% mark with a 45.5% reading in June. Sequential inflation, which compares inflation over three-months to six-months and over six-months to 12-months and over 12-months to the 12-months before, shows a tempered but rising trend. Over 12 months there was a significant deceleration of inflation with diffusion at only 18%, but that stepped up sharply to 63.6% over six months and this has since moderated to just below neutral for a reading of 45.5% over three months. This is not surprising since headline inflation in three-months compared to six-months is slightly weaker at 2.9%, down from 3.2%, and 3-month inflation for the core CPIH is down to 4.1% from 4.9%. So, the headline/core are pointed to some deceleration and having diffusion slightly below 50 suggests that most of the components are moving in that direction as well. That is good news. However, the movement, even though it's in the right direction, appears to be slow. Inflation is still quite stubborn at uncomfortably high levels. U.K. monetary policy is in a rough patch and seems likely to be there for a while.
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