This week, we examine the deepening divisions between the US and China, which are affecting not just trade but also investment flows, monetary policy, and technological development.
On the trade front, China has shifted from modest trade shares with its partners (chart 1) to capturing significantly larger shares across Asia, Africa, and Latin America (chart 2), while US progress in these regions has been more subdued. This signals a clear bifurcation, with China forging its own trading blocs, often at the expense of US market share. However, economies like Vietnam have managed to deepen trade ties with both countries (chart 3).
China’s efforts to strengthen relationships extend beyond trade to direct investment abroad (chart 4) and loan financing, particularly in Africa, where it has become a major investor in new projects. This has allowed China to cement a foothold in regions where US influence is limited. The bifurcation also extends to the monetary and currency space, with China gradually reducing its US Treasury holdings while increasing its gold reserves, possibly as part of a diversification push (chart 5). Concurrently, China’s push for de-dollarisation continues, despite significant hurdles.
Finally, US–China bifurcation is also playing out in the technological sector, where China has made significant advancements in critical areas, driven in part by substantial R&D investment over the years (chart 6). In response, US efforts to limit China’s access to key technologies may have inadvertently accelerated China’s development of its own systems and infrastructure, deepening the bifurcation further.
Shifts in China and US trade shares While economists may differ on when the broader US–China bifurcation began, many agree that the more significant phase of decoupling was triggered in 2018, when President Trump initiated the first wave of trade restrictions and tariffs against China during his first term. Prior to these sharp policy shifts—and before Trump took office—China’s share of total trade with several major global economies remained relatively modest, generally below 20%, as shown in chart 1. Similarly, the US also maintained a relatively balanced trade share with most partners, though its trade was more concentrated with neighbouring countries such as Canada and Mexico.