Haver Analytics
Haver Analytics

Economy in Brief

    • Gasoline prices strengthen.
    • Crude oil prices fall.
    • Natural gas costs rise.
  • Japan’s Economy Watchers Index saw its current and future indexes fall and indicated contraction in March. We can only imagine the knock-on effects of impending U.S. tariffs on these perceptions and expectations in the months ahead.

    As it stands, Japan’s economy watchers survey show month-to-month attitude deterioration in their diffusion responses up and down the line. For the current conditions survey, entries erode except for eating & drinking places, manufacturers, and services. For the future index, all the responses are weaker month-to-month except for housing, corporations, and manufacturers.

    In terms of percentile standings on survey responses from March 2004 to date, only one category in the current or future services, current manufacturers, has a reading above the 50% mark making it the lone response above its historic median on this timeline. It achieves this ‘milestone’ with a diffusion reading of 47.8, that nonetheless indicates contraction. Manufacturers also have the highest diffusion ranking in the future survey but at the below median 46.2 percentile mark; the topical diffusion reading of 47.4 indicates ongoing contraction.

    • Nonrevolving credit declines slightly.
    • Revolving credit edges up.
  • This week, we focus on the sweeping "reciprocal" US tariffs announced by President Trump last week. As shown in chart 1, these tariffs are primarily based on US trade deficits with its trading partners. This is in contrast to earlier indications that suggested other factors, such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, would also be considered. Using the tariff formula provided by the US Trade Representative, we derive the announced tariff rates. We also highlight the factors contributing to Vietnam’s relatively high "reciprocal" tariff rate, compared to other Asian economies such as Singapore (chart 2). However, we argue that focusing solely on trade deficits does not fully capture the trade dynamics between the US and its partners. The applied tariff rates of other economies should also be factored in (chart 3), especially in relation to trade with the US. Moreover, non-tariff trade barriers (chart 4) should also be considered, as tariffs and trade deficits alone may not provide a complete picture of trade dynamics. To present an alternate view, we introduce a “tariff scorecard”, which incorporates these factors and offers a perspective on how US "reciprocal" tariffs could have been applied (chart 5). Looking ahead, with the "reciprocal" tariffs already in place, we also discuss the initial and varying responses from Asian economies, considering their significant exposure to these tariffs (chart 6).

    US “reciprocal” tariffs Last week, US President Trump’s announcement of “reciprocal” tariffs caught many economists by surprise. While the tariffs themselves were anticipated, their scope and scale were far more severe than expected, contradicting much of the messaging leading up to the announcement. Prior statements—both before and during the unveiling of the tariffs—suggested that the "reciprocal" measures would account for various factors, including trade barriers (both tariff and non-tariff) and currency manipulation. However, the formula revealed by the US Trade Representative’s Office showed that the tariffs were simply based on the US trade deficit with other countries, as outlined in chart 1. This approach was far simpler than expected, relying solely on trade deficits without factoring in the other economic considerations. Also, many investors and observers were shocked by the announcement, as it contradicted earlier messaging that the tariffs would be “lenient.” Some had also expected bilateral negotiations with trading partners to influence the final tariff structure. Instead, the formula was purely based on the US trade deficit. Furthermore, even countries with low or no tariffs on US imports—or those with which the US runs a trade surplus (such as Singapore)—were still subjected to a 10% tariff floor.

    • Job strength is concentrated in three sectors.
    • Earnings growth trend decelerates.
    • Jobless rate is highest in four months.
  • Germany
    | Apr 04 2025

    German Orders Fall

    German orders came up flat in February after falling by 5.5% in January. It's been a turbulent period for orders. The January drop came after an increase of 5.6% in December, so orders have been chopping around the last few months and are not really going anywhere. Foreign orders rose 0.8% in February after falling 0.5% in January and being flat in December. Domestic orders fell 1.2% in February after falling by 12.1% in January but that had followed a 13.9% increase in December. Once again, there is a lot of volatility and little trend.

    The trend path for orders looking at 12-month, 6-month, and 3-month growth shows not much stirring. Total order orders fall 0.2% over 12 months; they rise at a 2.7% annual rate over six months and then fall at a 0.9% annual rate over three months.

    Foreign orders rose 0.1% over 12 months; they were up 1.9% at an annual rate over six months and they rose by 1.4% at an annual rate over three months. Foreign orders are showing some sustainable growth over three months and six months although they have very little to show for it over 12 months. Domestic orders fall by 0.9% over 12 months; they gain at a 3.5% annual rate over six months and then fall at a 4.3% annually over three months. Domestic orders display the same kind of volatility that we see in the headline overall and not the tendency toward creeping growth that we see looking at foreign orders. Moreover, the domestic series updates with a 3-month growth rate that's negative which is not encouraging. Real sales data show a small increase in February of 0.2% for manufacturing after falling 1.0% in January and rising 0.8% in December. The sequential growth rates hint at some improvement but not much with a 3% decline over 12 months, a 0.4% decline at an annual rate over six months and then a swing to positive growth at 0.4% at an annual rate over three months; this is creeping and good news, but it's very moderate growth.

    Industrial confidence measures for Germany, France, Italy, and Spain the four largest economies in the European Monetary Union, show a modest improvement from January to February in Germany and in France, unchanged conditions in Italy, compared to some slight slippage in Spain. Viewed sequentially, the industrial confidence data don't show much movement from 12-months to 6-months to 3-months for these countries; Germany and France get slightly weaker; Italy and Spain have even smaller moves although they also get slightly weaker. The rankings on the levels of these industrial confidence measures in February give us rankings that are below the 50% mark, putting them below their median for all four countries. The reading for Germany is the lowest with 5.9 percentile standings; the others have rankings between the 20th and 40th percentile on that timeline.

    The data on orders in real sales on a ranking basis we find overall orders and domestic orders are moderate-to-weak with an overall order of ranking in the 53rd percentile compared to a domestic ranking at the 25th percentile and foreign orders have a firm 71.5 percentile standing. These calculations are based on the levels of orders. Then expressed in terms of growth rates, these three orders metrics have rankings between their 36th and 40th percentiles putting them below their median growth rate for the period. Real sector sales, for manufacturing sales for example with a 48-percentile standing based upon the level of sales, logs a 19-percentile standing based upon the ranking of its year-over-year growth rate.

  • For some further views on the impact on the world economy of recent US tariff policies please see Liberating the Downside on our Viewpoints section.

    The return of protectionist trade policies under the new US administration had already added a significant layer of uncertainty to an already fragile global landscape. And this has now been dramatically amplified following the decision by the US administration to announce a sweeping package of tariffs on a broad range of imports from key trading partners—including the EU, China, and several emerging markets. These measures were more expansive in both scope and scale than markets had anticipated, and they carry the potential for significant global economic disruption—particularly if targeted trading partners respond with retaliatory countermeasures, escalating the risk of a full-scale trade conflict.

    The announcement has sent a fresh wave of volatility through financial markets. Equities in export-dependent economies have sold off sharply, while European capital goods manufacturers and global logistics firms saw their valuations marked down in anticipation of disrupted supply chains and rising input costs. Treasury yields have also declined on expectations of weaker investment and slower growth, while emerging market currencies came under pressure amid renewed concerns over capital outflows and global trade fragmentation.

    The impact on business sentiment and investment planning could be immediate. Firms with international exposure are likely reassessing capex plans and supply chain configurations, while some have accelerated domestic sourcing strategies in anticipation of longer-term decoupling. Early survey data suggest that capital expenditure intentions, particularly in globally integrated sectors, are already weakening—a signal that could weigh heavily on productivity and future potential output.

    Against this backdrop, central banks face a challenging policy recalibration. While disappointing US growth data had already tilted expectations toward monetary easing, the scale of trade disruption now adds an additional layer of urgency (charts 1 and 2). Economic forecasters broadly anticipate that most major central banks will lean further into rate cuts in the coming months to offset downside risks (chart 3). That view has gained further traction in Europe, where softer inflation prints (chart 4) have reinforced expectations of imminent ECB action. Meanwhile, more activist fiscal policies in Europe and China (chart 5) provide some offset to the gloom, though these too now face bigger headwinds in an increasingly fragmented trade landscape.

    Ultimately, the burden of adjustment is now falling most heavily on trade-dependent economies (chart 6). With the global system inching closer to bifurcation, the downside risks to growth, investment, and policy coordination are rising sharply. The next few months will test not only the resilience of the global economy but also the credibility of the policy frameworks designed to support it.

    • Goods deficit shrinks while services surplus falls.
    • Exports are double January’s increase; imports are roughly steady.
    • Energy product imports decline while crude oil prices stabilize.